[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [成唯識論了義燈](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832) › 4.85 # 成唯識論了義燈 4.85 成唯識論了義燈 4.85 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [4.85](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.4.85) 《論》：「俱有所依。」護法義簡，取決定有境為主、為所依，簡餘非所依。令心、心所取自所緣，此即舉果顯因所依，若法雖杖託因緣起，而不能取自所緣者，果名有依，不名有所依。因緣望彼，但得為依，而非所依，何故如是，以《瑜伽論》唯心、心所，名有所依，餘不名有所依。若不作斯義門簡者，法有相濫。然《疏》云：而以義准，由少義理，謂自身識為依，非後為前，前為後依，及他為自依。《要集》云：此無相濫。此中既辨俱有依根，非前後故，自識不依他根而起，已極成故，故唯四義簡法已盡。今謂不爾，雖知四義簡法已周，論文不顯，但且對前諸師異說，辨彼非所依，不顯簡他及於前後，明是自身。若以言俱有，即不須簡非前後者，亦應云等無間，明前望後為等無間，何須復云前聚於後。下解開導，云於後生心、心所法，又本辨心、心法，何須說云謂有緣法？言心、心所豈非能緣。又如熏習，熏自極成，可須復簡他身前後，故今疏意。心、心所法杖因託緣，皆得名依，既論說云，展轉增上力，二識成決定，亦是自識因他識生，何故不簡？前後雖別，亦得名有，如前因果別時家，解《攝論》熏習，俱生俱滅，以前後法，同有生滅，云俱生俱滅。今前後心異遍計，故俱得名有，何故不簡，不以同是有，要非前後是俱有依。又云：《樞要》云：前三各具四義。若爾，決定簡法已盡，謂同境即顯有境，根本即為主故，由此證知，餘三無用。今謂此情不悟大意，何者本疏以論說俱有依？前明具義，後復云同境、不共、分別、染淨、根本所依不同，此之五種於前義中為具、不具。若其不具，得為所依，何須前義？要具為依，即是前三各具四義，四義隨有，即具前義，方是所依，由是身根望眼等四識，非彼五種，故非所依。《要集》云：今解身根為主義簡者。今謂不爾，論文本意，為主一義。以王簡臣，不簡身根。若云雖有身根，四根若𨷂，四識不生，故知不依者不然，亦雖有第六，若無身根，身識不起，豈許身識不依第六？故不以主簡別身根。又《樞要》言順取所緣者，解同境根，若同境根亦具前義，不解有境義，不得妄難，故七依八，即不同境，故知不約順取境義，說有境義。若順、不順皆有境故，智者當察。問：今解俱有依根，既以有境，簡去種子，豈可種子非俱有依。若非是依，種應非根，便違聖說，眼等五根皆通種、現。答：論根通種、現，今護法辨依、所依別，現根用勝，名為所依，種根非勝，不說所依。若取種根，為俱有所依者，自種應是。今辨俱有所依，不依解根義，故不取種。 > The Treatise says: "Co-arising supports." Dharmapāla's qualifying differentiation takes that which definitively possesses an object, acts as master, and acts as the supported, to qualify and exclude other things that are not supports, causing the mind and mental factors to apprehend their own referent objects. This cites the result to illuminate the support of the cause. If a phenomenon, though arising in reliance on cause-conditions, cannot apprehend its own referent object, its result is called 'having a support' (youyi), not 'possessing a support' (yousuoyi). With respect to it, the cause-condition can only be a support (yi), not that which is relied upon (suoyi). Why is this so? Because the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra states that only the mind and mental factors are called 'possessing a support', while other phenomena are not called 'possessing a support'. If one does not make this qualifying distinction, phenomena would be conflated. However, the Commentary says: Yet inferring conceptually from a minor point of doctrine, it means the consciousness of one's own continuum serves as the support, not subsequent for prior, nor prior for subsequent, nor another's for one's own. The Yaoji says: "There is no conflation here. Since we are here discerning the faculties as co-arising supports, which are not before and after, and it is already fully established that one's own consciousness does not arise relying on another's faculties, these four criteria alone completely qualify the phenomena." I now say this is not so. Although we know these four criteria comprehensively qualify the phenomena, the text of the Treatise does not make it explicit; it merely discerns against the divergent doctrines of the earlier masters that those things are not supports, without explicitly excluding others or prior and posterior to clarify that it is one's own continuum. If, because it says 'co-arising', one does not need to qualify non-temporality, then for equal-and-immediate support, since it clarifies that the prior serves as equal-and-immediate with respect to the posterior, why must it again say 'the prior collection with respect to the posterior'? Below, in explaining opening-and-guiding, it says 'with respect to the subsequently arising mind and mental factors'. Furthermore, since it originally discerns mind and mental factors, why must it say 'namely, phenomena with cognitive objects'? In speaking of mind and mental factors, are they not cognitive agents? Moreover, just as in perfuming, perfuming one's own continuum is fully established; does one need to qualify another's continuum and prior and posterior? Therefore, the intention of the present Commentary is that when mind and mental factors rely on causes and conditions, they can all be called 'supported'. Since the Treatise says: "Through the reciprocal sovereign power, the two consciousnesses become determinate," this is also one's own consciousness arising due to another consciousness; why not qualify it? Although prior and posterior are distinct, they can both be termed 'existent' (you). Just as the school