[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [因明義斷](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1841) › 1.23 # 因明義斷 1.23 因明義斷 1.23 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [1.23](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1841.1.23) 有人難云：若言夫喻況法，法必似喻者。未知能喻所喻之法，其體為一為別？若言一者，體既是一，彼此共知，何待因成？若言別者，即明別體之法，有別同相、有因義者，引之為喻，何得例難，令法體相一切皆同。其義云何？答：此義不然。若取瓶體為喻，此與聲宗為一為別？若言是一，即同前難，又有多過。若言別者，何得名同法？若云聲有所作，瓶亦有所作，故名同法者。不然。何以故？應云顯瓶決定有無常，何須云顯因同品決定有性，因是所作瓶上之義，豈可瓶體名所作性？若爾，應聲體為所作體。若如是，即取有法聲名之為因，還成宗義一分為因，宗因無別過。餘多問難，得失例知，煩不具述。然既取瓶為喻，將作殊能，今者據彼略舉三難。一云：古師許瓶燒見理，令自許聲燒見者。陳那順此作難：為以聲是燒見？為非燒見？若自許，即相符極成。若自不許，今者難他何非自違耶者？不然。由彼取瓶為同喻體，陳那就他為難云：汝所許聲，應可燒見，猶如瓶等。如難勝論云：汝地應非有礙身根所得，許眼見故，猶如色等。豈自不許地身根得而為難耶？故就他難，即無自過，明非自許。二云：故《理門》釋喻中云「由如是說，能顯示因同品定有、異品遍無，非顛倒說。」既不取瓶，此乃重頌前因，云何能顯因也。如言聲無常，所作性故，諸所作皆無常，如所作無常等。豈成能立者。不然。前所作無常，但別宗因。後舉諸所作，總攝宗喻。無常亦爾，不唯重頌，亦正是合，故定所作無常是喻體。若如先所說，取瓶為喻體，即應直指瓶，何須重舉諸勤發皆無常，猶如瓶等耶？又若取瓶體為喻，成立聲無常等，何故云「說因宗所隨，宗無因不有」，不言「說瓶因所隨，瓶無因不有」。此二名譬喻，餘皆此相似。又云：應以非作證其常，或以無常成所作。此顯正說，應以所作成無常，以常離所作，不言以瓶證無常。故正喻體，所作無常，舉依以顯。若不如是，舉瓶即知定有所作。舉喻之時但云如瓶，何須俱牒宗因，云諸所作皆是無常，猶如瓶等？何須煩重？又瓶為喻體，即因外立別法為喻，與其因義都不相應。乃至云：所作性故，所類同法不說能立所成立義。此意不說能立之因、所立宗義以為喻故。又因所作性，喻體即瓶，以瓶有所作故無常，不是所作無常為同品。即唯宗法名因，瓶體非因。雖瓶體上有於因宗，終是大過。故《理門》云「若唯宗法是因性者，其有不定應亦成因。」云何具有所立能立及異品法二種譬喻，而有此失？准此論文，故不取瓶等體正為其喻。三云：陳那意，以外人立無義之因，於同異品義相各別。以義別，不得和合正說。為非彼義，故云喻顯於因，無別喻體者。亦不然。准此意許，若有義之因，因外立喻，即取瓶等。若爾，何得喻是因分？因是所作，瓶四塵故。即違《理門》。彼云「若爾，喻言應非異分。」答云：事雖實爾。然此因言，唯為顯了是宗法性，非為顯了同品異品、有性無性。故立同異，顯後二品。因言顯初相，即聲所作。同顯第二，故瓶所作。若以同顯第二即取瓶體，因顯初相應當取聲。既詮初相，取聲上所作故。詮第二相，取瓶所作。故下文云「故定三相，唯為顯因」。由此道理，雖一切分皆能為因、顯了所立，然唯一分且說為因，故第二分明。亦所作不可難言，即第三分說為異喻亦應所作。第三遮詮，故不為例。又第三相異遍非有。舉異非有，正即是因。故舉瓶等，但是喻依。若作斯解，可謂妙解。餘謬名妙，非為實妙。諸餘不正，准此例知。故作三解喻體之中，第三順古，文義無違。初二皆違，可熟思察，故不煩顯。 > Someone objects, saying: “If one says that an example illustrates a subject, and the subject must resemble the example, one does not know whether the entities of the illustrating \[example\] and the illustrated dharma are identical or distinct. If one says they are identical, since their entities would be one and already commonly known to both parties, why would it await establishment by a reason? If one says they are distinct, then having made clear that dharmas of distinct entities possess distinct common characteristics and possess the sense of the reason, one adduces them as an example; how could you make a parallel objection demanding that all aspects of the dharma’s entity be entirely the same?” How is its meaning to be taken? Answer: This meaning is incorrect. If one takes the entity of the jar as the example, is this identical with or distinct from the pratijñā of sound? If you say they are identical, it is subject to the previous objection and has many other faults besides. If you say they are distinct, how can it be called a similar dharma (sādharmya)? If you say that sound has the quality of being produced, and the jar also has the quality of being produced, and therefore they are called similar dharmas, this is not so. Why is this? You ought to say: “It shows that a jar definitely has impermanence”; why would one need to say: “It shows that what is similar to the reason definitely has existence”? The reason is the quality of being produced present upon the jar; how could the entity of the jar be called the property of being produced? If so, the entity of sound would have to be the entity of being produced. If it were like this, then taking the dharmin, sound, and calling it the reason, would turn out to make a part of the meaning of the pratijñā into the reason, incurring the fault that there is no distinction between pratijñā and reason. Many other questions and objections can be known by parity of reasoning regarding their merits and faults, so I will not elaborate them in detail. However, having taken the jar as the example and considering it to have exceptional capacity, I shall now briefly raise three objections against that \[view\]. The first says: Ancient masters accepted the principle that a jar can be seen to burn, which causes their own accepted sound to be seen to burn. Dignāga formulated an objection in accordance with this: Is sound seen to burn? Or is it not seen to burn? If one accepts it oneself, it is a siddhasādhana. If one does not accept it oneself, then in now