[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [瑜伽師地論略纂](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829) › 13.16 # 瑜伽師地論略纂 13.16 瑜伽師地論略纂 13.16 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [13.16](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.13.16) 論云「何故若無諸識俱轉，業用差別不應道理」等者，此第五亦非正立第八而破於他，亦因他難，解難之由，遂成第八。四種業用：一、了別器業，謂外器世界。二、了別依業，即內五根、扶根五塵及內種子等。此二第八識之業，故《勝鬘經》云：自身、資生具，一時頓分別。此第一業，第八唯變故緣。從種生故，名為變；是彼境故，名為彼緣。其內依業具有二義：一、變故緣；二、執故緣。變故緣義，如上可知。執故緣者，名眾生數。三、了別我業，即末那常計第八以為我也。四、了別境業，即餘六識各了自境。此中意者，謂第四境業一識起時，剎那剎那四業俱轉，非一切時無心悶絕等及入無心定而皆具四，唯具前三故。如經所說：若一境業起時，必剎那剎那四業可得。若無第八，諸識不得並生，而此四業不可一識一時頓有，豈不違經及於道理？小乘若信大教，及一剎那中有此四業，可如此難。他宗既不信經，及不許有四業一剎那中而現可得，何得如此而起難耶？述曰：然以道理逐之，必許有此四業，及信大教而得成立。以理逐者，且立唯識比量云：色等諸法皆不離識（宗），是所識故（因），猶如於識（喻）。既色等諸法不離於識，從識而現，無識之時此境應無。且如入無心定，或唯緣涅槃等境，爾時色等既無能緣之識，眼等諸根及外器等便應斷絕。應立量云：入無心定等位時，眼等諸根及外器等便應斷絕（宗），以無識故（因），如所滅識（喻）；又緣涅槃等境時，諸眼根等必應斷絕（宗），以自能緣識體無有故（因），由如未生緣眼等識。此即成立初二種業是有。次成第三業。二乘唯云有了我之業，不言一切時恒起了我。今應立量云：異生所起善等心時必有我見（宗），此是有簡，可須思之，是異生故（因），如起餘位我見之時（喻）。此三種業義已成立，於一切時必須恒有，若境業起時必須有四，不然唯前三。了別境業，二乘共許，前三業義已成，故於一時四業可得。於前三業總立量云：異生身中無染心等現在前時必有前三種業（宗），異生位故（因），如二共所許三種了別現在前時（喻）。以此義故，知四業可知，以理遂立前唯識量。　又有三藏所立云：真故極成色不離於眼識（宗），自許初三攝，眼所不攝故（因），由如眼識（喻）。前雖可爾，簡過未周。此中簡過，如《因明抄》。上來雖復理破，違教如何？如《攝論》中廣立大乘真是佛語，信佛語已，有違教過，非未信前而有此過。如《攝論》說。此並與現量相違過，如文。 > The treatise says: "Why is it that without the simultaneous operation of the various consciousnesses, the differences in activity would not be reasonable?" and so forth. This fifth \[reason\] also does not directly establish the eighth to refute others; rather, it is also on account of others' objections: by explaining the reason for the objection, it ultimately establishes the eighth. There are four kinds of activities: First, the activity of cognizing the receptacle, referring to the external receptacle world. Second, the activity of cognizing the āśraya, which is the internal five sense faculties, the five sense objects that support the faculties, the internal seeds, and so forth. These two are the activities of the eighth consciousness; hence the Śrīmālā-sūtra says: "One's own body and the requisites of life are all distinguished simultaneously and suddenly." Regarding this first activity, the eighth consciousness only takes them as objects because it transforms. Because it is produced from seeds, it is called "transforming"; because it is its object, it is called "taking it as an object." Its activity toward the internal āśraya possesses two meanings: first, taking it as an object because it transforms; second, taking it as an object because it appropriates it. The meaning of taking it as an object because it transforms is understood as above. Taking it as an object because it appropriates it is called "sentient category." Third, the activity of cognizing the self: this is the manas constantly clinging to the eighth as the self. Fourth, the activity of cognizing cognitive objects: that is, the remaining six consciousnesses each cognizing their respective objects. The meaning here is: when one consciousness of the fourth activity of objects arises, in moment after moment all four activities operate simultaneously; it is not that at all times—such as during mindless stupor and so forth, or upon entering the mindless absorption—all four are present, for only the first three are present. As the sūtra states: when one activity of objects arises, in moment after moment the four activities are invariably found. If there is no eighth consciousness, the various consciousnesses cannot arise simultaneously; and these four activities cannot be possessed simultaneously and suddenly by a single consciousness. Would this not contradict both sūtras and reasoning? If the Hīnayāna believed in the Mahāyāna teaching and that these four activities exist within a single moment, such an objection could be raised. But since the other school neither believes in the sūtra nor concedes that four activities can be directly found within a single moment, how could an objection be raised in this way? Explanation: However, if one pursues them with reasoning, they must concede that these four activities exist, and by believing in the Great Teaching, it is established. To pursue them with reasoning, let us first formulate the Consciousness-Only syllogism: Entities such as visible forms are all not separate from