[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [成唯識論述記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830) › 5.515 # 成唯識論述記 5.515 成唯識論述記 5.515 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [5.515](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.5.515) 述曰：自下第二，重明前位。文有其二，唯廣初二故。廣初有二：初明二執寬狹；後明用、體同別。此初也。今顯初位必帶後位，以初短故。人我位必有法我，人我必依法我起故，人我是主宰作者等用故；法我有自性勝用等故，即法我通，人我狹也。如人要迷杌，不知是杌等，方執為人，迷杌為先，後方人起。此中喻況理有淺、深，淺喻謂人是人執，迷杌是法執；深喻即迷杌是迷法空，謂人是起人執，法中據迷理，人中起事執。問：人中亦可言迷理，法中起事執。答：不然。人狹法寬，以法為本故。難淺喻云：若執是杌即執人，可使執杌是法執。既言迷杌起於人，迷杌應非是法執。答：不然。迷者不了，不了杌時似於法執，非謂執是實杌方為不了。問：若不了杌與疑何別？答：彼猶豫故，此決定故。決定迷杌遂執是人，故是法執。問：如何二執得俱起耶？ > The Commentary states: From here down is the second part, re-elucidating the previous stages. The text has two sections, only expanding on the first two. The expansion of the first has two parts: first, clarifying the breadth and narrowness of the two attachments; second, clarifying the identity and difference of function and substance. This is the first. Now it is shown that the first stage necessarily carries the latter stage, because the first is brief. The stage of person-self necessarily has dharma-self, because person-self necessarily arises supported by dharma-self, since person-self is the function of being a master, agent, and so forth; dharma-self is intrinsic nature, superior function, and so forth; hence dharma-self is broad and person-self is narrow. Just as a person must be deluded about a post, not knowing it is a post and so forth, before grasping it as a person; delusion about the post comes first, and only then does \[the conception of\] a person arise. In this analogy, the principle has shallow and deep aspects: the shallow analogy is that the person is the attachment to person, and being deluded about the post is the attachment to dharmas; the deep analogy is that being deluded about the post is being deluded about dharma-emptiness, and conceiving it as a person is giving rise to the attachment to person; in dharmas it is based on delusion regarding principle, and in person it gives rise to attachment to things. Question: In the case of person, might one also say it is delusion regarding principle, while in dharmas it gives rise to attachment to things? Answer: It is not so. Person is narrow and dharmas are broad, because dharmas are the root. An objection to the shallow analogy says: If grasping it as a post were grasping a person, one could allow that grasping a post is an attachment to dharmas. Since you say that delusion about a post gives rise to a person, delusion about a post should not be an attachment to dharmas. Answer: It is not so. Delusion means non-comprehension; when not comprehending the post, it resembles attachment to dharmas; it does not mean that only when grasping it as a real post is it non-comprehension. Question: If not comprehending the post, how does this differ from doubt? Answer: Doubt is wavering, whereas this is decisive. Decisively deluded about the post, one thereupon grasps it as a person; hence it is an attachment to dharmas. Question: How can the two attachments arise together? > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 5.514](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.5.514) - [Next: 5.516](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.5.516) - [Up: 5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.5) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830~en-mt.5.515) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [宗鏡錄](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.52.12) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.5.515](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.5.515) · Pramāṇa