asserting different times for cause and effect, when explaining 'co-arising and co-ceasing' in perfuming in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, says 'co-arising and co-ceasing' because prior and posterior phenomena equally possess arising and ceasing; here, because prior and posterior minds differ from conceptual constructions, both can be termed 'existent'; why not qualify it? It is not that because they are equally existent, they must be non-temporal to be a co-arising support. Furthermore, it says: The Essential Summaries states that the first three each possess the four criteria. If so, they definitively qualify phenomena completely: having the same object manifests possessing an object, and being fundamental manifests being the master; from this it is proven that the remaining three are useless. I now say this opinion fails to understand the great import. Why? The Root Commentary bases itself on the Treatise's discussion of co-arising supports: first it clarifies the criteria, and then it states the distinctions of shared-object, uncommon, discriminating, defiled-pure, and fundamental supports. Do these five possess or lack the aforementioned criteria? If they lack them and yet can be supports, why were the previous criteria needed? They must possess them to be supports; this means the first three each possess the four criteria. Whichever possesses the four criteria possesses the previous meaning, only then becoming a support. Because of this, the body faculty, with respect to the eye and other four consciousnesses, is not those five kinds, and is therefore not their support. The Yaoji says: "We now explain that the body faculty is excluded by the criterion of 'acting as master'." I now say this is not so. The original intention of the Treatise's text was to use the single criterion of 'acting as master' to qualify sovereign from subordinate, not to qualify the body faculty. If one says that although there is a body faculty, if the four faculties are missing the four consciousnesses do not arise, and therefore we know they do not rely on it, this is not correct: similarly, although there is a sixth consciousness, without the body faculty the body consciousness does not arise; could one grant that the body consciousness does not rely on the sixth? Therefore, one does not use 'master' to exclude the body faculty. Moreover, when the Essential Summaries speaks of 'conformingly apprehending the referent object', it explains the shared-object faculty; if the shared-object faculty also possesses the previous criteria, it does not explain the meaning of possessing an object, and one must not recklessly object. Therefore, the seventh relies on the eighth without sharing the same object; thus we know that possessing an object is not stated in terms of conformingly apprehending an object. Whether conforming or not, they all possess objects; the wise should examine this. Question: In the present explanation of the co-arising support faculty, since possessing an object excludes seeds, can seeds not be a co-arising support? If they are not a support, seeds would not be faculties, contradicting the sacred teaching that the five faculties such as the eye extend to both seeds and actualities. Answer: The Treatise says faculties extend to seeds and actualities; now Dharmapāla discerns the distinction between support (yi) and that which is relied upon (suoyi): the actual faculty's function is superior, so it is called 'that which is relied upon'; the seed faculty is not superior, so it is not called 'that which is relied upon'. If one takes the seed faculty as a co-arising support, one's own seed should be it. Here, in discerning the co-arising support, it does not rely on explaining the meaning of faculties, and therefore does not take seeds. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 4.84](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.4.84) - [Next: 4.86](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.4.86) - [Up: 4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.4) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832~en-mt.4.85) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [成唯識論述記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.4.950) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.4.85](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.4.85) · Pramāṇa