[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [成唯識論述記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830) › 2.62 # 成唯識論述記 2.62 成唯識論述記 2.62 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [2.62](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.2.62) 述曰：下正破執，於中有四：一、破正量；二、破經部；三、破古薩婆多；四、破新薩婆多。此中唯破正量部。正量部識不立似相，直取前境即名為緣。吠世史迦，眼舒光至境緣，餘塵至根方緣。下既別破薩婆多故，此初破正量部也。正量不許具二義名緣，但能生識即是所緣，何假似自者？今難之云：以能生識故是所緣緣者，其因緣等應是所緣緣。「等」者，等取等無間、增上緣等。對立量云：且汝眼識現緣色時，眼識所有因緣等應是眼識所緣緣，宗也；但能生眼識故，因也；如現色等，喻也。或翻遮色等非所緣緣，如眼根等，但能發生無似相故。經部師等「因緣等」者，種子等也；薩婆多等「因緣等」者，同類因等也，彼並非眼識所緣緣，故今非地。又與能生識是所緣緣，為不定過。且望一色處作法，汝此色處為如聲等，能生五識，故是五識中隨一所緣緣攝，為如眼等增上緣、同類因等，能生五識故，非是所緣緣。因緣等法既非所緣緣，心外色等應知亦爾，此破親所緣緣。然小乘等共計，他心等法為自識親所緣緣，即是心外取法，故今破也。此等親疎所緣緣義，分行相事等，如第七卷說。若不遮心外法為疎所緣緣，即是第八為質，餘識託之而變。《觀所緣緣論》說：過去色識是現五識所緣緣。《二十唯識》等，並如下第四卷，不能別敘。 > The Commentary states: Below is the refutation proper of these attachments, within which there are four \[sections\]: first, refuting the Saṃmatīya; second, refuting the Sautrāntika; third, refuting the ancient Sarvāstivāda; fourth, refuting the neo-Sarvāstivāda. Here it is only the Saṃmatīya school that is refuted. The Saṃmatīya does not establish a resembling aspect (nimitta) in consciousness; directly apprehending the front object is called being a condition (pratyaya). For the Vaiśeṣika, the eye emits light reaching the object to cognize it, whereas the other \[sense\] objects reach the sense organ before being cognized. Since below there is a separate refutation of the Sarvāstivāda, this first part refutes the Saṃmatīya. The Saṃmatīya does not accept that possessing both meanings is called being a condition, \[holding that\] merely being able to produce consciousness is indeed the object-condition (ālambana-pratyaya)—why need it resemble oneself? Now, challenging them, we say: If being able to produce consciousness makes it an ālambana-pratyaya, then causes and conditions (hetu-pratyaya) and so forth ought to be ālambana-pratyayas. 'And so forth' includes equal-and-immediate conditions (samanantara-pratyaya), dominant conditions (adhipati-pratyaya), and so forth. Setting up a formal syllogism against them: When your visual consciousness presently cognizes visible matter, the causes, conditions, and so forth possessed by visual consciousness ought to be ālambana-pratyayas of visual consciousness (thesis); because they merely can produce visual consciousness (reason); like present visible matter and so forth (example). Or, conversely excluding visible matter and so forth from being ālambana-pratyayas: like the visual organ and so forth, because they merely can produce \[consciousness\] without \[consciousness bearing\] a resembling aspect. For Sautrāntika masters and others, 'causes, conditions, and so forth' means seeds and so forth; for Sarvāstivādins and others, 'causes, conditions, and so forth' means homogeneous causes (sabhāga-hetu) and so forth; neither of these are ālambana-pratyayas of visual consciousness, hence they are now excluded. Furthermore, \[the statement that\] 'being able to produce consciousness is being an ālambana-pratyaya' incurs the fallacy of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika). Taking the single category of visible matter as a proposition: Is this category of visible matter of yours like sound and so forth, being able to produce the five consciousnesses and therefore included among the ālambana-pratyayas of any one of the five consciousnesses; or is it like the eye and other dominant conditions, homogeneous causes, and so forth, which can produce the five consciousnesses, and therefore is not an ālambana-pratyaya? Since factors like causes and conditions are not ālambana-pratyayas, one should know that external visible matter and so forth outside mind are likewise so; this refutes the direct object-condition (sākṣād-ālambana-pratyaya). However, Hīnayāna and others collectively posit that phenomena such as another's mind are the direct object-conditions of one's own consciousness, which is grasping phenomena outside the mind; hence it is now refuted. These meanings of direct and indirect object-conditions, distinguishing the cognitive aspect and matter, are as explained in the seventh fascicle. If one does not exclude external phenomena as indirect object-conditions (dūra-ālambana-pratyaya), it is the eighth \[consciousness\] serving as the substrate, which the other consciousnesses rely on to transform. The Ālambanaparīkṣā states: Past visible matter and consciousness are the ālambana-pratyayas of the present five consciousnesses. The Viṃśikā-vijñaptimātratā and so forth are all as found below in the fourth fascicle, and cannot be separately recounted here. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 2.61](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.2.61) - [Next: 2.63](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.2.63) - [Up: 2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.2) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830~en-mt.2.62) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.2.62](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.2.62) · Pramāṇa