[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [唯識二十論述記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1834) › 2.75 # 唯識二十論述記 2.75 唯識二十論述記 2.75 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [2.75](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1834.2.75) 述曰：此重顯成，破聚無合。汝之聚色許有方分，亦不許相合，返顯成立極微無合不由無方分。若由無方分，執極微無合，聚既有方分，聚色應有合。此中乃有法之差別，及有法差別隨一不成，非遍是宗法，同喻能立不成，異喻所立不遣。合有六過，所以者何？彼立量云：如我所說極微無合；無方分故；如心、心所。實微無合，非實微無合，是法差別，作實微緣性不作實微緣性。有礙、無礙，名有法差別。此因非但能成無合，如是亦能成無合宗法非實微無合，及成有法作非實微緣性，及無質礙。若說汝實微無方分故，他隨一不成。若說我假微無合，無方分故，因不遍宗法，我說假微有方分故。若以聚色亦無合故，為微同品，能立不成，說諸聚色，有方分故。若以聚色有方分故，為因異品，所立不遣，以諸聚色雖有方分亦無合故。此中亦有如電、日等無常同品，勤勇之因，於此無故。同喻之中，能立不成，以電、日等為因異法，有無常故，所立不遣。為例難者，此亦不然，今他但以聚，為極微異法之喻，無合故，便有所立不遣之失。非聲無常宗，電等為異法，故無所立不遣之過。故今此論但顯他量有此所立不遣之失，自餘五過，今助顯之，非本論意，善因明者，當自詳之。 > The Commentary says: This reiterates the establishment, refuting that aggregates have no conjunction. Your aggregate forms are accepted to have spatial divisions and yet are not accepted to conjoin; this in turn demonstrates that paramāṇus having no conjunction is not due to lacking spatial divisions. If, due to lacking spatial divisions, one clings to paramāṇus having no conjunction, then since aggregates have spatial divisions, aggregate forms should have conjunction. Herein there are \[the fallacies of\] particularity of the predicate (dharma-viśeṣa-viparyaya), particularity of the subject (dharmi-viśeṣa-viparyaya), unestablished for either party (anyatarāsiddha), lack of universal presence in the subject (asvapara-pratijñārtha-hetu / bhāgāsiddha), unestablished sadhya-property in the positive example (sādhya-vikala), and non-exclusion of the sadhya-property in the negative example (sādhyāvyāvṛtta). Altogether there are six fallacies. Why is that? They formulate an anumāna: 'As I state, paramāṇus have no conjunction; because they lack spatial divisions; like the mind and mental factors.' Real paramāṇus have no conjunction, and non-real paramāṇus have no conjunction: these are particularities of the predicate; being the condition for real paramāṇus versus not being the condition for real paramāṇus, possessing resistance versus lacking resistance: these are called particularities of the subject. This hetu not only proves non-conjunction, but in like manner also proves the predicate's particularity of non-conjunction in non-real paramāṇus, and proves the subject's particularity of being a condition for non-real paramāṇus, as well as lacking physical resistance. If one says that your real paramāṇu lacks spatial divisions, it is unestablished for the other party (anyatarāsiddha). If one says that my nominal paramāṇu has no conjunction because it lacks spatial divisions, the hetu is not pervasive of the subject, because I say nominal paramāṇus have spatial divisions. If, because aggregate form also has no conjunction, it is taken as a positive instance (sapakṣa) of paramāṇus, the sadhya is unestablished (sādhana-vikala / sādhya-vikala), because aggregate forms are said to have spatial divisions. If, because aggregate form has spatial divisions, it is taken as a negative instance (vipakṣa) for the hetu, the sadhya is not excluded (sādhyāvyāvṛtta), because although aggregate forms have spatial divisions, they also have no conjunction. In this context, there is also the case where, as with lightning and the sun being positive instances of impermanence, the hetu 'produced by effort' is absent therein, so in the positive example the prover is unestablished; yet if lightning and the sun are taken as negative instances for the hetu, because they possess impermanence, the proved property is not excluded. As for using this as an analogy to object, this too is not correct: now the other party merely takes aggregates as the negative example for paramāṇus, and because it has no conjunction, there is the fault of non-exclusion of the property to be proved. It is not like the thesis that sound is impermanent where lightning and so forth are negative instances, so there is no fault of non-exclusion of the property to be proved. Therefore, this treatise now merely reveals that the other's anumāna has this fault of non-exclusion of the property to be proved; the remaining five faults are now shown additionally by me, not being the primary intention of the root treatise. Those skilled in hetuvidyā should examine this for themselves. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 2.74](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1834.2.74) - [Next: 2.76](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1834.2.76) - [Up: 2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1834.2) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1834~en-mt.2.75) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1834.2.75](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1834.2.75) · Pramāṇa