consciousness (thesis); because they are cognized (reason); just like consciousness (example). Since entities such as visible forms are not separate from consciousness and appear from consciousness, when there is no consciousness, these cognitive objects should not exist. For instance, when entering the mindless absorption, or when taking exclusively nirvāṇa and so forth as objects, at that time, since visible forms and so forth lack a cognizing consciousness, the eye and other faculties as well as the external receptacle and so forth should be severed. One should formulate a syllogism: At times such as entering the mindless absorption, the eye and other faculties as well as the external receptacle and so forth should be severed (thesis); because consciousness is absent (reason); like the consciousness that has been extinguished (example). Again: When taking nirvāṇa and so forth as objects, the eye and other faculties must be severed (thesis); because the intrinsic nature of the consciousness that can cognize them does not exist (reason); just like the unproduced consciousness that takes the eye and so on as objects (example). This establishes that the first two kinds of activity exist. Next, the third activity is established. The two vehicles only say that there is an activity of cognizing the self; they do not say that cognizing the self constantly arises at all times. Now one should formulate a syllogism: When ordinary beings generate minds of wholesome and other states, they must possess the view of self (thesis)—this has qualifications, which should be considered; because they are ordinary beings (reason); just like at other states when the view of self arises (example). Once the meanings of these three kinds of activity are established, they must constantly exist at all times; when the activity of objects arises, all four must exist; otherwise, only the former three exist. The activity of cognizing cognitive objects is commonly accepted by the two vehicles; since the meanings of the former three activities are already established, the four activities can be found at one time. A general syllogism is formulated for the former three activities: When defilement-free minds and so forth appear before an ordinary being's body, the former three kinds of activity must be present (thesis); because it is the state of an ordinary being (reason); just like when the three kinds of cognition mutually accepted by both appear before them (example). On this basis, one knows that the four activities are understood, and by reasoning one then establishes the preceding Consciousness-Only syllogism. Furthermore, what the Tripiṭaka Master \[Xuanzang\] established says: In ultimate truth, universally established visible form is not separate from visual consciousness (thesis); because it is accepted by oneself as included in the first three and not included in the eye (reason); just like visual consciousness (example). Although the former was admissible, its exclusion of fallacies was not exhaustive. The exclusion of fallacies here is as in the Yinming-chao. Although it has been refuted by reasoning above, how about contradiction of scriptural authority? As the Mahāyānasaṃgraha extensively establishes that the Mahāyāna is truly the Buddha's word, after believing the Buddha's word, there is the fault of contradicting scriptural authority; this fault does not exist prior to having faith. As stated in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. These are also the faults of contradicting direct perception, as in the text. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 13.15](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.13.15) - [Next: 13.17](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.13.17) - [Up: 13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.13) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829~en-mt.13.16) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (2) - [瑜伽論記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1828.13.78) — Classical Chinese - [瑜伽師地論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.yogacara.yogacarabhumi*zh-xuanzang.51.25) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.13.16](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.13.16) · Pramāṇa