[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [瑜伽師地論略纂](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829) › 13.12 # 瑜伽師地論略纂 13.12 瑜伽師地論略纂 13.12 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [13.12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.13.12) 論云「又六識身無覆無記異熟所攝類不可得，是第三因」者，言六識中雖有異熟，但一念生。或諸心間前後一類異熟生必不可得，前後一類異熟之性無有變易可能執持，是真異熟。今六識中異熟心但一念生，非無有間，既非一類，是異熟生，不得稱言而能執受。應立量云：六種轉識非真異熟生（宗），有間斷故（因），譬如風聲等（喻）。此量未明，應更別立之：六種轉識無覆無記異熟一類既不可得，不能執持身（宗），有間斷義故（因），喻等同前。或應立量云：六轉識中異熟生心不能執受（宗），有間斷故（因），如風聲等（喻）。其論云「異熟類不可得」者，即是此中有間斷之因言也。即彼逐難：六識中異熟心是異熟生，非真異熟，不能執持者，汝宗何故言不苦不樂受從異熟生？既異熟生，應非執受。述曰：異熟生有二種：一、從異熟種子生；二、從異熟相續生。第六識等者，是異熟種子生，名假異熟。如眼根，非真異熟。其第八識是異熟相續生，前念後念皆異熟故。今前念後念皆是異熟者，能執持，非六種識，故有異也。即以此文，一師言：欲界有第六異熟心。一師云：此乃遮計。又彼外計汝宗第七識應得能執持身，何勞第八者，應立量云：我第七識不能執持身，非異熟性故，如六種轉識等。又彼外計：非一種識能持一切根，一一自識能持自根。今應破之，故第四因云「又六識身各別依轉乃至是第四因」。此中有二：初、依計正破；二、縱計逐難。謂如眼識起時，餘耳等無識之根便應爛壞（宗），無能持識故（因），以小乘宗諸識不並生故，如死屍（喻）。「設許執受，亦不應理」者，此牒計逐難。謂彼外計眼識起時，非但唯持眼根，亦能持餘耳等之根。今設縱之，故云設許執受，亦不應理，識遠離故。今立量云：眼識必不能持耳等諸根（宗），識遠離故（因），如他八識不能持身根等，如死屍等。又有合立量云：無識諸根應無執受（宗），識遠離故（因），如死屍（喻）。既難無執受已，應成非情攝。立量云：無識諸根應非情攝（宗），無執受故（因），如死屍（喻）；又眼等諸識起時，應不遞相執受（宗），所依別故（因），由如眼識起時不依諸根。此量有過，同喻所立不成過。如前所計身識持自根，設爾，應成數執過，故第五因應成數執過。其文可解。此中有量：既有執受、不執受，不執受時應非有情攝，無執受故，如死屍等。又可云：六種轉識應非執受，三性心間非一類故，如聲、火炎等。此亦有過。由上五因，六識執持既非道理，故許第八能執持身。結文可知。 > Where the treatise states: 'Furthermore, a category subsumed under the non-obscured indeterminate maturation (vipāka) of the six collections of consciousness is not found: this is the third reason,' this means that although there is vipāka within the six consciousnesses, it arises only in a single moment. Alternatively, among various minds, that which is produced from vipāka as a uniform category throughout before and after is definitively not found; only that which is of a uniform category of vipāka before and after without alteration can perform the sustaining, and that is true vipāka. Now, the maturational mind within the six consciousnesses arises only for a single moment and is not uninterrupted; since it is not of a uniform category, it is vipākaja (produced from maturation) and cannot be designated as capable of appropriating. One should establish the inference: 'The six kinds of sensory evolving consciousnesses are not true vipākaja (thesis), because they are intermittent (reason), like wind, sound, and the like (example).' This inference not being clear, one should formulate another separately: 'Since a uniform category of non-obscured indeterminate vipāka cannot be found among the six kinds of sensory evolving consciousnesses, they cannot sustain the body (thesis), because they possess the meaning of being intermittent (reason); the example and so forth are the same as before.' Or one should establish the inference: 'The mind produced from vipāka among the six sensory evolving consciousnesses cannot appropriate (thesis), because it is intermittent (reason), like wind, sound, and the like (example).' The treatise saying 'a category of vipāka is not found' is precisely this statement of the reason 'because of being intermittent.' In response to their pressing objection: 'If the maturational mind within the six consciousnesses is vipākaja, not true vipāka, and cannot sustain, why does your school state that neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling is born from vipāka? Since it is born from vipāka, it should not be appropriated'—the exposition says: vipākaja is of two kinds: first, born from vipāka seeds; second, born from a continuity of vipāka. That which pertains to the sixth consciousness and so forth is born from vipāka seeds and is called nominal vipāka. Like the visual sense-faculty, it is not true vipāka. The eighth consciousness is born from a continuity of vipāka, because the preceding moment and the succeeding moment are both vipāka. Now, that whose preceding moment and succeeding moment are both vipāka can sustain, not the six kinds of consciousness; hence there is a difference. Relying on this text, one master says: 'The desire realm possesses a sixth maturational mind.' Another master says: 'This is merely refuting an assertion.' Furthermore, regarding another external assertion: 'In your school the seventh consciousness should be able to sustain the body; what need is there for an eighth?,' one should establish the inference: 'Our seventh consciousness cannot sustain the body (thesis), because it is not of