[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [成唯識論了義燈](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832) › 2.6 # 成唯識論了義燈 2.6 成唯識論了義燈 2.6 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [2.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.2.6) 又如前量云：且如餘祠授等，於天授作諸業時，亦應作業；我是一故；如天授等。餘人不解此之比量，謂將餘祠授等於天授作業時，總為有法。便即難云：如何復取有法為喻，由不解意。意云：如餘祠授，是有法。於他天授作業之時亦作業，是法。標舉天授作業之時，祠授亦應作業，以我體一。若不言於天授作業時亦應作業，天授未作破僧等業，可令祠授等亦作破僧業，即同喻無所立，為簡此過。云於天授作業之時亦應作業，喻具二立，問外人依同處不相離色作不定失。立量云：我所執我體定非是一；許更相遍故；如汝大乘同處不相離色。此有何過？答：此量有二過。一、有有法自相相違因過，我亦所諍，同處不相離色體非我故，此更相遍因，以同處色為同法故，即是唯於我異喻轉，更無遍是我同喻故；二、有有法差別相違因過，有法之我，正是言顯，假我、實我，即是意許有法差別。以大乘宗同處不相離色，即是假我。復更相遍，喻具二立，更無實我，更遍同喻。故立量云：汝所執我，應是假我非實我；許更遍故；如同處不相離色。《要集》云：三藏有三說，一、云同處不相離，瑜伽論隨經部轉門，非大乘正義；二、云亦大乘正義，然識所變是假非實，皆不離心故得涉入。不同彼宗，眼等實有不相涉入；三、云七物別類同處不雜，我類無別同處應雜；三藏意存第二。《集》云：今尋初釋有他不定；依第二釋，雖識變假，七非成一故亦不定；依第三釋，外器類同一處不雜成一故亦不定。故今因云同類無增減更相遍故，無不定失。同類簡七物，無增減簡外器，外器有增減，我即不爾。或可，因云天授、祠授二我，隨一攝更相遍故，亦無不定。今謂此釋不稱正理，添足論文。本疏云應言常遍，即難云有違論失，今加五字豈不為過？又云：或可，云二我隨一攝更相遍故，亦加論文。又二解中同喻皆闕所立法故。過如前顯，又有比量相違決定因過，應依本疏。 > Furthermore, as the previous inference states: 'Take, for instance, other Yajñadattas and the like: when Devadatta performs various actions, they should also perform the actions; because the ātman is one; just like Devadatta and the like.' Other people do not understand this inference, supposing that 'other Yajñadattas and the like, at the time Devadatta performs actions' is taken in its entirety as the subject (dharmin). They then immediately object: 'How can one again take the subject as the example?' This is due to not understanding the intention. The intention is: 'like other Yajñadattas' is the subject (dharmin); 'at the time another, Devadatta, performs actions, also performs the actions' is the predicate (dharma). Specifying that when Devadatta performs actions, Yajñadatta should also perform actions is because the substance of the ātman is one. If one did not say 'at the time Devadatta performs actions, \[he\] should also perform actions,' then when Devadatta has not yet performed an action such as causing a schism in the Sangha, one could cause Yajñadatta and others to also perform the act of schism, and then the positive example would lack that which is to be proved (sādhyavikalatā). To eliminate this fault, it says 'at the time Devadatta performs actions, \[he\] should also perform actions,' so that the example possesses both things to be established. Question: The outsider, relying on matter that is non-separate from the same location (sahabhū-rūpa), formulates the fault of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika). He constructs the inference: 'The ātman grasped by me definitely cannot be one in substance; because you accept that they mutually pervade; like the matter non-separate from the same location in your Mahāyāna.' What fault does this have? Answer: This inference has two faults. First, it has the fault of a reason that contradicts the subject's own nature (dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana). The ātman is also in dispute; because the substance of matter non-separate from the same location is not an ātman, this reason of 'mutually pervading,' by taking matter of the same location as the positive instance, operates solely in the negative instances of the ātman, since there is no other omnipresent thing that is an ātman to serve as a positive instance. Second, it has the fault of a reason that contradicts the intended property of the subject (dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana). The ātman as the subject is explicitly stated, whereas a conventional ātman or real ātman is the intended specification of the subject. In the Mahāyāna school, matter non-separate from the same location is precisely a conventional ātman; furthermore, they mutually pervade, so the example possesses both things to be established, but there is no real ātman to serve as an omnipresent positive example. Therefore, one establishes the inference: 'The ātman you grasp should be a conventional ātman and not a real ātman; because you accept that they mutually pervade; like matter non-separate from the same location.' The Yaoji states: 'The Tripiṭaka Master had three explanations. First: non-separateness in the same location in the Yogācārabhūmi follows the provisional perspective of the Sautrāntika, not the definitive Mahāyāna doctrine. Second: it is also the definitive doctrine of Mahāyāna, yet what is transformed by consciousness is conventional and not real; because none of it is separate from mind, they interpenetrate. It is not like their school, where the eye and so on are real entities that do not interpenetrate. Third: the seven physical elements are of different categories, so in the same location they do not intermix; the ātman has no categorical differences, so in the same location they should intermix. The Tripiṭaka Master favored the second.' The Yaoji says: 'Now examining the first explanation, it has the fault of inconclusiveness from the opponent's perspective; relying on the second explanation, although transformed by consciousness and conventional, the seven do not become one, hence it is also inconclusive; relying on the third explanation, external vessels of the same category do not intermix into one in the same location, hence it is also inconclusive. Therefore, now the reason states: "because being of the same category, without increase or decrease, they mutually pervade," so there is no fault of inconclusiveness. "Same category" excludes the seven physical elements; "without increase or decrease" excludes external vessels, for external vessels have increase and decrease, whereas the ātman does not. Alternatively, the reason states: "because being included under either of the two ātmans of Devadatta or Yajñadatta, they mutually pervade," so there is also no inconclusiveness.' Now we say: this explanation does not accord with the correct principle, adding superfluous words to the treatise's text. When the primary commentary stated that one should say 'permanent and omnipresent,' he immediately objected that it had the fault of contradicting the treatise; now, in adding five characters, how could that not be a fault? Moreover, saying 'alternatively, because being included under either of the two ātmans, they mutually pervade' also adds to the text of the treatise. Furthermore, in both explanations, the positive examples lack the property to be established. The faults are as demonstrated before, and there is also the fault of an inconclusive reason counterbalanced by an opposing inference (viruddhāvyabhicārin); one should rely on the primary commentary. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 2.5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.2.5) - [Next: 2.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.2.7) - [Up: 2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.2) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832~en-mt.2.6) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [成唯識論述記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.1.232) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.2.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.2.6) · Pramāṇa