[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [成唯識論了義燈](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832) › 1.126 # 成唯識論了義燈 1.126 成唯識論了義燈 1.126 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [1.126](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.1.126) 《論》：如患夢等。西明釋云：對經部、薩婆多。薩婆多夢境雖實，而非父母，執為父母，故得成喻。《要集》救斷，此亦為正。今謂不爾。既云：《正理》五十云：夢緣過去曾所緣法，而有夢中見菟角者，曾於異處見菟見角。今於夢中，由心惛倒，謂於一處，和合追憶。或大海中，有此形獸，曾見聞故，今夢追憶。《婆沙》三十七大同《正理》。既有父母，夢見父母，何不許夢緣實父母不得？引《智度論》外云：實有人頭，餘實有角救。彼自破云：雖實有人，實有角，但人頭生角者妄。又外救云：世界廣大，或有國人有角等。亦破云：若餘國人，有角可爾，但夢見此國所識人有角，則不可得破。何以故？大乘許夢緣虛妄故，作此破他，非他外人，許緣妄法。今薩婆多自許緣實，何得以大乘義？顯成彼宗，亦許緣妄，破彼可爾，立彼不成。故如本疏，除其有部，但對經部。 > The Treatise says: "Like an illness, a dream, etc." Ximing explains: This is addressed to the Sautrāntika and the Sarvāstivāda. For the Sarvāstivādin, although the dream object is real, it is not one's parents, yet it is grasped as one's parents; hence the metaphor holds. The Yaoji comes to the defense and concludes that this \[view\] is also correct. Now I say this is not so. For the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 50, says: "Dreams take as their cognitive object things previously cognized in the past. If one sees a hare's horn in a dream, it is because one previously saw a hare and saw a horn in different places. Now in a dream, due to a muddled and inverted mind, one calls it up in memory as being combined in a single place. Or, such a shaped beast exists in the great ocean; having heard of or seen it before, now in a dream one recalls it in memory." The Vibhāṣā, fascicle 37, is largely the same as the Nyāyānusāra. Since parents exist and one sees parents in a dream, how could one not accept that the dream cognizes real parents? It is not permissible to cite the \*Dà zhìdù lùn\*, where the opponent says: "There are real human heads, and elsewhere there are real horns," and defend \[the opponent\] by noting its own refutation: "Although there are real humans and real horns, that a human head grows horns is an error." Furthermore, the opponent defends: "The world is vast; perhaps there is a country where people have horns, etc." It also refutes this: "If people of another country had horns, that might be so; but dreaming of a person known from this country having horns cannot be maintained." Why so? Because Mahāyāna accepts that dreams cognize what is unreal, it raises this refutation against the other; it is not that the other, the outsider, accepts that \[the dream\] cognizes unreal things. Now, since the Sarvāstivādin himself accepts that \[dreams\] cognize what is real, how could one use the Mahāyāna doctrine to prove that their school also accepts that dreams cognize what is unreal? Refuting them is acceptable, but establishing their \[own\] position this way fails. Therefore, following the Root Commentary, we exclude the Sarvāstivāda and address only the Sautrāntika. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 1.125](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.1.125) - [Next: 1.127](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.1.127) - [Up: 1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.1) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832~en-mt.1.126) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.1.126](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.1.126) · Pramāṇa