[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大乘起信論裂網疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1850) › 2.60 # 大乘起信論裂網疏 2.60 大乘起信論裂網疏 2.60 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [2.60](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1850.2.60) 由迷一心而有妄念。由有妄念，妄見心相生住異滅。但當推求現前一念心相，畢竟了不可得，則計有心相之妄念自息。妄念既息，則知心相尚不可得，云何得有生住異滅之相？蓋若謂生住異滅果有相者，為生在前耶、住異滅在前耶？生在後耶、住異滅在後耶？抑生住異滅皆同時耶？若謂生在前者，為有心故生、為無心故生？若有心故生則有二心，若無心故生心則有始。又所生心果有何相？故生在前不相應也。若住異滅在前者，必須有生，方得有住異滅；前既無生，云何有住異滅？故住異滅在前不相應也。若謂生在後者，前既無生，云何後忽有生？又由滅故，方說有生；前既無生，則無可滅；前既無滅，後豈有生？故生在後不相應也。若住異滅在後者，前必無滅；前既無滅，亦無有生；前既無生，云何得有後住異滅？故住異滅在後不相應也。若謂生住異滅皆同時者，生與滅違、住與異違，尤為不相應也。如此推責，則知生住異滅，但有名字，何甞有自性耶？ > From being confused about the one mind, there are deluded thoughts. Due to having deluded thoughts, one falsely sees the marks of the mind as arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing. But if one investigates the marks of the presently manifest single thought of mind, they are ultimately completely unobtainable, and then the deluded thoughts that posit marks of the mind will cease of themselves. Once deluded thoughts have ceased, one knows that the marks of the mind cannot even be found, so how could there be marks of arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing? For if one claims that arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing actually have marks, is arising prior, or are abiding, changing, and ceasing prior? Is arising posterior, or are abiding, changing, and ceasing posterior? Or are arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing all simultaneous? If one claims that arising is prior: does it arise because there is mind, or does it arise because there is no mind? If it arises because there is mind, then there would be two minds; if it arises because there is no mind, then mind would have a beginning. Furthermore, what mark does the arisen mind actually have? Therefore, arising being prior does not accord. If abiding, changing, and ceasing are prior: there must first be arising before there can be abiding, changing, and ceasing; since there was no arising previously, how could there be abiding, changing, and ceasing? Therefore, abiding, changing, and ceasing being prior does not accord. If one claims that arising is posterior: since there was no arising previously, how could there suddenly be arising afterward? Furthermore, it is only due to ceasing that one speaks of arising; since there was no arising previously, there is nothing to cease; and since there was no ceasing previously, how could there be arising afterward? Therefore, arising being posterior does not accord. If abiding, changing, and ceasing are posterior: previously there must have been no ceasing; since previously there was no ceasing, there was also no arising; and since previously there was no arising, how could there afterward be abiding, changing, and ceasing? Therefore, abiding, changing, and ceasing being posterior does not accord. If one claims that arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing are all simultaneous: arising and ceasing are contradictory, and abiding and changing are contradictory, so this is even more in contradiction. Investigating and scrutinizing in this way, one knows that arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing exist merely in name; how have they ever had an intrinsic nature? > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 2.59](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1850.2.59) - [Next: 2.61](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1850.2.61) - [Up: 2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1850.2) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1850~en-mt.2.60) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1850.2.60](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1850.2.60) · Pramāṇa