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# 成唯識論了義燈 2.15

成唯識論了義燈 2.15

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [2.15](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.2.15)

問：分別我執麁故易斷，初見道時即能除滅。大乘既有三心見道，二乘有幾？答：以義准之，大乘為斷二障，各分二品。別、總斷之即立三心，以第二心但斷下品分別法執，若二乘人，但有二心，唯斷我執，分二品故。問：二障分上下，下品二心除。兩障分細麁，斷細亦分二。答：初道力猶劣，下品二心除，後道有勝能，故合一心斷。問：前俱生執因七緣八，不言取簡，間斷我見，即言取蘊。答：七唯緣第八，狹不須簡。第六通緣餘，故取言簡。問：總緣蘊計，蘊通無漏。云何但云緣五取蘊？答：約相分說云緣取蘊。取者，准《集論》等，即四種取，皆唯說貪。云取有四種，謂欲取、見取、或取、我語取。執取諍根，執取後有，是取義故，乃至云，由貪著欲繫縛沈染為因，諸在家者以為諍根；由貪著諸見，繫縛耽染為因，諸出家者以為諍根。故取緣此四貪名取。同《唯識論》愛增名取。唯識又云：雖取支中攝諸煩惱，而愛潤勝說是愛增，准此諸惑皆名為取。若准《瑜伽》八十九說，即通一切有漏之法，皆名為取。故彼云：當知此中若所取、若能取、若所為取，如是一切總說名取。問：何所取？答：欲、見、戒禁、我語是所取，何能取？四種欲貪是能取，何所為取？為得諸欲及為受用故等，准此諸文。若取唯愛據增上說，若據能取有及有具通餘煩惱，若相從者所取、能取、及所為取，取境、取體、取因皆取，各據一義，並不相違，諸說不同，准此應會。今言取蘊，隨其所應取所生，生於取所取、能取、及所為取，皆得名取蘊。問：何故法執通緣處、界，我但緣蘊？答：法執通無為得緣界、處，我緣有為不得通界、處。又我執多一常，不緣於界、處，法執非一常，故通界處。又解依影略說，此解為正。《辨中邊論》說：蘊、處、界，皆為破我，故知我執通緣三科。此緣蘊等據佛法談，外道不立蘊、處、界等，初見道時即能除滅。有四解：一、見修對，見在初；二、真相對，真在初；三、四道對，非勝進；四、無間解脫對，在無間故言初見道。

> Question: Because the discriminative grasping at self is coarse, it is easy to sever, and can already be eradicated at the initial path of seeing. Since the Mahāyāna has a threefold-mind path of seeing, how many \[minds\] do the two vehicles have? Answer: Inferring on the basis of reason, for the Mahāyāna, in order to sever the two obstacles, each is divided into two grades; severing them separately and collectively establishes three minds, because the second mind only severs the lower grade of discriminative grasping at dharmas. If it is a person of the two vehicles, there are only two minds, because they only sever the grasping at self, which is divided into two grades. Question: The two obstacles are divided into lower and upper, and the lower grade is eliminated in two minds; the two obstacles are divided into subtle and coarse, so should severing the subtle also be divided into two? Answer: The power of the initial path is still weak, so the lower grade is eliminated in two minds; the subsequent path has superior efficacy, so they are combined and severed in a single mind. Question: Earlier, innate grasping \[was said to be\] due to the seventh \[consciousness\] cognizing the eighth, and it did not speak of grasping to delimit it; in the case of intermittent view of self, it spoke of grasping the aggregates. Answer: The seventh only cognizes the eighth; being narrow, it requires no delimitation. The sixth generally cognizes other things, so the word "grasping" is used to delimit it. Question: In comprehensively cognizing the aggregates and imagining \[a self\], the aggregates include the uncontaminated. Why does it only speak of cognizing the "five appropriated aggregates"? Answer: In terms of the objective aspect (nimittabhāga), it is said to cognize the appropriated aggregates. As for "appropriation" (upādāna), according to the \*Abhidharmasamuccaya\* and other texts, there are four kinds of appropriation, and all are explained solely as greed. It says that there are four kinds of appropriation: the appropriation of desire, the appropriation of views, the appropriation of precepts and vows, and the appropriation of theories of self. Grasping and appropriating the root of disputes and grasping and appropriating future existence are the meanings of "appropriation," up to saying: "With the fettering, indulgence, and contamination of greed for desires as cause, householders make them the root of disputes; with the fettering, indulgence, and contamination of greed for views as cause, renunciants make them the root of disputes." Therefore, cognizing these four kinds of greed is called "appropriation." This agrees with the \*Cheng weishi lun\*'s statement that the increase of craving is called appropriation. The \*Cheng weishi lun\* also says: "Although the factor of appropriation encompasses all afflictions, craving's moistening is predominant, so it is spoken of as the increase of craving." According to this, all afflictions are called "appropriation." If one relies on the explanation in the eighty-ninth fascicle of the \*Yogācārabhūmi\*, then it extends to all contaminated phenomena, all being called "appropriation." Thus it says there: "One should know that here, whether what is appropriated, what appropriates, or what is appropriated for—all such things collectively are called 'appropriation.'" Question: What is what is appropriated? Answer: Desires, views, precepts and vows, and theories of self are what is appropriated. What is what appropriates? Four kinds of desire-greed are what appropriates. What is what is appropriated for? For the sake of obtaining desires and for the sake of enjoyment, and so forth. According to these passages, if appropriation is solely craving, it is stated in terms of predominance; if stated in terms of what can appropriate existence and the requisites for existence, it extends to other afflictions; if taken together, what is appropriated, what appropriates, and what is appropriated for—the object of appropriation, the substance of appropriation, and the cause of appropriation are all appropriation. Each relies on a specific meaning, and they do not contradict each other; though the explanations differ, they should be reconciled according to this. Now, speaking of the "appropriated aggregates," as appropriate, that which is produced by appropriation, that which produces appropriation, what is appropriated, what appropriates, and what is appropriated for—all may be called appropriated aggregates. Question: Why is it that grasping at dharmas generally cognizes bases and elements, while \[grasping at\] self only cognizes aggregates? Answer: Grasping at dharmas extends to the unconditioned, and can cognize elements and bases; grasping at self cognizes the conditioned, and cannot extend to elements and bases. Moreover, grasping at self mostly \[imaginatively constructs\] a single and permanent \[entity\], so it does not cognize elements and bases; grasping at dharmas is not a single and permanent \[entity\], so it extends to elements and bases. Another explanation says it is an abbreviated expression; this explanation is correct. The \*Madhyāntavibhāga-śāstra\* says: "Aggregates, bases, and elements are all for refuting the self." Hence we know that grasping at self generally cognizes the three categories. This cognizing of aggregates and the like is discussed according to the Buddhadharma; non-Buddhists do not posit aggregates, bases, elements, and so forth. "At the initial path of seeing it can already be eradicated." There are four explanations: first, contrasted with cultivation, the seeing is at the beginning; second, contrasted with the conventional, the true is at the beginning; third, contrasted with the four paths, it is not the advancing path; fourth, contrasted with the path of liberation, it is in the uninterrupted path; hence it says "initial path of seeing."  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832~en-mt.2.15) — English, machine translation

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.2.15](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.2.15) · Pramāṇa
