[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [因明入正理論疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1840) › 2.14 # 因明入正理論疏 2.14 因明入正理論疏 2.14 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [2.14](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1840.2.14) 古師復云：「若爾何失？縱同外道亦何過耶？」如外道說有五根識，佛法亦有，非為失故。陳那難云：「此說但應類所立義，無有功能，非能立義。由彼但說所作性故所類同法，不說能立所成立義。」此中難意：我亦不說同於外道說極成義名之為失，由同彼說不極成義有過失故。謂諸古師同外道說，聲無常宗，所作性因，同喻如瓶，異喻如空，不極成義。陳那難云：「若說瓶體，空體為喻，但應以瓶類於所立無常之義，既喻不言諸所作者皆是無常，舉瓶證聲無有功能，其喻便非能立之義。」由彼舉因，但說所作法，舉瓶類聲同無常，不說能立諸所作者，及與所立皆是無常，故無功能，非能立義。又若以瓶即為喻體，瓶即四塵，可燒可見，聲亦應爾。若我如說所作者皆是無常，譬如瓶等。所作既為宗正同法，無常隨之亦決定轉，舉瓶喻依以顯其事，便無一切皆相類失。汝既不然，故有前過。陳那又難：「又因、喻別，此有所立同法、異法，終不能顯因與所立不相離性，是故但有類所立義，然無功能。」此意難言：因、喻既別，同喻但有所立無常，異喻無此。汝同喻不說諸所作者皆是無常，異喻不雙無，終不能顯所作性因與所立無常不相離性。總結之云：是故但有類所立義，然無功能，非能立義。 > The ancient master said again: 'If so, what is the fault? Even if it is the same as non-Buddhists, what error is there?' Just as non-Buddhists say there are five sense consciousnesses, and the Buddhadharma also has them, this is not a fault. Diṅnāga objected: 'Such a statement can only analogize the probandum; it has no functional efficacy and is not a proving statement. Because they merely state the property of being produced as an analogized similar dharma, without stating the proving and the to-be-proved meanings.' The meaning of the objection here is: I am not saying that being identical to non-Buddhists in stating a mutually established meaning is a fault; rather, it is because of the fault in following their statement of an unestablished meaning. That is, the ancient masters followed the non-Buddhists in stating the unestablished meaning of: thesis: sound is impermanent; reason: because of being produced; similar example: like a pot; dissimilar example: like space. Diṅnāga objected: 'If one states the substance of the pot and the substance of space as examples, one would merely be analogizing the pot to the posited meaning of impermanence. Since the example does not state "whatever is produced is impermanent", citing the pot to prove sound has no functional efficacy, and the example is therefore not a proving statement.' Because when they presented the reason, they only stated the property of being produced and cited the pot to analogize sound as being similarly impermanent, without stating the prover 'whatever is produced' and the proved 'all are impermanent', it has no efficacy and is not a proving statement. Moreover, if the pot itself is the substance of the example, the pot consists of the four sensory elements, and can be burned and seen; sound would then also have to be like this. According to our statement, 'Whatever is produced is impermanent, as in the case of a pot, etc.' Since being produced is the true similar property of the thesis, impermanence following it also definitely occurs; citing the pot as the substrate of the example to illustrate this matter avoids the fault of everything being analogized indiscriminately. Since you do not do this, you incur the aforementioned fault. Diṅnāga further objected: 'Furthermore, the reason and the example being distinct, this \[example\] has the similar dharma and dissimilar dharma of the probandum, but ultimately cannot demonstrate the inseparability of the reason and the probandum; therefore, it only has the meaning of analogizing the probandum, but lacks functional efficacy.' The meaning of this objection is: since the reason and the example are distinct, the similar example only possesses the probandum 'impermanence', while the dissimilar example lacks this. Your similar example does not state 'whatever is produced is impermanent', nor does your dissimilar example lack both; ultimately, you cannot demonstrate the inseparable connection between the reason of being produced and the probandum of impermanence. Concluding in summary, he says: therefore, it only has the meaning of analogizing the probandum, but lacks functional efficacy and is not a proving statement. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 2.13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1840.2.13) - [Next: 2.15](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1840.2.15) - [Up: 2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1840.2) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1840~en-mt.2.14) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1840.2.14](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1840.2.14) · Pramāṇa