[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [成唯識論述記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830) › 6.527 # 成唯識論述記 6.527 成唯識論述記 6.527 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [6.527](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.6.527) 「四遍常論」者，一、由能憶二十成壞劫，彼便執我、世間俱常，由隱顯故；二、由能憶四十成壞劫，彼便執我、世間俱常；三、由能憶八十成壞劫，便執為常；四、由天眼見諸有情死時、生時諸蘊相續，彼便執我、世間俱常。四中前三由依靜慮起，宿住通有上、中、下；第四由依天眼所見。此見道斷，即有見道，常見亦他界緣，緣三界法並是常故。然依定後起，可通上界繫。雖三界合緣，仍隨所應界地所繫，以獨影故，唯從見說。四一分常論，一、從梵天沒來生此間，得宿住通作如是執，我等皆是梵王所化，梵王是常，我等無常；二、聞梵王有如是見等，大種常，心無常，或翻此說。同彼忍者，或住梵世乃至或是展轉聞如是道理，我以梵王為量，信其所言，是故世間一分常住；三、有先從戲忘天沒來生此間，得通起執，在彼諸天不極戲等，在彼常住，我等無常。四、有從意憤天沒，乃至如前。此天住處，文如前已說。此四由執大梵、大種或心戲忘、憤恚四事而起，此之八見依前際起，以色界之我緣自地為我，或以下界我見計梵王為他、我故，計一分常，常見所攝。不爾，應非邊見所攝。但不得緣他地諸法為其自我，他我計故，其全常等，理不相違。設自身，我亦在中故，如何全常一个邊見緣上下生？一分常者是常見，無常者是何見？此雖非斷，然堅執發，亦是染污，非五見攝，但是染惠。又解邪見所攝，此不同於不可記事，是斷見攝。彼言無常，意說斷故。前解為勝，不說一分通邪見故。 > Regarding the "four doctrines of universal permanence": First, because one can remember twenty kalpas of formation and destruction, one then grasps that the self and the world are both permanent, through their concealment and manifestation. Second, because one can remember forty kalpas of formation and destruction, one then grasps that the self and the world are both permanent. Third, because one can remember eighty kalpas of formation and destruction, one then grasps that they are permanent. Fourth, because through the divine eye one sees sentient beings at the time of death and at the time of birth, with the aggregates continuing in unbroken succession, one then grasps that the self and the world are both permanent. Among the four, the first three arise based on dhyāna, where the supernormal knowledge of remembering past lives has superior, medium, and inferior degrees; the fourth arises based on what is seen by the divine eye. This is severed upon the path of seeing, so there is \[severance by\] the path of seeing. The view of permanence also takes other realms as its object, because taking the phenomena of the three realms as its object, all are \[grasped as\] permanent. However, arising subsequent to concentration, it can pertain to attachment to the higher realms. Although it takes the three realms together as its object, it still pertains to the bond of the corresponding realm or ground; because it is an isolated reflection, it is described solely in terms of the view. As for the four doctrines of partial permanence: First, having deceased from the Brahmā heaven and come to be born here, one attains the supernormal knowledge of past lives and conceives such a grasping: 'We were all transformed and created by the Great Brahmā King; the Brahmā King is permanent, and we are impermanent.' Second, one hears that the Brahmā King holds such views, etc.—that the great elements are permanent and the mind is impermanent, or the reverse of this. As for those who share that patience: either they abide in the Brahmā realm, or even have heard such reasoning successively, thinking, 'I take the Brahmā King as an authority and believe what he says; therefore, one part of the world is permanent.' Third, there are those who previously deceased from the heaven of gods corrupted by play and came to be born here; having attained supernormal knowledge, they give rise to the grasping: 'Those gods who do not excessively play are permanent there; we are impermanent.' Fourth, there are those who deceased from the heaven of gods corrupted by malice, and so on as before. The dwelling places of these gods are as explained in the preceding text. These four arise through grasping the four matters: Great Brahmā, the great elements or the mind, play-forgetfulness, and malice. These eight views arise based on the past. Taking the self of the form realm, they take their own ground as the self; or, using a view of self from a lower realm, they construct the Brahmā King as another's self, and thus construct partial permanence, which is subsumed under the view of permanence. If it were not so, it should not be subsumed under extreme views. However, they cannot take phenomena of other grounds as their own self, because it is constructed as another's self. With respect to universal permanence and the like, this does not contradict reason. Even supposing one's own body, the self is also included within it, so how could a single extreme view of universal permanence arise taking both the upper and lower as its object? The one who \[holds\] partial permanence holds a view of permanence; what view is held by the one who \[grasps\] impermanence? Although this is not \[a view of\] annihilation, yet, being launched by stubborn clinging, it is also defiled; it is not subsumed under the five views, but is merely defiled understanding. Another explanation holds that it is subsumed under wrong views; this is not the same as the unrecorded points, which are subsumed under views of annihilation. When they say 'impermanent', they intend annihilation. The former explanation is superior, because it is not stated that a part is common to wrong views. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 6.526](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.6.526) - [Next: 6.528](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.6.528) - [Up: 6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.6) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830~en-mt.6.527) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.6.527](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.6.527) · Pramāṇa