the nature of vipāka (reason), like the six kinds of sensory evolving consciousnesses and so forth (example).' Furthermore, another external assertion states: 'It is not that a single consciousness sustains all sense-faculties; each individual consciousness can sustain its own sense-faculty.' This should now be refuted, so the fourth reason says: 'Furthermore, the six collections of consciousness operate dependent on separate supports... up to... is the fourth reason.' Herein there are two: first, directly refuting according to the assertion; second, granting the assertion and pressing the objection. That is to say: when the visual consciousness arises, the remaining sense-faculties such as the auditory that lack consciousness would rot and decay (thesis), because there is no consciousness capable of sustaining them (reason)—for according to the Hīnayāna school, the consciousnesses do not arise simultaneously—like a dead corpse (example). 'Even if appropriation were conceded, this too would be illogical': this cites the assertion and presses the objection. That is, the external opponent asserts that when visual consciousness arises, it does not merely sustain the visual sense-faculty alone, but can also sustain the other sense-faculties such as the auditory. Now, provisionally conceding this, it is said: 'Even if appropriation were conceded, this too would be illogical, because consciousness is distant and separate.' We now establish the inference: 'The visual consciousness definitively cannot sustain the auditory and other sense-faculties (thesis), because consciousness is distant and separate (reason), like another person's eight consciousnesses being unable to sustain \[one's own\] bodily sense-faculty and the like, or like a dead corpse and so forth.' Furthermore, an inference may be jointly established: 'The sense-faculties lacking consciousness should be without appropriation (thesis), because consciousness is distant and separate (reason), like a dead corpse (example).' Having already pressed the objection that they lack appropriation, they should consequently be subsumed under non-sentient things. The inference is established: 'The sense-faculties lacking consciousness should be subsumed under non-sentient things (thesis), because they lack appropriation (reason), like a dead corpse (example);' furthermore: 'When the visual and other consciousnesses arise, they should not mutually appropriate one another (thesis), because their supports are distinct (reason), just as when visual consciousness arises it does not rely on the other sense-faculties (example).' This inference has a fallacy: the fallacy of the non-establishment of what is to be proved in the concordant example (sādhyāprasiddha). As in the previous assertion that the body-consciousness sustains its own sense-faculty, if so, it would incur the fallacy of repeated appropriation (sakṛd-upādāna); hence the fifth reason should incur the fallacy of repeated appropriation. Its text is intelligible. Herein there is an inference: 'Since there would be appropriation and non-appropriation, during the time of non-appropriation it should not be subsumed under sentient beings (thesis), because of the absence of appropriation (reason), like a dead corpse and so forth (example).' It may also be said: 'The six kinds of sensory evolving consciousnesses should be non-appropriating (thesis), because the minds of the three natures are intermittent and not of a uniform category (reason), like sound, flame, and the like (example).' This also has a fallacy. By the above five reasons, since the sustaining by the six consciousnesses is illogical, one accepts that the eighth consciousness can sustain the body. The concluding text is clear. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 13.11](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.13.11) - [Next: 13.13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.13.13) - [Up: 13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.13) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829~en-mt.13.12) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [瑜伽師地論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.yogacara.yogacarabhumi*zh-xuanzang.51.18) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.13.12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.13.12) · Pramāṇa