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# 成唯識論了義燈 4.10

成唯識論了義燈 4.10

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [4.10](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.4.10)

《論》：體既本有等，本疏設難。《要集》云：有救。《婆沙》救云：見色等用，不通過去，故三世別。正理師救：約同類因，取果作用，以辨三世。餘皆功能，此設彼救。在疏不引，云破不成據何所以。今謂若《婆沙》救見色等用，不通過去，故三世別者，則色等五境，雖在現在，亦無見等用，應名過去。正理唯約因類之因，取與果用，名為作用。以同類勝者，則苦法忍，應不得生，闕同類因，無作用故。又復五因俱因緣性，俱能取果，何非作用。若非作用，應非因緣。又《婆沙》第十二云：等無間緣，除阿羅漢，最後心、心所法，餘過、現心、心所法。有餘師說，亦為等無間緣，但後果不生，評不應爾，所以者何？等無間緣，依作用立。若法與彼法，作等無間緣，無法無有情能為障礙，令彼不生。世第一法，非最後心，後非同類，可非無間，以此故知，無學後心，無有作用，既無作用，何非過去，故助難成，然准《婆沙》，等無間緣，過去亦有取與果用。彼第十云：何者等無間緣？云：與次第義，與作用義，此是與果。復云：能生心義，能引發義，此取果義。又云：能引等無間法，名等無間緣，故知等無間有取、與義。

> The Treatise says: 'Since the substance is originally existent,' and so forth; the root commentary raises an objection. The Yaoji says: there is a rescue. The \*Vibhāṣā\* rescues this, saying: the function of seeing form and so forth does not extend into the past, so the three time periods are distinct. The masters of the \*Nyāyānusāra\* rescue it by saying: the three time periods are distinguished by the function of grasping results in terms of the homogeneous cause; all others are mere capacities. These are the rescues proposed by them. The commentary does not cite them, and when stating that the refutation is incomplete, upon what grounds does it rely? Now I say: if the \*Vibhāṣā\* rescues it by saying that the function of seeing form and so forth does not extend into the past, and thus the three time periods are distinct, then although the five objects such as form are in the present, they also lack the function of seeing and so forth, and should be called the past. The \*Nyāyānusāra\* exclusively takes the function of grasping and giving results in terms of the cause of the same kind to be 'function' (kāritra). If it is distinguished because the homogeneous is superior, then the forbearance with the doctrine of suffering would not be able to arise, since it would lack a homogeneous cause and thus lack function. Furthermore, the five causes all have the nature of being a causal condition and can all grasp results; why would they not be functions? If they were not functions, they should not be causal conditions. Furthermore, the twelfth fascicle of the \*Vibhāṣā\* says: as for the equal-and-immediate condition, with the exception of the final mind and mental associates of an arhat, it consists of the remaining past and present minds and mental associates. Other masters say that it is also an equal-and-immediate condition, but the subsequent result does not arise. The judgment is that it should not be so; why is that? The equal-and-immediate condition is established on the basis of function. If a phenomenon serves as the equal-and-immediate condition for that phenomenon, no phenomenon and no sentient being can obstruct it from arising. The supreme worldly phenomena are not the final mind, and the subsequent \[mind\] is not of the same kind, so it may not be immediate; from this we know that the final mind of the one beyond training lacks function. Since it lacks function, why is it not the past? Thus our auxiliary objection holds. However, according to the \*Vibhāṣā\*, in the past there is also the function of grasping and giving results for the equal-and-immediate condition. Its tenth fascicle says: What is the equal-and-immediate condition? It states: having the meaning of sequence and having the meaning of giving function—this is giving the result. It further states: having the meaning of being able to produce the mind and having the meaning of leading forth—this is the meaning of grasping the result. It also states: being able to lead forth an equal-and-immediate phenomenon is called the equal-and-immediate condition; therefore we know that the equal-and-immediate condition has the meaning of grasping and giving.  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832~en-mt.4.10) — English, machine translation

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.4.10](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.4.10) · Pramāṇa
