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# 成唯識論了義燈 6.4

成唯識論了義燈 6.4

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [6.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.6.4)

問：難他心智，應緣外境。今云：緣自心非親緣他心，亦應如鏡為緣，還見自質者。為鏡喻心？為當取質？答：設爾何失？二俱有過。以鏡喻心，應云以鏡為緣，還見自鏡故，心為緣還見自心，如何得云還見自質？以質喻心為難准此。答：二解：一云，且約散位應云如質，以鏡為緣，還見自質。今他心智以他心緣，還見自心；二云，約定如定為緣，自心變作種種影像不離自心，如似散心，以鏡為緣，還見本質。非離於質，鏡中別生。問：自心他為緣，還能見自心，自質鏡為緣，質不能見，質如何為喻？答：喻取少分，如似眼質，以鏡為緣，還見眼質。故云還見自質，雖所見非眼，眼依處故，隨世俗故。問：所見之中，據大乘宗質、相有別，云何得云還見自質？答：攝相從質，以似於質，據實所見，親見自相，取少分喻，喻他心智等所取之境，皆悉無過。故《無性論》第五云：非等引地善惡思業，本質為緣，影像果生，亦復如是。問：諸迷亂見所見影像，以何為體？何處所攝？答：獨頭、散意分別，妄執謂鏡有影等，是迷亂等所見影像，何處攝者？《要集》云：有說還是色處似前相故者，本疏無文。本釋〈法苑法處章〉中云：影像色是色處者，據獨意識散，緣五塵名分別意。以相從質，在色處攝，不解鏡中執有實色為影像者，法師本釋不託於質，妄執鏡像為實有者，是法處中遍計所起。問：《顯揚論》中五塵色境亦有影像色；法處色中定所行境，亦有影像色；遍計色中亦有影像色。有何差別？答：色處影像有其二解：一云，分別意識緣五塵相，以境對根應法處攝。今者從質及所生果故色處收；二云，五識所變名影像色，本識所變為所餘色，以根對境，第八所變，應法處收。以闇從明，故色處攝。二解俱得，然第二勝　遍計影像，前已略辨，定所行者，所變金等，無實用等名定影像。問：以鏡為緣，何故不言，還見自影，緣影像故。答：緣影不極成，攝相云見質。

> Question: In refuting the knowledge of others' minds, it should be that it conditions an external object. Now you say: it conditions one's own mind and does not directly condition another's mind; it should also be that, like taking a mirror as a condition, one turns back to see one's own archetype. Does the mirror serve as a metaphor for the mind, or should one take the archetype? Answer: Supposing it is so, what fault is there? Both have faults. If the mirror is taken as a metaphor for the mind, one should say that taking the mirror as a condition, one turns back to see one's own mirror; thus, taking the mind as a condition, one turns back to see one's own mind—how could one say 'one turns back to see one's own archetype'? Taking the archetype as a metaphor for the mind is to be questioned in the same way. Answer: There are two explanations. One says: provisionally speaking in terms of the dispersed state, one should say that, like the archetype, taking the mirror as a condition, one turns back to see one's own archetype. Now, the knowledge of others' minds, with another's mind as a condition, turns back to see one's own mind. The second says: speaking in terms of meditative concentration, just as concentration serves as a condition, one's own mind transforms into various reflected images that are not separate from one's own mind, like a dispersed mind which, taking a mirror as a condition, turns back to see the original archetype. It is not that, separate from the archetype, a distinct \[entity\] is generated in the mirror. Question: One's own mind, taking another as a condition, can still see one's own mind; but one's own archetype, taking a mirror as a condition, cannot see—how can the archetype serve as a metaphor? Answer: The metaphor takes a partial aspect: just as the archetype of the eye, taking the mirror as a condition, turns back to see the archetype of the eye. Hence it is said: 'turns back to see one's own archetype.' Although what is seen is not the eye, it is the basis of the eye, conforming to conventional truth. Question: Among what is seen, according to the Mahāyāna school the archetype and the image-aspect (pratibimba) are distinct; how can one say 'turns back to see one's own archetype'? Answer: Subsuming the image-aspect under the archetype, because it resembles the archetype; in terms of what is truly seen, one directly sees one's own image-aspect. Taking a partial metaphor to illustrate the objects grasped by the knowledge of others' minds and the like is completely without fault. Therefore, Asvabhāva's Commentary (Mahāyānasaṃgrahopanibandhana), fascicle 5, states: 'Wholesome and unwholesome volitional karma of the uncollected levels, taking the archetype as a condition, gives rise to the reflected fruit; it is just like this.' Question: For all deluded views, what is the substantial entity of the reflected images seen, and under what category are they subsumed? Answer: Solitary, dispersed conceptual thought falsely grasps that the mirror contains an image and so forth; as for where these reflected images seen by deluded \[views\] are subsumed, the Yaoji states: 'Some say it is still the base of forms (rūpāyatana), because it resembles the preceding characteristic.' In the original subcommentary there is no such text. The original explanation in the 'Chapter on the Base of Phenomena' in the Fayuan states: 'The reflected form is the base of forms,' referring to the solitary manovijñāna in a dispersed state conditioning the five dusts, called conceptual mind. Subsuming the aspect under the archetype, it is subsumed under the base of forms; this does not address the case of grasping a real form in a mirror as a reflected image. The master's original explanation is that without relying on an archetype, falsely grasping a mirror image as truly existent is an imagined \[form\] within the base of phenomena (dharmāyatana). Question: In the Prakaraṇāryavācā-śāstra, the form-objects of the five dusts also have reflected form; within the forms of the base of phenomena, the sphere of meditative concentration also has reflected form; and among imagined forms, there is also reflected form. What is the difference? Answer: Reflected forms belonging to the base of forms have two explanations: One says that the conceptual manovijñāna conditions the characteristics of the five dusts; matching the object against the sense faculty, it should be subsumed under the base of phenomena. Now, in accordance with the archetype and the fruit produced, it is included in the base of forms. The second says: what is transformed by the five consciousnesses is called reflected form, while what is transformed by the fundamental consciousness is the remaining form; matching the sense faculty against the object, what is transformed by the eighth \[consciousness\] should be included in the base of phenomena. Subsuming the dark under the luminous, it is subsumed under the base of forms. Both explanations are admissible, but the second is superior. Imagined reflections have already been briefly discriminated earlier; those belonging to meditative concentration, such as transformed gold and the like which lack real utility, are called reflections of meditative concentration. Question: Taking the mirror as a condition, why does it not say 'turns back to see one's own reflection', since it conditions a reflected image? Answer: Conditioning a reflection is not mutually accepted; subsuming the aspect \[under the archetype\], it says 'seeing the archetype'.  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832~en-mt.6.4) — English, machine translation

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.6.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1832.6.4) · Pramāṇa
