[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [成唯識論了義燈](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832) › 3.37 # 成唯識論了義燈 3.37 成唯識論了義燈 3.37 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [3.37](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.3.37) 《論》：如是二法等者，緣瓶等心，等取衣食車等心，是何量攝？答：本云非量收，不親緣得法自體故，非比度故，非量所收，非量不要，唯竪執故。西明意同。有解，似現即比量攝，故《理門》云：彼聲、喻等，攝在此中，故唯二量。有云：若開現、比、及非量，三法不同，能緣之心，可通三量。然《要集》斷云：假立瓶等，義同名等，雖非法數，然定散意，皆得緣瓶，故前三師，皆不應理。取第四正。今謂初二義即如實，後二非理，所以者何？且第三師云：緣瓶之心，是似現量，即比量攝，理且不然。現、比二量，是正智攝。似現、比量，迷亂所收。何名比量？若以緣共相故比量收，諸迷亂心，及以妄執似比量心，應比量攝。若許爾者，真似何別？似比量等，非真比量收，似現亦應爾。又《理門》解比量智云：從現量生，或比量生，緣瓶心是似現所攝。何得說是比量收耶？然《理門論》云：彼聲喻等，攝在此中。故唯二量者，據得法體無謬者說，非似現、比，亦許二攝。何能自悟？若二皆攝，何能自悟？若第四師，緣瓶之心．若二皆攝。何能自悟？若第四師，緣瓶之心，通三量者，違《理門》說。彼云：如是一切世俗有中，瓶等、輿等，皆似現量，於實有中，作餘行相，假合餘義，分別轉故。《八正理論》亦云：謂諸有智，了瓶、衣等，分別而生，由彼於義，不以自相為境界故，名似現量，非比如前。所說非理。　問：若爾定心諸佛菩薩，豈不緣瓶？答：不障緣瓶，但心不作實有瓶解，得瓶所依四塵自相，於實有中，不作餘行相，假合餘義分別轉故，以能了知世間緣彼作實瓶解，故現量境。如遍計性聖者，達無亦為聖境，非同凡執，說為聖境。本疏云：緣瓶之心，是非量者，據作實瓶解說，非約了瓶假，亦是非量收。設復緣瓶作比量解，亦似比量，非真比量，無實瓶體，故亦非量。非似現比，是非量攝，不稱境故，邪謬智故。 > \[Regarding\] the text of the Śāstra: “Such two dharmas…,” the mind perceiving a vase and so forth—the “and so forth” including minds perceiving clothing, food, carts, etc.—under which pramāṇa is it subsumed? Answer: Originally it was said to be subsumed under non-pramāṇa (aprāmaṇya), because it does not directly apprehend the self-essence (svalakṣaṇa) of the dharma, and because it is not inferential deduction; hence it is subsumed under non-pramāṇa; non-pramāṇa does not require solely a persistent adherence. Ximing’s intention is identical. Another explanation says that pseudo-direct perception is subsumed under inference; hence the Nyāyamukha states: “Those \[pramāṇas\] such as testimony and analogy are subsumed herein; therefore there are only two pramāṇas.” Some say: If one opens it into three different categories—direct perception, inference, and non-pramāṇa—the cognizing mind may encompass all three pramāṇas. However, the Yaoji concludes: “Nominally positing vases, etc., has the same sense as names and so forth; although they are not mental factors, yet both concentrated and dispersed minds can perceive a vase. Therefore the previous three masters are all unreasonable; the fourth should be taken as correct.” Now I say: The first two meanings are indeed true, while the latter two are unreasonable. Why is that? First, the third master says that the mind perceiving a vase is pseudo-direct perception, which is subsumed under inference; this principle is simply not so. The two pramāṇas, direct perception and inference, are subsumed under correct cognition. Pseudo-direct perception and pseudo-inference are subsumed under confusion and error. How could it be called inference? If because it perceives a common characteristic (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) it is subsumed under inference, then all confused minds and pseudo-inferential minds with false attachments should be subsumed under inference. If that were permitted, what difference would there be between true and pseudo? Since pseudo-inference and the like are not subsumed under true inference, pseudo-direct perception should also be like this. Furthermore, the Nyāyamukha explains inferential cognition as: “Born from direct perception, or born from inference.” The mind perceiving a vase is subsumed under pseudo-direct perception. How could it be said to be subsumed under inference? As for what the Nyāyamukha states: “Those \[pramāṇas\] such as testimony and analogy are subsumed herein; therefore there are only two pramāṇas,” this is stated with reference to apprehending the essence of dharmas without error; it does not mean that pseudo-direct perception and pseudo-inference are also admitted to be subsumed under the two. How could one attain self-awakening? If both were subsumed, how could one attain self-awakening? If, according to the fourth master, the mind perceiving a vase... If both were subsumed, how could one attain self-awakening? If, according to the fourth master, the mind perceiving a vase encompasses all three pramāṇas, it contradicts the Nyāyamukha’s statement. That \[text\] says: “In this way, among all conventional existents, vases, carts, etc., are all pseudo-direct perception, because with respect to real existents one produces other mental images (ākāra), falsely combining other meanings, and operates through conceptual differentiation (vikalpa).” The Pramāṇasamuccaya also says: “Namely, all those who have cognition, conceptually discerning vases, clothing, etc., produce differentiation, because their domain is not the self-characteristic with respect to the referent; thus it is called pseudo-direct perception, not inference, as explained before.” What was stated is unreasonable. Question: If so, do the concentrated minds of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas not perceive a vase? Answer: It does not prevent them from perceiving a vase, but their minds do not produce the understanding of a really existent vase; they apprehend the self-characteristics of the four sensory dusts upon which the vase depends, and with respect to real existents they do not produce other mental images or operate through conceptual differentiation falsely combining other meanings. Because they can know that worldly beings perceive it and form the understanding of a real vase, it is a realm of direct perception. Just as with the parikalpita nature, an ārya's penetration of its nonexistence also serves as an ārya realm; it is not the same as an ordinary being's clinging, yet it is called an ārya realm. The original Commentary says that the mind perceiving a vase is non-pramāṇa: this is spoken with reference to producing the understanding of a real vase; it does not mean that discerning the vase as nominal is also subsumed under non-pramāṇa. Even if one perceives a vase and forms an inferential understanding, it is also a pseudo-inference, not a true inference; because there is no real vase essence, it is also non-pramāṇa. Is it not that pseudo-direct perception and pseudo-inference are subsumed under non-pramāṇa, because they do not match the object, and are erroneous cognitions? > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 3.36](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.3.36) - [Next: 3.38](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.3.38) - [Up: 3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.3) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832~en-mt.3.37) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [成唯識論述記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.2.480) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.3.37](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.3.37) · Pramāṇa