[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [因明入正理論疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1840) › 3.26 # 因明入正理論疏 3.26 因明入正理論疏 3.26 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [3.26](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1840.3.26) 今指彼論，故言如說。有性有法，非實者法，合名為宗。此言有性，仙人、五頂兩所共許，實、德、業上能非無性，故成所別。若說大有，所別不成，因犯隨一。此之有性體非即實，因云有一實故。勝論六句束為四類：一者無實、二者有一實、三者有二實、四者有多實。地、水、火、風、父母、常、極微、空、時、方、我、意并德、業、和合，皆名無實。四本極微，體性雖多，空、時等五體各唯一，皆無實因。德、業、和合雖依於實，和合於實，非以為因，故此等類並名無實。大有、同異名有一實，俱能有於一一實故。至劫成初，兩常極微合，生第三子微，雖體無常，量德合故，不越因量，名有二實。自類眾多，各各有彼，因二極微之所生故。自此已後，初三三合生第七子，七七合生第十五子，如是展轉生一大地，皆名有多實，有多實因之所生故。大有、同異能有諸實，亦得名為有一實、有二實、有多實。然此三種實等雖有，功能各別，皆有大有令體非無，皆有同異令三類別，名有一實、有德、業者，亦有無有，非大有也。若是大有，因成隨一，同異非喻，能立不成。如佛法言有色、有漏，有漏之有，能有之法，能有所有煩惱漏體，猶如大有能有實等。有色之言，如有一實及有德等，無別能有而有於色。此色體上有其色義，如空有聲，非空之外別有能有，但是屬著法體之言。是故於因無隨一過，有一一實故，更不須徵，即實離實之有一實。況復此因不應分別，應分別者便無同喻。 > Now referring to that treatise, it says, 'for instance, stating'. 'Existence' is the subject (dharmin), and 'is not a substance' is the predicate (dharma); combined, they are called the thesis (pratijñā). This word 'existence' (bhāva) is accepted by both the ṛṣi and Pañcaśikha as the capacity to not be non-existent upon substance, quality, and action; hence it serves as the subject. If he had said 'Great Existence', the subject would not be established, and the reason would commit the fault of being unestablished for one party (anyatarāsiddha). This existence is not intrinsically substance, because the reason says: 'because it possesses one substance'. The six categories of the Vaiśeṣika are condensed into four classes: first, having no substance; second, having one substance; third, having two substances; fourth, having many substances. Earth, water, fire, wind, parent permanent subtle atoms, space, time, direction, self, and mind, together with quality, action, and inherence, are all called 'having no substance'. Although the four primary subtle atoms are multiple in nature, the five—space, time, and so forth—are each unique in substance, and none of them has a substance as its cause. Although quality, action, and inherence reside in substance and inhere in substance, they do not take substance as their cause; hence these classes are all called 'having no substance'. Great Existence and commonality-particularity are called 'having one substance', because both can have each individual substance. When the initial stage of cosmic formation is reached, two permanent subtle atoms combine to produce a third, a daughter atom; although it is impermanent in substance, because its dimension quality combines, it does not exceed the causal dimension; this is called 'having two substances'. Its own kind being manifold, each has that, because it is produced from two subtle atoms. From this point on, three initial atoms combine to produce a seventh daughter atom, and seven of these combine to produce a fifteenth daughter atom, and proceeding in this manner an entire great earth is produced; all of these are called 'having many substances', because they are produced from many substantial causes. Great Existence and commonality-particularity can have various substances, and thus may also be called 'having one substance', 'having two substances', or 'having many substances'. However, although these three kinds—substance and so forth—exist, their functions are distinct: they all have Great Existence causing their nature to not be non-existent, and they all have commonality-particularity causing the three classes to be distinct. When it is said 'possesses one substance' and 'possesses quality and action', this also refers to non-Great-Existence, not to Great Existence. If it were Great Existence, the reason would be unestablished for one party, commonality-particularity would not serve as an example, and the probans would be unestablished. Just as in the Buddha's teaching one says 'possessing form' (rūpin) or 'possessing defilements' (sāsrava): the 'possession' of defilements is the possessing dharma that possesses all the entities of defilement and outflows, just as Great Existence possesses substance and so forth. The expression 'possessing form' is like 'possessing one substance' and 'possessing quality and so forth'; there is no separate possessing entity that possesses form. Upon the substance of this form there is its meaning of form, just as space has sound; it is not that outside space there is a separate possessing entity, but it is merely an expression of pertenence to the entity of the phenomenon. Therefore, there is no fault of being unestablished for one party in the reason. Because it possesses each individual substance, there is no need to question further whether 'possessing one substance' is identical with substance or separate from substance. Furthermore, this reason should not be qualified; if it were qualified, there would be no homologous example. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 3.25](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1840.3.25) - [Next: 3.27](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1840.3.27) - [Up: 3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1840.3) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1840~en-mt.3.26) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1840.3.26](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1840.3.26) · Pramāṇa