objecting to the other, how is it not a contradiction of oneself? \[Answer:\] This is not so. Because the other party took the entity of the jar as the entity of the similar example, Dignāga formulated the objection based on the other party’s position, saying: “The sound accepted by you should be observable burning, just like a jar and so forth.” It is like the objection against the Vaiśeṣikas: “Your earth should not possess resistance and be perceived by the tactile faculty, because it is accepted to be seen by the eye, just like visible form and so forth.” Would one fail to accept oneself that earth is perceived by the tactile faculty when formulating the objection? Therefore, when objecting based on the other, there is no fault of one's own, making it clear that it is not accepted by oneself. The second says: Therefore, the Nyāyamukha, in explaining the example, states: “By speaking in this way, one is able to show that \[the reason\] definitely exists in the sapakṣa and is completely absent from the vipakṣa, not spoken erroneously.” Since one does not take the jar, this would be a mere repetition of the preceding reason; how could it be able to reveal the reason? As when one says: “Sound is impermanent, because of being produced; whatever is produced is impermanent, like what is produced and impermanent, etc.” How could this constitute a sādhana? \[Answer:\] This is not so. The previous “produced” and “impermanent” only distinguished the pratijñā and the reason. The subsequent mentioning of “whatever is produced” comprehensively encompasses both the pratijñā and the example. Impermanence is also like this; it is not merely a repetition, but is precisely the upanaya; therefore, it is certain that what is produced and impermanent is the entity of the example. If, as was stated before, one took the jar as the entity of the example, then one should point directly to the jar; why would one need to repeat: “Whatever is produced through effort is impermanent, just like a jar and so forth”? Furthermore, if one took the entity of the jar as the example to establish that sound is impermanent and so forth, why does \[the treatise\] say: “It is said that where the reason is, the pratijñā follows; where the pratijñā is not, the reason does not exist,” instead of saying: “It is said that where the jar is, the reason follows; where the jar is not, the reason does not exist”? These two are termed udāharaṇa; the others are all jāti of this. It also says: “One should prove its permanence through non-production, or establish being produced through impermanence.” This shows the correct statement: one should establish impermanence through being produced, and through permanence be separated from being produced; it does not say to prove impermanence through a jar. Therefore, the genuine entity of the example is what is produced and impermanent, and the substrate \[of the example\] is mentioned in order to reveal it. If it were not so, then by mentioning the jar one would already know that it definitely possesses being produced. When presenting the example, one would only say “like a jar”; why would one need to repeat both the pratijñā and reason, saying: “Whatever is produced is impermanent, just like a jar and so forth”? Why would one need such troublesome repetition? Furthermore, if the jar were the entity of the example, then setting up a separate dharma outside the reason as the example would not correspond at all to the meaning of that reason. Up to \[where it says\]: “Because of the nature of being produced, the similar dharmas of that class do not express the meaning of the sādhaka and sādhya.” This intention is because the sādhaka reason and the sādhya meaning of the pratijñā are not taken as the example. Moreover, if the reason is the nature of being produced, and the entity of the example is precisely the jar, then because the jar has being produced, it is impermanent; it is not that what is produced and impermanent serves as the sapakṣa. Then only the property of the subject (pakṣadharmatva) would be called the reason, and the entity of the jar would not be the reason. Although the reason and the pratijñā are present upon