[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大乘玄論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853) › 1.6 # 大乘玄論 1.6 大乘玄論 1.6 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [1.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.1.6) 立名第三。三門分別：前辨立名、次辨絕名、後辨借名。立名者，不真不俗，亦是中道、亦名無所有、亦名正法、亦名無住。此非真非俗無名，今假為立名。此名以無名之所立名，如提羅波夷真不食油強為食油。二諦亦爾，以其真表不真、俗表不俗，假言真俗。以其假言，名無得物之功，物無應名之實。《淨名經》云「從無住本立一切法，無住即無本。」故云若能若所皆以無住為本。《大品》云「般若猶如大地，出生萬物，波若正法無住，此三眼目之異名。」若就用中辨二諦反覆得立名，俗為真立名、世為第一立名，如言由世故第一。真俗亦如是，真應對世、第一對第二。而今真對俗、世對第一，非正相待義，聖人未必以對立名。故經云「法無有彼此，離相待故。」次明相待者，真俗當體受名，世與第一用中褒貶為稱也。第二辨絕名。常途相傳，世諦不絕名。引《成論》文「劫初時物未有名，聖人立名字，如瓶衣等物，故世諦不絕名。」真諦與佛果，三師不同。光宅云：此二皆不絕名，真諦有真如實際之名，佛果有常樂我淨之名，但絕麁名、不絕細名。莊嚴云：此二皆絕名。佛果出於二諦外，是故絕名；真諦本來自虛，忘四句、絕百非故絕名。開善云：真諦絕名，佛果不絕名。真諦之理絕四句百非故是絕名，佛果此世諦所以不絕名，若佛智冥如絕名。今明一往為論何為不得？然非理實說。今問若劫初物作名銘者，以真諦無名，假名銘者與真何異？又問火名，為當即火離火？若使此火名即火，呼火即燒口；若使火名離火，何故不得水耶？故知非即離體有名。若在口中，不在火上，是即火絕名。且復從來蛇床虎杖，世諦絕名。復問人是何物？人頭手等何意呼人耶？強為立名，豈非皆絕。次難佛果有三家。今先難初家。若使言真諦與佛果但絕麁名不絕細名者，今難本以絕故妙，若不絕即不妙。難第二家真諦與佛果俱絕名者，今難若以名求真不得真者，此名便有文爾無理。真諦有文無理，如私陀言涅槃；佛果有理無文，如犢子存焉。難第三家佛果不絕、真諦絕名，同前二家所見，不具辨也。今明以四句辨之：一者俱絕、二者俱不絕、三者真絕俗不絕、四者俗絕真不絕。所言二諦俱絕者，二諦皆如，奈得皆不絕。二諦俱不絕者，得是如相名為如來，得是二如相，所以皆不絕。又言如來常依二諦說法。《大論》云「如瓶衣等法，世界悉檀即有，第一義悉檀即無。真如實際等，於第一義悉檀即有，世界悉檀即無。」此名字互有互無，故知二種俱絕俱不絕。三者真絕俗不絕，此文即多，經云「以世諦法故說，非第一義。」四俗絕真不絕，如言「生不可說、不生亦不可說、生不生亦不可說、不生非不生亦不可說。」四句皆不可說，即是世諦絕名。今更作一種方言，世諦即絕實不絕假、真諦即絕假復絕實。何者？眾生計有為有、計無為無，此之有無是斷常二見，即是性實。今破有故言不有、破無故言不無，所以明佛說假有假無為世諦，此假有不名有、此假無不名無。問：此假有，何物有？明此假有不名實有，假無亦是不名實無。是即此假有假無名為世諦，所以其不名實有實無，故言絕。而此不有為成假有、不無為成假無，此即是不絕假義。若言二諦俱絕者，真諦絕四句、離百非，世諦亦絕四句、離百非。然此義從來所無，唯今家有也。言二諦皆絕四句離百非者，俗不定俗，俗名真俗；真不定真，真名俗真。真俗假俗、俗真假真，假俗即百是不能是、百非不能非，假真亦爾。何者？假俗即是，是不能是，百是亦不能是；非非不能非，百非亦不非。假真即非，是不能是，百是亦不是；是非不能非，百非亦不非。是故皆離四句、絕百非也。雖二諦皆離四句、絕百非，然二諦俱絕爾大異。何者？俗諦絕即絕實、真諦絕即絕假。俗諦絕實者，是是即是實是，非非即是性非。以俗諦絕實故，是是不能是，百是亦不是；非非不能非，百非不能非也。