[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [成唯識論了義燈](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832) › 3.77 # 成唯識論了義燈 3.77 成唯識論了義燈 3.77 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [3.77](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.3.77) 《論》：識以了別為行相故。本釋云：識自體分，以了別為行相，故行相見分也。類體亦然。此意見分名行相者，行應平聲讀，以見分能行於境相故，此見分得行相名。評取初解云：然本但是行於相義，類體亦然者，以行相不可知，類體亦然。然西明疏并顯同一所緣不同一行相，總為三釋評取第三。第三釋行相言者，即了別領納等各不同故，名不同一行相。此意行者即去聲讀，正是能緣之行解也。又解云：行於相故，帶相行故，名行相。此即平聲。相通影、質。即同本釋。然《要集》評取第三釋同。世親、無性俱行解相貌以為行相，此論亦云了別、領納等作用各異故。若取行於相故名行相者，恐非論意。又不應言行相不同。違教及理。以心、心所行於境相無差別故。何得言不同　今謂錯評。何者？汎言行相有三：一、境名行相，即十六行諦；二、能緣行相，即十二行法輪；三、行於相名行相，即無分別智等。前二是局，後一即通。今此了言雖能緣行，釋從通解。第三能變即依局辨，云了境相麁故。《般若經》云：彼識不能了故，不通無分別智。第二能變亦從通解，恒審思量無我相故。或相影顯。隨其所應在因在果。故《攝論》本頌云：諸菩薩行相，復於所緣中，是無分別智，彼所知無相。無性釋云：於所緣中相似而行，故名行相，此釋初句行相，既言相似而行，故名行相。明作平聲，不作去聲而讀行相。然次論云：所知無相者，謂說此智於真如境所作行相。此意說言，無分別智緣真如境，離一切相作意行相，以為行相者，是釋第四句。重顯無分別智行相，行於境相中時，不作行解相狀，不是正釋行相之言。問：相者是境，行者是心，如何說了名為行相？答：能行於相名為行相。有財釋，或相之行；依主釋，不得難云若取行於境相名行相即違教理。及心、心所行於境相無差別故者。此意難云：論說識、受、想等，作用各別，故違教。心及心所作用各別，若取行於境相，王、所同緣，如何各別？此難不然，《論》云：了別、領納等，作用各異者，據能行說，不約所行。識即能了行於境相，受即領納行於境相，云作用各異，約取境用異。不取緣境之時，取諸境相行解用異。以無分別智，不作諸境別行相故。雖後得智及分別心，緣境之時作諸行解，不取此釋識之行相，以不遍故。今本論意但取心起行於境相，名為行相，即通一切。不取行解名為行相，不通一切故。又此正釋本識了言，若以行解相貌以為行相，深乖論旨，本識任運無行解故。若局後得及分別心釋行相者，得約行解名為行相。 > The Treatise says: 'Because consciousness takes discernment as its mental aspect (ākāra).' The basic commentary explains: 'The self-substance division of consciousness takes discernment as its mental aspect (ākāra); therefore, the mental aspect is the seeing division (darśanabhāga). By analogy, the substance is also like this.' According to the view that the seeing division is named the mental aspect, xíng ('operating/proceeding') should be read in the level tone (píngshēng), because the seeing division can operate upon the aspect of the object (xíng yú jìngxiàng); thus this seeing division gets the name 'operating on the aspect' (xíngxiàng). Evaluating and accepting the first explanation, it says: 'However, the original \[meaning\] is simply the meaning of operating upon the aspect. That "by analogy the substance is also like this" means that since the mental aspect is unknowable, by analogy the substance is also like this.' However, Ximing's commentary, in clarifying 'having the same object of cognition but different mental aspects', proposes three interpretations altogether and evaluates the third as superior. The third explains the word 'mental aspect' (行相, xíngxiàng) as: discernment, reception, etc., are each different, hence they are called 'not having the same mental aspect'. In this sense, xìng is read in the departing tone (qùshēng), which is precisely the cognitive understanding (xíngjiě) of the cognizing consciousness. Another explanation says: Because it operates upon the aspect, or because it proceeds carrying the aspect, it is called xíngxiàng. This is in the level tone. 'Aspect' (相) applies to both reflex image and archetype. This agrees with the basic commentary. However, the Yaoji evaluates and accepts the third explanation, agreeing with Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva, who both took the appearance of cognitive understanding as the mental aspect (ākāra), and this treatise also states that the functions of discernment, reception, etc., are each different. \[The Yaoji claims that\] if one takes 'operating upon the aspect' as the meaning of xíngxiàng, it is feared this is not the treatise's intention; furthermore, one should not say that the mental aspects are different, as this contradicts both teaching and reason, since the operating of the mind and mental factors upon the aspect of the object is without difference, so how could one say they are different? Now I say this evaluation is mistaken. Why? Generally speaking, there are three kinds of 'aspect/operation' (xíngxiàng): 1. The object is called xíngxiàng, namely the sixteen aspects of the truths; 2. The cognizing operation is called xíngxiàng, namely the twelve aspects of the Dharma-wheel; 3. Operating upon the aspect is called xíngxiàng, namely non-conceptual wisdom, and so forth. The first two are restricted, while the latter is comprehensive. Here the word 'discernment', though a cognizing operation, is explained from the comprehensive perspective. The third transforming \[consciousness\] is distinguished according to the restricted \[sense\], saying that it discerns object aspects coarsely. The Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says that that consciousness cannot discern, so it does not apply to non-conceptual wisdom. The second transforming \[consciousness\] is also