[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [成唯識論述記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830) › 10.34 # 成唯識論述記 10.34 成唯識論述記 10.34 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [10.34](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.10.34) 述曰：其初地時已離麁犯戒垢，然此二地能全離故，所以說之。望前細故，下十一障中當辨二障攝。淨尸羅者，謂別解脫、道定共也，即通三種。雖第三地始發定增，能離過時此地已滿故。或依別脫，亦能全離加行、後起、根本罪故，非定、道共能離加行、後起罪故。世親《攝論》說：此二地性戒成就，非如初地思擇護戒。性戒成故，諸犯戒垢已極遠離。何故初果已具性戒，極喜地中當言未具，大分已具仍有誤犯微細過失。又論性戒，初地已離，入地菩薩更亦不同初二果者猶有妻孥，性罪必無犯，但於遮罪猶有誤犯，今第二地悉能永離。餘論皆同。此下餘論同者，更不煩敘。此下諸地並如《瑜伽》第四十八，《十地》第四已去各一卷解，不能繁引。 > The Commentary states: At the time of the first ground, one has already departed from the coarse defilements of breaking moral discipline; however, this second ground is able to depart from them completely, which is why it is so described. Because they are subtle compared to the earlier ones, they will be distinguished below among the eleven obstacles as being subsumed under the two obstacles. Pure moral discipline (śīla) refers to prātimokṣa, the moral discipline concurrent with the path, and that concurrent with meditation; thus it encompasses all three kinds. Although it is on the third ground that superior samādhi begins to arise, at the time of being able to depart from faults, this ground has already fulfilled it. Alternatively, relying on prātimokṣa, it is also able to completely depart from preparatory, subsequent, and fundamental offenses, whereas discipline concurrent with meditation and the path cannot depart from preparatory and subsequent offenses. Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha-bhāṣya states: On this second ground, innate morality (prakṛti-śīla) is accomplished, unlike the first ground where one protects discipline through deliberation. Because innate morality is accomplished, all defilements of breaking discipline are extremely far removed. Why is it that the first fruit \[of the śrāvaka\] has already fulfilled innate morality, whereas in the Ground of Utmost Joy one must say it is not yet fulfilled? In large part it is already fulfilled, yet there are still subtle faults of mistaken transgression. Moreover, in discussing innate morality, the first ground has already departed from \[transgressions\]; a bodhisattva who has entered the grounds is also no longer like those of the first two fruits who still have wives and children; there are definitely no transgressions against natural offenses (prakṛti-sāvadya), but there are still mistaken transgressions regarding prescribed offenses (pratiṣiddha-sāvadya); now, the second ground is able to sever them forever. The other treatises all agree. From here on, where other treatises agree, they will not be tediously recounted. The grounds below are all as explained in fascicle forty-eight of the Yogācārabhūmi and in one fascicle each from the fourth onward in the Daśabhūmika-śāstra; they cannot be cited at length. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 10.33](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.10.33) - [Next: 10.35](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.10.35) - [Up: 10](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.10) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830~en-mt.10.34) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.10.34](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.10.34) · Pramāṇa