[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [起信論疏筆削記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1848) › 7.34 # 起信論疏筆削記 7.34 起信論疏筆削記 7.34 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [7.34](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1848.7.34) 四宗外道者，一、數論外道，執有等性與諸法一，即當有句，故彼破云：此執非真。所以者何？若青等色與色性一，應如色性其體皆同。五樂等聲與聲性一，應如聲性其體皆同。眼等諸根與根性一，應如根性其體皆同，應一一根取一切境，應一一境對一切根。又一切法與有性一，應如有性，其體皆同。二、勝論外道，說有等性與法非一，當非有句。此亦非真。所以者何？若青等色與色性異，應如聲等，非眼所行，聲等亦爾。又一切法異有性者，應如兔角，其體本無，乃至廣破。三、無慚外道，執有等性與彼諸法亦一亦異，當於亦有亦非有句。此亦非真。所以者何？若有性等與色等一，同數論過；與色等異，同勝論矣。一異二種性相相違，而言體同，理不成立。一應非一，以即異故如異；異應非異，以即一故如一，乃至廣破。四、邪命外道，執有等性與彼諸法非一非異，當非有非非有句。此亦非真。所以者何？汝此所說非一非異者，為但是遮？為偏有表？若偏有表，應不雙非；若但是遮，應無所執。有遮有表理互相違，無遮無表言成戲論，乃至廣破。如是世間起四種謗，謂有非有、雙許雙非，如次是增益、損減、相違、戲論，是故世間所執非實。 > "The four schools of non-Buddhists": First, the Sāṃkhya non-Buddhists, who cling to the nature of existence and so forth as being identical with the dharmas; this corresponds to the proposition of existence. Therefore they are refuted: this clinging is not real. Why? If colors such as blue were identical with the nature of form, their substances should all be the same, just like the nature of form. If sounds such as the five musical notes were identical with the nature of sound, their substances should all be the same, just like the nature of sound. If sense faculties such as the eye were identical with the nature of faculties, their substances should all be the same, just like the nature of faculties: each single faculty should grasp all objects, and each single object should correspond to all faculties. Furthermore, if all dharmas were identical with the nature of existence, their substances should all be the same, just like the nature of existence. Second, the Vaiśeṣika non-Buddhists, who say that the nature of existence and so forth is not identical with dharmas; this corresponds to the proposition of non-existence. This too is not real. Why? If colors such as blue were different from the nature of form, they should, like sound and so forth, not be the domain of the eye; sound and so forth would likewise be so. Furthermore, if all dharmas were different from the nature of existence, they should be like the horns of a hare, fundamentally devoid of substance—and so on through extensive refutations. Third, the Ahrīka non-Buddhists, who cling to the nature of existence and so forth as being both identical with and different from those dharmas; this corresponds to the proposition of both existence and non-existence. This too is not real. Why? If the nature of existence and so forth were identical with form and so forth, it would share the fault of the Sāṃkhyas; if it were different from form and so forth, it would share \[the fault of\] the Vaiśeṣikas. The natures and marks of oneness and difference contradict each other; to say that their substance is the same cannot be rationally established. Oneness should be non-one, because being identical with difference it is like difference; difference should be non-difference, because being identical with oneness it is like oneness—and so on through extensive refutations. Fourth, the Ājīvika non-Buddhists, who cling to the nature of existence and so forth as being neither identical with nor different from those dharmas; this corresponds to the proposition of neither existence nor non-existence. This too is not real. Why? Is what you describe as neither identical nor different merely negative exclusion (apoha), or does it specifically have positive affirmation? If it specifically has positive affirmation, it should not doubly negate; if it is merely negative exclusion, there should be nothing clung to. To have both exclusion and affirmation is logically contradictory; to have neither exclusion nor affirmation reduces words to frivolous discourse (prapañca)—and so on through extensive refutations. In this way, the worldly generate four kinds of slander, namely existence, non-existence, asserting both, and negating both, which correspond in order to superimposition, deprecation, contradiction, and frivolous discourse; therefore, what the worldly cling to is not real. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 7.33](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1848.7.33) - [Next: 7.35](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1848.7.35) - [Up: 7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1848.7) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1848~en-mt.7.34) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [起信論疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1844.1.18) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1848.7.34](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1848.7.34) · Pramāṇa