explained from the comprehensive perspective, because it constantly deliberates upon the aspect of non-self; or the aspects mutually imply each other, as appropriate to cause or fruition. Therefore, the basic verse of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'The mental aspect of the bodhisattvas / Furthermore, regarding the cognitive object, / Is non-conceptual wisdom; / Its cognizable object is without aspect.' Asvabhāva's commentary explains: 'Because it operates similarly regarding the cognitive object, it is called xíngxiàng.' This explains the xíngxiàng of the first line: since it says 'it operates similarly, hence it is called xíngxiàng', it clearly should be read in the level tone, not in the departing tone. But the subsequent treatise says: '"Its cognizable object is without aspect" means stating the mental aspect produced by this wisdom regarding the realm of tathatā.' This means that non-conceptual wisdom cognizes the realm of tathatā with a mental aspect of mental orientation free of all marks; taking this as the mental aspect explains the fourth line. It re-clarifies that when the mental aspect of non-conceptual wisdom operates within the aspect of the object, it does not produce the appearance of cognitive understanding; this is not the direct explanation of the term xíngxiàng. Question: 'Aspect' is the object, and 'operating' is the mind; how can one say that discernment is called xíngxiàng? Answer: That which is capable of operating upon the aspect is called xíngxiàng. This is a bahuvrīhi compound, or \[if interpreted as\] 'the operation of the aspect', a tatpuruṣa compound. One cannot object: 'If taking operating upon the aspect of the object as the name xíngxiàng, it contradicts teaching and reason, because the operating of the mind and mental factors upon the aspect of the object is without difference.' This objection means: The treatise says that the functions of consciousness, sensation, conception, etc., are each distinct, so \[your view\] contradicts the teaching; since the functions of the mind and mental factors are each distinct, if one takes operating upon the aspect of the object, then since the primary mind and mental factors cognize the same \[object\], how could they be distinct? This objection is incorrect. When the Treatise says that the functions of discernment, reception, etc., are each distinct, it speaks in terms of the capable-of-operating, not in terms of that which is operated upon. Consciousness is capable of discerning, operating upon the aspect of the object; sensation is reception, operating upon the aspect of the object. When it says the functions are each distinct, it refers to the difference in the function of grasping the object. It does not refer to a difference in the function of cognitive understanding grasping various object aspects at the time of cognizing an object. This is because non-conceptual wisdom does not produce distinct mental aspects of various objects. Although subsequently attained wisdom and discriminatory mind produce various cognitive understandings at the time of cognizing an object, this is not taken to explain the mental aspect of consciousness, because it is not pervasive. Now, the intention of the basic treatise is simply to take the arising of the mind operating upon the aspect of the object as the meaning of xíngxiàng, which applies comprehensively to all. It does not take cognitive understanding as the meaning of xíngxiàng, because that is not comprehensive to all. Furthermore, this directly explains the word 'discernment' of the fundamental consciousness: if one were to take the appearance of cognitive understanding as the mental aspect, it would profoundly violate the treatise's meaning, because the fundamental consciousness functions spontaneously without cognitive understanding. If one restricts the explanation of mental aspect to subsequently attained \[wisdom\] and discriminatory mind, one may designate it as mental aspect in terms of cognitive understanding. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 3.76](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.3.76) - [Next: 3.78](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.3.78) - [Up: 3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.3) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832~en-mt.3.77) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [成唯識論述記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.3.130) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.3.77](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.3.77) · Pramāṇa