the entity of the jar, it would ultimately be a great fault. Therefore the Nyāyamukha states: “If only the property of the subject were the nature of the reason, then that which is anaikāntika should also become a reason.” How could having both kinds of examples—those possessing the sādhya and sādhaka, and the vipakṣa dharma—incur this fault? According to this passage of the treatise, therefore, one does not take the entity of the jar and so forth as the genuine example. The third says: Dignāga’s intention was that because outsiders established reasons devoid of meaning, their conceptual characteristics were distinct with respect to sapakṣa and vipakṣa. Because the meanings were distinct, they could not be properly stated in harmonious combination. In order to reject their meaning, he stated that the example reveals the reason, and that there is no separate entity of the example. \[Answer:\] This is also not so. Following what is accepted in this intention: if for a reason with meaning one established an example outside the reason, one would then take the jar and so forth. If so, how could the example be a part of the reason? The reason is being produced, whereas a jar is four sense-data. That would then contradict the Nyāyamukha. That treatise says: “If so, the words of the example should not be a distinct member.” It answers: “Although in reality it is so, yet these words of the reason are only for revealing the property of the subject (pakṣadharmatva), not for revealing the existence or non-existence in the sapakṣa and vipakṣa. Therefore, one establishes the similar and dissimilar to reveal the latter two pakṣas.” The words of the reason reveal the first characteristic, namely, the being produced of sound. The similar reveals the second, and therefore it is the being produced of the jar. If, by the similar revealing the second, one were to take the entity of the jar, then when the reason reveals the first characteristic, one should take sound. Since in expressing the first characteristic, one takes being produced upon sound; when expressing the second characteristic, one takes being produced in the jar. Therefore, the lower text says: “Hence, it is determined that the three characteristics are only for revealing the reason.” By this principle, although all members can serve as reasons to reveal the sādhya, nevertheless only one member is provisionally stated as the reason; therefore, the second member is clearly also being produced. One cannot object by saying: “Then the third member, stated as the dissimilar example, should also be being produced.” The third is an exclusionary expression (apoha/vyatireka), so it does not serve as a parallel. Furthermore, the third characteristic is pervasive non-existence in the vipakṣa. Presenting non-existence in the vipakṣa is precisely the reason itself. Therefore, mentioning the jar and so forth is merely the substrate of the example (udāharaṇāśraya). If one forms this understanding, it can be called a profound understanding. When others mistakenly call something profound, it is not genuinely profound. Other improper views may be known by analogy with this. Therefore, among the three explanations of the entity of the example, the third accords with the ancient and exhibits no contradiction in text or meaning. The first two both contradict it; one should reflect and examine them carefully, so there is no need to expound them further. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 1.22](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1841.1.22) - [Next: 1.24](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1841.1.24) - [Up: 1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1841.1) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1841~en-mt.1.23) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (2) - [因明正理門論本](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.pramana.nyayamukha*zh-xuanzang.1.20) — Classical Chinese - [因明正理門論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.pramana.nyayamukha*zh-yijing.1.20) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1841.1.23](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1841.1.23) · Pramāṇa