[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [瑜伽師地論略纂](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829) › 15.149 # 瑜伽師地論略纂 15.149 瑜伽師地論略纂 15.149 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [15.149](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.15.149) 論云「十四、他境緣，謂色界於欲行煩惱，無色於色行煩惱乃至於彼下地諸有情所，由常恒樂淨具勝功德，自謂勝故」者，即大乘中，上地得緣下地起煩惱。　問曰：此是何惑？答曰：有解此是見慢，如餘處。更有但言我此勝，彼不如等，設起我慢，非一切煩惱皆起。又解：此是一切煩惱，貪等並然，常以恒是常見，淨勝是見取等故。雖有是緣，不似本質，緣名為境。如前卷初及《對法》第六。餘處言上不緣下者，此是隨順理文。　問曰：下地貪、慢不得緣上，上界之慢如何緣下？答曰：下地劣故，不於彼起慢，上勝故可起。即《對法》第二無色不緣下地等文，如彼和會。 > Regarding the treatise's statement, "Fourteenth: having another realm as their objective support, which refers to the afflictions active in the desire realm \[occurring\] with respect to the form realm, and the afflictions active in the form realm \[occurring\] with respect to the formless realm... up to, with respect to sentient beings of those lower realms, asserting oneself to be superior because of permanently, constantly, blissfully, and purely possessing superior virtues": this means that within the Mahāyāna, higher realms may take lower realms as objective support to arouse afflictions. Question: Which affliction is this? Answer: One explanation states that this is view and conceit, as elsewhere. Others simply state that thinking 'I am superior here, they are inferior,' even if one arouses the conceit 'I am' (asmimāna), it is not that all afflictions are aroused. Another explanation states: this comprises all afflictions; greed and the like are all likewise, because 'permanent' and 'constant' constitute the view of eternalism, and 'pure' and 'superior' constitute the adherence to views (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa) and so forth. Although there is such an objective condition, it does not resemble the fundamental substance (vastu); condition is called 'realm/object'. This is like the beginning of the previous fascicle and the sixth \[fascicle\] of the Abhidharma\[-samuccaya-bhāṣya\]. Where other texts state that the higher does not take the lower as an objective support, that is in accord with reasonable treatises. Question: If greed and conceit in lower realms cannot take the higher as objective support, how can conceit in higher realms take the lower as objective support? Answer: Because the lower realms are inferior, one does not arouse conceit towards them; because the higher is superior, it can be aroused. This is like the text in the second \[fascicle\] of the Abhidharma\[-samuccaya-bhāṣya\] where the formless does not take lower realms as an objective support, and so forth, as harmonized there. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 15.148](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.15.148) - [Next: 15.150](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.15.150) - [Up: 15](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.15) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829~en-mt.15.149) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (2) - [瑜伽論記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1828.17.75) — Classical Chinese - [瑜伽師地論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.yogacara.yogacarabhumi*zh-xuanzang.59.59) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.15.149](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.15.149) · Pramāṇa