[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大乘起信論義記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1846) › 2.212 # 大乘起信論義記 2.212 大乘起信論義記 2.212 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [2.212](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1846.2.212) 問：三細屬賴耶，六麁屬意識，何故不說末那識耶？答：有二義意：一、前既說賴耶，末那必執相應，故不別說。故《瑜伽》云「賴耶識起必二識相應」故。又由意識緣外境時，必內依末那為染污根方得生起，是故次說六麁，必內依末那故，亦不別說。二、以義不便故，略不說之。不便相者，以無明住地動本靜心，令起和合成梨耶；末那既無此義，故前三細中略不說。又由外境牽起事識，末那無緣外境義故，六麁中亦略不說。亦可計內為我屬前三細，計外為我所屬後六麁，故略不論也。《楞伽》中亦同此說。故彼經云「大慧！略說有三種識，廣說有八相。何等為三？謂真識、現識、分別事識」乃至廣說。經中現識，即是三細中現相也；分別事識，即是下六麁也。所以知者，彼經下釋分別事識中，乃云「攀緣外境界，起於事識等」，故知事識非是末那。此論下文並亦同此，宜可記之。 > Question: The three subtle marks pertain to the ālaya, and the six coarse marks pertain to mental consciousness (manovijñāna). Why is the manas consciousness not mentioned? Answer: There are two intended meanings: First, since the ālaya has already been spoken of, manas necessarily conjoins with attachment \[to it\]; thus it is not separately spoken of. Hence the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra states: "The arising of the ālaya consciousness necessarily conjoins with two consciousnesses." Furthermore, when the mental consciousness takes external objects as conditions, it necessarily relies internally on the manas as the defiled faculty before it can arise. Therefore, when the six coarse marks are subsequently explained, because they necessarily rely internally on the manas, it is also not separately spoken of. Second, because it is theoretically inconvenient, it is omitted and not mentioned. The characteristics of this inconvenience are: the avidyā-entrenchment stirs the fundamentally quiet mind, causing it to arise and form the composite ālayavijñāna; since manas lacks this meaning, it is omitted and not mentioned among the preceding three subtle marks. Furthermore, external objects draw forth and arouse the empirical consciousness, but manas lacks the function of taking external objects as conditions; hence it is also omitted and not mentioned among the six coarse marks. It can also be said that grasping within as the self pertains to the preceding three subtle marks, while grasping without as what belongs to the self pertains to the subsequent six coarse marks; hence it is omitted and not discussed. The Laṅkāvatārasūtra also agrees with this statement. Thus that sūtra states: "Mahāmati! Briefly spoken there are three kinds of consciousness, and extensively spoken there are eight aspects. What are the three? They are the true consciousness, the manifesting consciousness, and the differentiating empirical consciousness," and so on up to the extensive explanation. The 'manifesting consciousness' in the sūtra is precisely the manifesting mark among the three subtle marks; the 'differentiating empirical consciousness' is precisely the six coarse marks below. How do we know this? In the subsequent explanation of the differentiating empirical consciousness, that sūtra actually says: "Conditioning external objects, it gives rise to the empirical consciousness," and so forth. Thus we know that the empirical consciousness is not manas. The subsequent text of this treatise is entirely consistent with this; this should be kept in mind. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 2.211](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1846.2.211) - [Next: 2.213](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1846.2.213) - [Up: 2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1846.2) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1846~en-mt.2.212) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [宗鏡錄](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.56.7) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1846.2.212](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1846.2.212) · Pramāṇa