[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [成唯識論了義燈](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832) › 4.19 # 成唯識論了義燈 4.19 成唯識論了義燈 4.19 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [4.19](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.4.19) 《論》：或名阿賴耶等。本云：但有能藏雜染及我見執，不說為染熏習所藏，不通果位，無熏習故。能緣執藏雖無我執，平等智緣亦通果位，所以但簡我執執藏。故《論》云：非無學位、不退菩薩，有雜染法執藏義故。執者，緣執、妄執，俱名為執。如言執受，執言通故，不唯妄執，故但簡染。不爾，但應云非無學位、不退菩薩有執藏義。何須說云：有雜染法執藏義故，故但說二，如下釋頌。初約一義，名阿賴耶，後更義釋，具足三義，不云唯以二義解藏，不違諸論。若如諸釋不假別文，即此論文可具三藏，即我見、愛等緣執我邊，是我愛執藏義，即能熏彼是所藏義，不可取藏雜染品法，即是染法能藏之義。以《攝大乘》釋雜染者，是諸轉識非阿賴耶，然此捨名。唯約緣縛斷伏盡位，名之為捨。非捨能藏、所藏之義，以雜染言，有漏三性皆名雜染，通於二障。無文唯說，是所知障。八地已去，五、七有漏，猶得現行能熏第八相、見二分，具能所藏，但無我執，即名為捨。故前文云：雖未斷盡異熟識中煩惱種子，而緣此識我見、愛等，不復執藏為自內我，由斯永捨阿賴耶名。不言能藏、所藏並無方名為捨。問：何故不同阿陀那，名失一之時，而名不捨？答：此約緣縛義，彼約自性義。若無我執，離能緣縛，捨賴耶名。雖無結生，猶執根、種，陀那不失。 > The Śāstra states: "Or it is named ālayavijñāna," etc. The root \[text/commentary\] states: It only has the function of storing defilements and being grasped by the view of self; it is not said to be stored by the perfuming of defilements, nor does it extend to the stage of fruition, because there is no perfuming \[in fruition\]. Although grasping as an object and storing does not have self-grasping, equality wisdom's taking it as an object also extends to the stage of fruition, so it merely eliminates being grasped and stored by self-grasping. Therefore the Śāstra states: "It is not that at the stage of non-learning and for non-retrogressing bodhisattvas there is the meaning of being grasped and stored by defiled phenomena." Grasping includes both cognitive grasping and erroneous grasping; both are called "grasping." Just as in the expression "grasped and received," the word "grasp" is broad, not referring solely to erroneous grasping; therefore it merely excludes defilement. Were it not so, it should simply say, "It is not that at the stage of non-learning and for non-retrogressing bodhisattvas there is the meaning of grasping and storing." Why would it need to say: "there is the meaning of being grasped and stored by defiled phenomena"? Therefore it states only two, as explained below in the verse. First, in terms of one meaning, it is named ālaya; later, by further semantic explanation, it possesses all three meanings. It does not say that "store" is explained solely by two meanings, thus not contradicting the treatises. If, following the various explanations, one does not rely on another text, this very treatise passage can possess the three stores: the aspect where self-view, self-love, and so forth cognitively grasp it as self is the meaning of being grasped and stored by self-love; that which can perfume it is the meaning of being that which is stored; and the impermissible storing of phenomena of the defiled category is the meaning of being that which stores defiled phenomena. Because the Mahāyānasaṃgraha explains defilements as the various transforming consciousnesses and not the ālaya. However, the relinquishment of this name is designated solely in terms of the stage where the bonds of cognitive objects are severed and subdued completely; it does not mean relinquishing the meanings of "storing" and "being stored." Because the term "defilement" encompasses all sāsrava natures of the three moral qualities, extending across both hindrances. There is no text stating that it is solely the hindrance to the knowable. From the eighth stage onwards, the sāsrava states of the five and seventh \[consciousnesses\] can still arise as samudācāra and perfume the object and subject aspects of the eighth consciousness, possessing both storing and being stored; but simply having no self-grasping, it is designated as relinquished. Therefore the preceding text states: "Although the affliction seeds within the vipāka consciousness are not yet completely severed, the self-view, love, and so forth that take this consciousness as an object no longer grasp and store it as an internal self; hence it eternally relinquishes the name ālayavijñāna." It does not say that only when storing and being stored are both absent is it called relinquished. Question: Why is it not like the ādāna, where when one \[aspect\] is lost, the name is not relinquished? Answer: This is in terms of the meaning of the bond of cognitive objects, whereas that is in terms of its essential nature. If self-grasping is absent, one is freed from the bond of cognitive objects and relinquishes the name ālaya. Although there is no connecting to rebirth, it still holds the sense faculties and seeds, so the ādāna is not lost. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 4.18](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.4.18) - [Next: 4.20](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.4.20) - [Up: 4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.4) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832~en-mt.4.19) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [成唯識論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.yogacara.trimsika!vijnaptimatratasiddhi*zh-xuanzang.3.90) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.4.19](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.4.19) · Pramāṇa