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# 成唯識論了義燈 3.33

成唯識論了義燈 3.33

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [3.33](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.3.33)

《論》：若謂聲上等者，牒破可知。然本疏量云：聲之屈曲，應非離所依；別有實體，法處所收；色蘊上屈曲故。或色、聲二色之上，隨一屈曲故；如色處長等。《要集》云：此量有法差別。法差別量云：聲之屈曲；應非離聲；處假法處攝。因、喻同前，此亦不爾。誰許聲體在法處收？以許名等在法處故。名等依聲，不即聲故。今對破他，計屈曲聲，即是名等。異聲別有法處所攝，故舉長等，以為量破。然西明云：汝色上長、短應異；色處別有法處自性，有屈曲故；如聲上屈曲。此量亦過，應云汝色上長短等，應異色處法處所攝；色上屈曲故；如聲上屈曲。今言長短，應異色處，別有法處自性，即長、短上生等諸法。法處所攝，即是長等，異於色處。有此生等法處自性，此言過失也。　又量云：聲上屈曲，應無別體法處自性；以即屈曲故；如色上屈曲。此量言過，同前應知。若即准言，復有法自相相違過也。問：若云聲上屈曲能顯義故，有教性故，意識所得故，法處收假立名等，他云我宗亦爾？大乘通云：不唯依聲假立名等，通依多法，故法處攝長等不然者。問：此據緣假為緣實者，若據五識，唯緣實宗，長等意得，應法處收。若云雖唯意得，依眼明取，故非法處，屈曲之聲，明取亦爾，應在聲處。若據緣假，屈曲之聲，亦耳識得，應聲處攝。又應耳識，亦緣名等，即屈曲故。今正解者云：大乘師聲上屈曲，雖體非實，仍法處收，說為名等者，據攝假從實。非即正取屈曲聲體以為名等，取屈曲上有能詮用說為名等，如無心定等。但取種上能防心用，非即種體，相等亦爾，故法處攝。長、短之色，無能詮用，如屈曲聲。自體性邊俱自處攝，非大許彼。屈曲聲，體在不相應，彼非色、心，此是色故。設五緣假，耳識但取屈曲聲體，不取詮用，故攝處別。疏中但以屈曲之聲，長、短等相例者，且隨他宗為不正釋。及攝假從實，云聲能詮，非是剋體性用別門。取聲體為名、句、文等，故下正解。然依語聲分位差別，而假建立名、句、文身，更多有問答，及以異釋。恐煩不述。

> When the Treatise says: "If it is claimed that on sound..." and so forth, it quotes and refutes, which is readily understood. However, the inference in the original Commentary states: "The modulation of sound should not be apart from that on which it relies, possessing a distinct real substance subsumed under the dharma āyatana; because it is a modulation on the form aggregate; or because it is a modulation on either of the two forms, form or sound; like length on the form āyatana." The Yaoji states: "This inference has a distinction of the subject. The inference with the distinction of the subject states: 'The modulation of sound should not be apart from sound; being nominally subsumed under the dharma āyatana.' The reason and example are as before." This is also not so. Who accepts that the substance of sound is subsumed under the dharma āyatana? It is because name and so forth are accepted as being in the dharma āyatana. Name and so forth rely on sound, yet are not identical to sound. Now, in counter-refuting the other position, they posit that modulated sound is itself name and so forth, existing apart from sound and subsumed under the dharma āyatana; hence, length and so forth are cited to construct an inference to refute them. However, Ximing states: "Your long and short on form should be distinct from the form āyatana, having a distinct intrinsic nature of the dharma āyatana; because they have modulation; like modulation on sound." This inference is also faulty. One should say: "Your long and short on form should be distinct from the form āyatana and subsumed under the dharma āyatana; because they are modulations on form; like modulation on sound." Now stating that long and short should be distinct from the form āyatana and possess a distinct intrinsic nature of the dharma āyatana means that the various dharmas such as arising on long and short, being subsumed under the dharma āyatana, are themselves long and short, distinct from the form āyatana and possessing this intrinsic nature of the dharma āyatana of arising and so forth—this phrasing is faulty. Furthermore, the inference says: "The modulation on sound should lack a distinct substance that is an intrinsic nature of the dharma āyatana; because it is modulation; like modulation on form." The fault of this phrasing should be understood as identical to the previous one. If one follows that phrasing, there is also the fault of contradicting the property of the subject. Question: If one says that modulation on sound, because it can reveal meaning, possesses the nature of teaching, and is cognized by mental consciousness, is nominally established in the dharma āyatana as name and so forth, and the opponent says "my school also holds this"? The Mahāyāna resolves it: name and so forth are not nominally established merely relying on sound, but generally rely on multiple dharmas, and thus are subsumed under the dharma āyatana, which is not the case for length and so forth. Question: This is based on cognizing the nominal versus cognizing the real. If based on the school where the five consciousnesses only cognize the real, length and so forth, being cognized by the mind, should be subsumed under the dharma āyatana. If one says that although they are cognized only by the mind, they are clearly grasped based on the eye, and therefore are not in the dharma āyatana, then the clear grasping of modulated sound is also like this and should be in the sound āyatana. If based on cognizing the nominal, modulated sound is also cognized by the ear consciousness, so it should be subsumed under the sound āyatana. Furthermore, the ear consciousness should also cognize name and so forth, because they are just the modulation. Now, the correct explanation says: for the Mahāyāna master, although the substance of modulation on sound is not real, it is still subsumed under the dharma āyatana and spoken of as name and so forth based on subsuming the nominal under the real. It does not directly take the substance of modulated sound itself as name and so forth; rather, taking the expressive function on modulation, it is called name and so forth, like the mindless samādhi and so forth. One merely takes the function on the seed that can prevent mental activity, not the seed substance itself; the same applies to characteristics and so forth, hence it is subsumed under the dharma āyatana. Long and short forms lack an expressive function like modulated sound. In terms of their intrinsic natures, both are subsumed under their own āyatanas; the Mahāyāna does not accept that the substance of modulated sound is in the non-concurrent formations, because the latter is neither matter nor mind, whereas this is matter. Even if the five \[consciousnesses\] cognize the nominal, the ear consciousness merely grasps the substance of modulated sound and does not grasp the expressive function; therefore, the āyatanas that subsume them are distinct. In the Commentary, merely drawing an analogy between modulated sound and long, short, and so forth is temporarily following the other school as an inexact explanation. And subsuming the nominal under the real to say that sound can express is not the separate approach of defining intrinsic nature and function. Taking the substance of sound as name, phrase, phoneme, and so forth is therefore correctly explained below. However, nominal establishment of the collections of names, phrases, and phonemes based on the distinctive states of spoken sound has many more questions, answers, and divergent interpretations, which are omitted here to avoid prolixity.  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832~en-mt.3.33) — English, machine translation

## Linked texts (2)

- [成唯識論述記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.2.431) — Classical Chinese
- [成唯識論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.yogacara.trimsika!vijnaptimatratasiddhi*zh-xuanzang.2.27) — Classical Chinese

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.3.33](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.3.33) · Pramāṇa
