[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [成唯識論了義燈](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832) › 3.34 # 成唯識論了義燈 3.34 成唯識論了義燈 3.34 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [3.34](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.3.34) 《論》：若謂聲上等者。外救量云：聲上音韻屈曲，不能詮；聲屈曲故；如弦管聲。聲上音韻屈曲是有法，不能詮是法。《樞要》云：論主為作有法，差別相違。內聲屈曲，能生名等，不生名等，是差別故。故《論》云：「此應如彼聲，不別生名等」。先舉同喻，後舉宗法，故作量云：汝內聲屈曲，不能生名等；聲屈曲故；如弦管聲。此就他宗，彼弦管聲，不生名等故；以內聲；如彼弦管聲。有解，作法差別相違因。破云：內聲屈曲，不能別生實名等；即聲屈曲故；如弦管聲。此說不爾。准外量文，屈曲是有法、非法，何名法差別？《要集》云：此破末，計屈曲有二：法差別相違因者，別生名等非詮，不別生名等非詮。故法差別。此亦不爾。他宗說聲不是能詮，名等能詮，別生名等，不生名等，在聲，不在非詮。何得言別生名等非詮？不別生名等非詮故，若以非詮為法差別。《論》應云此如彼能詮，不別生名等，何故云如彼聲？西明云：《雜心》許有因俱聲，如弦管等。《俱舍論》破。《正理論》救云：誰言一極微，二大所造，但約助緣，說因俱聲？此中正破《雜心》所說。不詳此說，《雜心》因俱，即弦管等，似有能詮，非實能詮。《正理》亦同，何故但言偏破《雜心》，不云兼破《正理》，何也？疏云：我亦不說弦上屈曲，非不能詮，但如汝化人，身、語二業，非善惡性。今我因俱故者，此意前隨汝宗。屈曲之聲，云如弦管，不生名等，非善、惡性。亦如汝說化人，身、語二業非善、惡性。我弦管聲，是因俱故，假通善、惡，亦許能詮。如林聲說法，離質化等，皆通善等。 > \[Regarding\] the text of the Śāstra: “If it is claimed that on sound…,” the other’s saving inference is: “The inflection of tone upon sound cannot be an expressive designator; because it is an inflection of sound; like the sound of strings and pipes.” The inflection of tone upon sound is the subject (dharmin), and cannot be an expressive designator is the predicate (dharma). The Shunyao states: The author of the treatise constructs an incompatibility with a particularity of the subject (dharmisvarūpa-viparītasādhana) for him. Internal sound's inflection can produce names and so forth, or cannot produce names and so forth—this is the particularity. Therefore the Śāstra states: “This \[internal sound\] should, like that sound, not distinctively produce names and so forth.” First it adduces the similar example, and then it adduces the thesis property. Thus the syllogism is constructed: “Your internal sound's inflection cannot produce names and so forth; because it is an inflection of sound; like the sound of strings and pipes.” This is from the standpoint of the other tradition, because in their view the sound of strings and pipes does not produce names and so forth; taking internal sound to be like that sound of strings and pipes. There is another explanation that makes it a reason incompatible with the particularity of the predicate (dharmaviśeṣa-viparītasādhana). Refuting: “Internal sound's inflection cannot distinctively produce real names and so forth; precisely because it is an inflection of sound; like the sound of strings and pipes.” This explanation is incorrect. According to the text of the other’s syllogism, “inflection” is the subject, not the predicate; how could it be called a particularity of the predicate? The Yaoji says: This refutes the branch; positing inflection as having two kinds. As for the reason incompatible with the particularity of the predicate: distinctively producing names and so forth is not an expressive designator, and not distinctively producing names and so forth is not an expressive designator. Therefore it is a particularity of the predicate. This too is incorrect. The other tradition says that sound is not the expressive designator, whereas names and so forth are the expressive designators; distinctively producing names and so forth or not producing names and so forth resides in sound, not in non-expressiveness. How could one say that distinctively producing names and so forth is non-expressive, and not distinctively producing names and so forth is non-expressive? If non-expressiveness were the particularity of the predicate, the Śāstra ought to say, “This, like that expressive designator, does not distinctively produce names and so forth.” Why does it say, “like that sound”? Ximing says: The Miśrakābhidharma-hṛdaya permits sound born of both causes (mahābhūta), like strings and pipes, etc. The Kośa refutes this. The Nyāyānusāra defends: “Who says that a single paramāṇu is created by two kinds of great elements? It is only in terms of assisting conditions that sound born of both causes is asserted.” Here it directly refutes what is stated in the Miśrakābhidharma-hṛdaya. This statement is inaccurate. The “born of both causes” in the Miśrakābhidharma-hṛdaya refers precisely to strings and pipes, etc., which appear to have expressive capacity, but are not real expressive designators. The Nyāyānusāra is also the same; why say that it solely refutes the Miśrakābhidharma-hṛdaya and not also the Nyāyānusāra? Why is that? The original Commentary states: “I also do not say that inflection on strings cannot express; it is merely like your created persons whose bodily and vocal karmas are neither of a good nor evil nature. Now, in our \[view, sound\] being born of both causes…” The meaning of this is: previously conforming to your school, inflection of sound was said to be like strings and pipes, which do not produce names and so forth and are neither good nor evil in nature. It is also like what you say of a created person whose bodily and vocal actions are neither good nor evil. In our \[view\], the sound of strings and pipes is born of both causes; thus, nominally it extends to good and evil, and it is also accepted as being capable of expressing. Like sounds from a forest preaching the Dharma, manifestations detached from physical substance, etc., all extend to good, etc. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 3.33](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.3.33) - [Next: 3.35](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.3.35) - [Up: 3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.3) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832~en-mt.3.34) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [成唯識論述記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.2.437) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.3.34](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.3.34) · Pramāṇa