[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大乘義章](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1851) › 1.106 # 大乘義章 1.106 大乘義章 1.106 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [1.106](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1851.1.106) 第四門中明即離者，就初宗二諦相望，即離不定，三句分別：一者世諦即第一義，如說陰界十二入等事相差別以為世諦，即此法中所有諦理說為真諦。二者世諦不即真諦，謂非數滅、虛空、無為。三者真諦望彼世諦不即不離，謂空無我，即就陰上明空無我，名為不離；然彼但無橫計我人、不空陰法，故名不即。第二宗中所說二諦，形對不定。對前宗中陰上無人，得說性空即於世諦。今說性空即陰無性，不同前宗陰上無人。若對後宗得言不即。後宗之中即指妄想虛誑之法以之為空，故名為即。今此宗中就假名因緣法中說無定性不空假名因緣之相，故曰不即。第三宗中所說二諦，一向相即。彼說諸法妄想虛誑，體是無法，其猶幻化，幻化之有喻彼世諦，幻化之無喻彼真諦。然彼幻有，無別體性，說無為有，無為有故，世諦即真；幻化之無亦無別體，指有為無，有為無故，真諦即世。世諦即真，色即空也；真諦即世，空即色也。色即空故，有即非有；空即色故，無即非無。故《地持》云「從有無方便，入非有非無。」第四宗中，兩種二諦：一者依持、二者緣起，備如前辨。若就依持二諦相望，不即不離。依真起妄，即妄辨真，得說不離：真妄性別，得云不即。故經說言「斷脫異外有為法依持建立者名如來藏。」若就緣起二諦相望，得言相即，即體起用，用即體故。二諦之義，厥趣如是。 > In the fourth gate, explaining identity and difference: looking at the two truths in the first school, identity and difference are not fixed, and are distinguished into three propositions. First, conventional truth is identical with the ultimate truth: for example, when the differentiated phenomenal marks of the aggregates, realms, twelve sense bases, and so forth are taken as conventional truth, the true principle inherent within these very dharmas is spoken of as the ultimate truth. Second, conventional truth is not identical with the ultimate truth: this refers to non-analytical cessation, space, and unconditioned \[dharmas\]. Third, regarding the ultimate truth in relation to conventional truth, they are neither identical nor different: this refers to emptiness and selflessness; explaining emptiness and selflessness directly upon the aggregates is called 'not different', yet because it only negates an arbitrarily imputed self or person without emptying the dharmas of the aggregates, it is called 'not identical'. As for the two truths spoken of in the second school, their comparative relation is not fixed. Compared to the previous school's negation of a person upon the aggregates, one may say that the emptiness of intrinsic nature is identical with conventional truth; now, saying that the emptiness of intrinsic nature means that the aggregates lack intrinsic nature differs from the previous school's absence of a person upon the aggregates. If compared to the later schools, one may say they are not identical. In the later schools, one points directly to the deceptive dharmas of false conceptualization and takes them to be empty; thus it is called 'identical'. Now in this school, within the conditionally arisen dharmas of conventional designation, one speaks of the absence of fixed nature without emptying the marks of conditionally arisen conventional designations; hence it is called 'not identical'. As for the two truths spoken of in the third school, they are strictly identical. That school explains that all dharmas are deceptive false conceptualizations, their substance being non-existent dharmas, just like an illusion: the existence of the illusion illustrates conventional truth, and the non-existence of the illusion illustrates ultimate truth. Yet that illusory existence has no separate substance: non-existence is spoken of as existence, and because non-existence constitutes existence, conventional truth is identical with the ultimate; the non-existence of an illusion likewise has no separate substance: existence is indicated as non-existence, and because existence constitutes non-existence, the ultimate truth is identical with the conventional. Since conventional truth is identical with the ultimate, form is identical with emptiness; since ultimate truth is identical with the conventional, emptiness is identical with form. Because form is identical with emptiness, existence is non-existence; because emptiness is identical with form, non-existence is non-non-existence. Therefore the Bodhisattvabhūmi says: 'From the expedient means of existence and non-existence, one enters neither-existence-nor-non-existence.' In the fourth school, there are two kinds of two truths: the first is support-and-dependence, and the second is dependent origination, fully distinguished as before. If one views the two truths of support-and-dependence in relation to each other, they are neither identical nor different. Delusion arises based on the real, and the real is identified directly upon delusion, so one may say they are not different; the real and the deluded have different natures, so one may say they are not identical. Therefore the sūtra states: 'That which serves as the support and establishment for conditioned dharmas severed and distinct from it is called the tathāgatagarbha.' If one views the two truths of dependent origination in relation to each other, one may say they are mutually identical, because function arises directly from substance and function is substance. The meaning of the two truths tends in this direction. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 1.105](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1851.1.105) - [Next: 1.107](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1851.1.107) - [Up: 1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1851.1) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1851~en-mt.1.106) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1851.1.106](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1851.1.106) · Pramāṇa