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# 瑜伽師地論略纂 14.30

瑜伽師地論略纂 14.30

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [14.30](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.14.30)

論解依止生中云「若有說言，於此處所」等者，謂一切有部計，如一石中，水、火、風大相雖不可得，然極微必有，彼以後得有故。今應問彼：此地大可得聚者，與餘三大不可得者，為體是等一種故可得，不等故可得？若體一種，而彼三大不可得者，非理。量云：於一石中，餘水、火、風亦應可得，體等有故，如地大。若不等者，為體量故不等，為據增上用故不等？若形量故不等而地大可得，餘三大形量小不可得而實是有者，彼三大小分應可得，以有分別形量故；少分既不可得故，故知此中無三大。量云：汝宗石中少分火等之大亦應是無，不可得故，如兔角等。若據用故，地大有用相可得，三大有用少故不可得者，用依於體，體既無有而有用者，此執非理。量云：於石中無水等威勢，以無體故，如兔角等。汝言石中三大勢用為少分是有故不等者，火亦應無，以無體故，如龜毛等。如下所言從煖生冷，即有喻界而有大。此大乘中何故諦之？義曰：大乘不然，以一切界皆在本識故，後若彼法生，皆依本識種故，至下文更會。下文云「雖無自性，然有其界」者，此據經部師義，非大乘。然如石中雖無三大之相，然本識中有其種子，遇緣生三大，亦就大乘解。

> Where the treatise explains arising dependent on an underlying support, saying: 'If it is asserted that in this place…' and so forth: this refers to the Sarvāstivāda tenet that, for example, within a single stone, although the characteristics of the great elements of water, fire, and wind cannot be perceived, their subtle atoms must certainly exist, because they can be obtained later. Now one should question them: regarding this earth element that can be perceived in the mass and the remaining three great elements that cannot be perceived, is it because their substances are of a single equal nature that \[only earth\] is perceivable, or is it because they are unequal that it is perceivable? If their substances were of a single equal nature and yet those three great elements could not be perceived, this would be unreasonable. The syllogism is: within a single stone, the remaining water, fire, and wind should also be perceivable; because their substances equally exist; like the earth element. If they are unequal, are they unequal on account of the quantity of their substances, or are they unequal on account of their dominant functional capacity? If they are unequal due to morphological quantity such that the earth element is perceivable while the other three great elements are unperceivable because their morphological quantity is small, yet they truly exist, then a minute portion of those three great elements should still be perceivable, because they have distinct morphological quantities; and since even a minute portion is unperceivable, one therefore knows that the three great elements do not exist here. The syllogism is: in your school, a minute portion of the great elements of fire and so forth within a stone should also be non-existent; because it cannot be perceived; like the horns of a hare and so forth. If it is on account of functional capacity—such that the functional characteristics of the earth element are perceivable, whereas because the functional capacity of the three great elements is slight, they are unperceivable—functional capacity relies on substance; since the substance does not exist, to say that there is functional capacity is an unreasonable attachment. The syllogism is: within a stone, there is no potency of water and so forth; because there is no substance; like the horns of a hare and so forth. If you say that the potency and functional capacity of the three great elements within a stone are unequal because a minute portion exists, then fire should also be non-existent; because it has no substance; like tortoise hair and so forth. As stated below regarding the arising of cold from heat, there is an illustrative element (dhātu) and thus there are the great elements. Why is this examined in the Mahāyāna? The explanation is: Mahāyāna is not like that, because all elements (dhātus) abide in the mūlavijñāna; if those dharmas arise later, they all depend on the seeds in the mūlavijñāna, which will be reconciled further in the text below. Where the text below says, 'although they lack intrinsic nature (svabhāva), they nonetheless have their elements (dhātu),' this is based on the Sautrāntika view, not the Mahāyāna. However, just as within a stone there are no characteristics of the three great elements, yet within the mūlavijñāna there are their seeds which, encountering conditions, produce the three great elements, this can also be explained according to the Mahāyāna.  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829~en-mt.14.30) — English, machine translation

## Linked texts (1)

- [瑜伽論記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1828.14.301) — Classical Chinese

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.14.30](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.14.30) · Pramāṇa
