[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [因明入正理論疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1840) › 3.13 # 因明入正理論疏 3.13 因明入正理論疏 3.13 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [3.13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1840.3.13) 此一似因，因仍用舊，喻改先立；後之三因，因、喻皆舊。由是四因，因必仍舊，喻任改同。若不爾者，必無法自相與餘隨一合，可成違二因，許初改喻，後三不改故。又九因中第四、第六名相違因，要同非有、異有或俱。若隨所立，後三相違，直觀立者因於同有，如何復難成相違耶？《理門》但言：「若法能成相違所立，是相違過，即名似因。」不說同喻亦仍用舊。此論示法，初一改喻，後三依舊，欲令學者知因決定，非喻前過故。下之三因，觀立雖成，反為相違，一一窮究，皆亦唯是同無異有，成相違故，至下當知。 > In this single fallacious reason, the reason still uses the old one, but the example is altered from what was previously established; in the latter three reasons, both reason and example are the old ones. Because these four are reasons, the reason must remain the old one, whereas the example may be altered to a similar one at will. Were it not so, there would certainly be no case where the own-nature of the property could combine with any one of the rest to form a reason contradicting two, since it is accepted that the first alters the example, while the latter three do not alter it. Furthermore, the fourth and sixth among the nine reasons are named contradictory reasons, requiring non-existence in similar instances and presence in or both \[presence and absence in\] dissimilar instances. If according to what is established, in the latter three contradictions, looking directly at the proponent's reason, it exists in the similar instances; how then could it again be objected to as being contradictory? The Nyāyamukha merely says: 'If a factor can establish the opposite of what is to be established, it is a contradictory fault, namely called a fallacious reason.' It does not say that the similar example also still uses the old one. The presentation of the method in this treatise—the first one altering the example and the latter three keeping the old one—is intended to let learners know that the reason is decisive and not that the example had the previous fault. Although the latter three reasons are established when viewed from the proponent's standpoint, they turn out to be contradictory: when investigated one by one, all are likewise only absent from similar instances and present in dissimilar instances, thereby becoming contradictory, as will be understood below. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 3.12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1840.3.12) - [Next: 3.14](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1840.3.14) - [Up: 3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1840.3) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1840~en-mt.3.13) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1840.3.13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1840.3.13) · Pramāṇa