[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [成唯識論述記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830) › 6.90 # 成唯識論述記 6.90 成唯識論述記 6.90 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [6.90](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.6.90) 述曰：今破彼計。勿於後時有染癡等、善信等故，今恒有彼類，亦為後因故。若言後生癡等，亦前癡等為因，即念非遍心有，如癡等故。若爾，如自證分為後憶念，因知前亦有，念亦應爾者，不然！心許前有體之上更立用，今已不許前有念體，後念等生，何得以念例於心也！ > The Commentary states: We now refute their thesis. It cannot be that because at a later time there are defilement, delusion, etc., or wholesome faith, etc., that categories of those must constantly exist at present to serve as causes for the later ones. If one says that subsequent delusion, etc., also have preceding delusion, etc., as their causes, then mindfulness is not present in all minds, just like delusion, etc. If \[one objects\]: 'Just as the self-cognition part (svasaṃvittibhāga) serves as the cause for subsequent recollection, from which one knows that it also existed previously, so mindfulness should be likewise'—this is not so! For citta, having accepted the existence of its entity previously, one further posits a function upon it; here, we already do not accept that an entity of mindfulness exists previously for subsequent mindfulness, etc., to arise; how could one draw an analogy from citta to mindfulness? > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 6.89](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.6.89) - [Next: 6.91](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.6.91) - [Up: 6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.6) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830~en-mt.6.90) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.6.90](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.6.90) · Pramāṇa