[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [成唯識論述記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830) › 7.13 # 成唯識論述記 7.13 成唯識論述記 7.13 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [7.13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.7.13) 述曰：自下第二，別解為二：初解悔、眠；後解尋、伺。於中各二：初別，後總。別即為二。「悔謂惡作」者，以體即因，即諸論說惡作者是。惡作非悔，悔之體性，追悔者是，如文可知。惡作之體以何為性？惡者悔也，即嫌惡所作業，諸所作業起心嫌惡已，而追悔之，方是悔性。若所作是惡名為惡作，即悔體唯善，唯悔惡事故。若嫌惡所作，體寧非悔，言是悔因？若先惡所作方生於悔，惡作非悔其體何也？此義應思。此中有解，此唯是厭。若爾，厭應通三性，何故唯善？此宗不爾，薩婆多正理論師厭體唯善，若同於彼有如前妨。有云：厭是省察心、心所，無別體性；大乘厭通三性，於義無違。若爾，善、染、無記之厭俱依何立？前第六卷云：善中厭是無貪一分，准彼染厭體即是嗔，由憎恚彼方厭善故。有欣上惡法是貪，厭下惡法亦是嗔分，若爾，無記之厭是何建立？即無記欲，於所作事雖不生欲，於此不作亦生欲，故名為厭也。如信、不信但有善、染而無無記，無記信即是欲解，此亦應爾。悔因即是前之厭、欲二法，然說惡作通三性者，從果為言，悔通三性故。或有解云：所作是境，而嫌惡所作是悔惡義。今言作者是所作事，能生於悔惡，即是悔因。因者境界，依作因依之生悔故。以惡作言通說彼境故，總言惡作是悔之因，其實惡者即是悔也。又解惡作善者是愧，以拒惡故。不善者是無慚，不顧賢善故。無記者是慧，威儀、工巧慧所攝故。又解三性俱體是惠，簡擇推度所作事故。言先不作後方追悔者，前後因果，或即俱時義說先後，然由境故心乃得生。 > The Commentary states: From here down is the second part, explaining them individually, which has two sections: first, explaining regret and torpor; second, explaining investigation and analysis. Each has two parts: first individual, then general. The individual part has two. Regarding 'regret means remorse': taking the entity to be the cause, this is what the various treatises call remorse (kaukṛtya). Remorse is not \[yet\] regret; the essential nature of regret is posterior regret, as is clear from the text. What constitutes the entity of remorse? Remorse (e) is regret (hui), which means disliking what has been done; when one arouses a mind of dislike toward what has been done and then regrets it afterward, only then is it the nature of regret. If what was done is bad (e) and it is called 'bad action' (e zuo), then the entity of regret would be purely wholesome, because one only regrets bad deeds. If disliking what was done is itself \[regret\], why would its entity not be regret, rather than being said to be the cause of regret? If one first dislikes what was done and only then gives rise to regret, and 'bad action' is not regret, what is its entity? This point should be considered. Here there is an explanation: this is solely revulsion (nirvid). If so, revulsion should apply across the three natures; why then is it solely wholesome? In this school it is not so; for the Sarvāstivādin Nyāyānusāra masters, the entity of revulsion is purely wholesome, and if one agreed with them, the aforementioned difficulty would arise. Some say: revulsion is an inspecting mind or mental factor, and has no separate substantial entity; in the Mahāyāna, revulsion applies across the three natures, which does not contradict the meaning. If so, upon what are wholesome, defiled, and neutral revulsion established? Fascicle 6 above stated: among the wholesome, revulsion is a portion of non-greed; by analogy with that, defiled revulsion is in entity anger, because by hating and resenting that, one becomes revulsed by the wholesome. Desiring higher bad dharmas is greed, and being revulsed by lower bad dharmas is also a portion of anger. If so, what is neutral revulsion established upon? It is neutral desire (chanda): toward what was done, although one does not give rise to desire, toward not doing it one does give rise to desire, hence it is called revulsion. Just as faith and lack of faith are only wholesome and defiled and have no neutral counterpart, and neutral 'faith' is merely aspiration, so it should be here too. The causes of regret are precisely the preceding two dharmas of revulsion and desire; yet saying that 'bad action' applies across the three natures is speaking from the perspective of the effect, because regret applies across the three natures. Or another explanation says: what was done is the objective domain, and disliking what was done is the meaning of regret. Here, saying 'action' refers to what was done; because it can give rise to regret, it is the cause of regret. 'Cause' means the objective domain; relying on the cause of action, one relies upon it to give rise to regret. Because the term 'bad action' generally speaks of that objective domain, it is stated overall that 'bad action' is the cause of regret; in fact, the badness is itself regret. Another explanation holds that wholesome remorse is shame (apatrāpya), because it resists evil; unwholesome remorse is shamelessness (ahrīkya), because it has no regard for the virtuous and good; neutral remorse is prajñā, because it is subsumed under the prajñā of deportment and arts. Another explanation holds that across all three natures, its entity is prajñā, because it discriminates and calculates what was done. Stating that one first does not do it and only later regrets it refers to prior and posterior cause and effect, or it means that although they are simultaneous, they are spoken of as prior and posterior conceptually; nevertheless, the mind is able to arise only due to the objective domain. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 7.12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.7.12) - [Next: 7.14](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.7.14) - [Up: 7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.7) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830~en-mt.7.13) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.7.13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.7.13) · Pramāṇa