[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [唯識二十論述記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1834) › 2.37 # 唯識二十論述記 2.37 唯識二十論述記 2.37 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [2.37](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1834.2.37) 述曰：經部等極微有一實體，唯意識境；薩婆多師等亦有一實體，十處所攝，六識之境。然汝所執一實極微，我不許有，理既不成，故說極微和合、和集，義皆乖返。然《觀所緣論》破經部師言：「色等和合於眼識等上，有彼相故，設作所緣，以麁顯故，識現相故，然無緣義，無實體故，如眼錯亂見第二月。彼無實體，不能生故。」遂立量云：「和合於五識設所緣非緣；彼體實無故；猶如第二月。」《成唯識論》復破彼言：「非和合相異諸極微有實自體，分折彼時，似彼相識定不生故，彼和合相既非實有，故不可說是五識緣，勿第二月等能生五識故。」此中難意：若有實極微，容有和合假，能合實非有，所合假成無。《觀所緣緣論》破正理師言：「如堅等相雖是實有，於眼等識容有緣義，而非所緣，眼等識上無彼相故，色等極微諸和集相，理亦應爾，彼俱執為極微相故。」遂立量云：「極微和集相設於眼等識是緣非所緣，許極微相故，猶如堅、濕等。」執眼等識能緣極微諸和集相，復有別生，瓶甌等覺相，彼執應無別，非形別故別，形別非實故；又不應執極微亦有差別形相。所以者何？極微量等故，形別唯在假，拆彼至極微，彼覺定捨故。《成唯識論》復作是說：「彼執不然，共和集位與未集時，體相一故，瓶、甌等物極微等者，緣彼相識應無別故。共和集位一一極微，各各應捨微、圓相故，非麁相識緣細相境，勿餘境識緣餘境故，一識應緣一切境故。」此論但有破本極微既非實有，所成和集理實不成，種種推徵，如餘論說。 > Commentary: The atom of the Sautrāntikas and others has a single substantial entity and is solely an object of mental consciousness; for the Sarvāstivāda masters and others, it also has a single substantial entity, is subsumed under the ten āyatanas, and is an object of the six consciousnesses. However, as for the single substantial atom held by you, I do not accept its existence; and since it is logically untenable, to say that atoms are composed or aggregated is in every sense contradictory. Now, the Ālambanaparīkṣā, in refuting the Sautrāntika master, says: 'Because composed forms and so on have that aspect upon the eye consciousness and the like, even if they act as the object (ālambana) because they are coarse and apparent, and the consciousness manifests their aspect, they lack the sense of a condition (pratyaya), because they lack a substantial entity, like an eye with impaired vision seeing a second moon. Because it has no substantial entity, it cannot produce \[the consciousness\].' Thereupon it establishes the inference: 'Composition, in relation to the five consciousnesses, may be an object but is not a condition (pratijñā); because its entity is substantially non-existent (hetu); like the second moon (dṛṣṭānta).' The Cheng weishi lun further refutes them, saying: 'It is not the case that the aspect of composition has a real intrinsic nature distinct from all the atoms, for when they are broken apart, the consciousness resembling that aspect definitely does not arise; since that aspect of composition is not substantially real, it cannot be said to be a condition for the five consciousnesses, lest a second moon and the like could generate the five consciousnesses.' The gist of the objection here is: if there were real atoms, there could conceivably be a nominal composition; but if the composing real \[elements\] do not exist, the composed nominal \[entity\] becomes non-existent. The Ālambanaparīkṣā, in refuting the master of the Nyāyānusāra, says: 'Although characteristics such as solidity are substantially real, they may conceivably have the sense of a condition in relation to the eye consciousness and so on, but they are not the object, because their aspect is absent from the eye consciousness and the like; the various aggregated aspects of atoms of form and so on should logically be the same, because they both hold them to be aspects of atoms.' Thereupon it establishes the inference: 'The aggregated aspects of atoms, even if conditions for the eye consciousness and so on, are not objects (pratijñā); because they are accepted as aspects of atoms (hetu); like solidity, wetness, and so forth (dṛṣṭānta).' Holding that the eye consciousness and so on can perceive the aggregated aspects of atoms, there would furthermore arise different cognitive aspects of pots, bowls, and the like; their position should entail that there is no difference \[between them\], for the difference is not due to shape, shape-difference being unreal; nor should one hold that atoms also have differentiated shapes and aspects. Why is this? Because atoms are equal in dimension; difference in shape pertains only to the nominal, and when breaking them down to atoms, that cognition is definitely discarded. The Cheng weishi lun further says: 'Their position is not correct: when aggregated together, the substance and aspects are identical with when they are unaggregated; therefore, the consciousness taking as its object the aspect of things such as pots and bowls whose atoms are equal should have no difference. In the state of aggregation together, each and every atom should forfeit its subtle and spherical aspect; it is not that a consciousness of a coarse aspect can take as its object a subtle-aspect sphere, lest a consciousness of one object take another object, and one consciousness would take all objects.' This treatise merely refutes the original atom as not substantially real, whereby the resulting aggregation is logically not established; the various deductions are as explained in the other treatises. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 2.36](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1834.2.36) - [Next: 2.38](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1834.2.38) - [Up: 2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1834.2) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1834~en-mt.2.37) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1834.2.37](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1834.2.37) · Pramāṇa