真諦絕假者，非是是與假是，非非與假非，真諦絕性假故。非但是是不能是，非是亦不是；非但非非不能非，是非亦不非。是是與非是，一切不能是；非非與是非，一切不能非。真諦雙絕，世諦絕實，此即漸捨，明二諦皆絕義，俗諦絕實、真諦絕假實。第二次就平道明二諦俱絕義。俗不定俗，由真故俗；真不定真，由俗故真。由真故俗，俗是假俗也，由假俗故真，真是假真。既云假俗，即四句皆絕，假俗非俗、假俗非不俗、假俗非亦俗亦不俗、假俗非非俗非不俗，假真亦爾。第三論借名。就借與不借，故是絕不絕耳。若二諦俱絕，即是兩種皆借名；二俱不絕，即相與不借。今亦次還辨前三家所說。彼三家同明：世諦有物有名，以名召物即得來，故不借名。真諦佛果，解有三家。今先難世諦不絕。若世諦有物即有名者，劫初時便應有名，不須聖人為立名耶。若物本無名，何異真諦本無名，後為真立名。問：是假借名者，後為物立名，何故非借名耶？汝若以名求真，去真遠矣。我亦以名求物，去物遠矣。又問今世諦以名求物物得應名者，今且問以瓶名，為在瓶上？為在口中？具如先難。若在瓶上，何處有名？若在口中，瓶即無名，豈非是絕名？此即與真何異。若言真本無名就世諦借者，今世諦中若有真名，可言其借；而今世諦中無有法名，真如絕離，可得言借？且復經言「第一義諦有名有實。」何時噵無名？經又云「一切諸法，但有假名。」但有名無實故言絕，但有名字故謂為借。若有名，但假設。何意？空就有借名，而有不就空借名也。故若言真諦無名就世諦借名，其義不可。今問：若以名求真去真遠者，此真名為表真理不耶？若使此名表理，依名得理，何謂真理絕名？名即無用。此名既其不得理，此名終此浪說，可謂有理而無文。常途解真諦佛果有三家，光宅二種俱不絕妙名，即不須借。莊嚴云二種俱絕，所以須借。若是開善，明佛果是世諦有名故不須借，真諦無名所以須借。此三解依前而難之，此不復重出，望前可見。今明借此假之異名，然此經論所無，大小乘經不載此說，恐不應借語。而今言借者，只是隨他意語耳。今明借此假之異名。今二諦既有四句辨絕不絕義，今借與不借准此可知。若二俱絕，即二諦俱不借。二諦不絕，即二俱借。若一絕一不絕，即一借一不借。若言二諦俱絕而論其借義，明真不可說名，二諦之名無法可說。二諦俱絕，故不明借。今以非真假言真、非俗可言俗，俗待真故，說俗從真借名；真待俗故，說真從俗借名。所以二諦俱不絕，假論借名，然此借名亦是不借。今以真不自真，由俗故說。真不自故，所以須他，故言借。若不借者，明若由真故說真，可得是借。由真故俗，那得是借也？故言此俗亦是不借也。橫論借名如此。若竪論，真從不真以借名，俗從不俗以借名。又問言：若從不真借名，只應真名不真，那得名為真？俗亦如是。答：今明真不真，一亦不得借，異亦不得借，因緣假名字故言借。借是待之異名，若不待不真，不得說真。由不真故真、由真故不真，真不真因緣假說，故言借。 > The third \[section\] is the establishment of names. This is distinguished through three gates: first, distinguishing the establishment of names; next, distinguishing the transcending of names; and finally, distinguishing borrowed names. As for establishing names: neither ultimate nor conventional is also the Middle Way; it is also called non-existence; it is also called the correct Dharma; it is also called non-abiding. This 'neither ultimate nor conventional' is nameless, yet a name is now conventionally established for it. This name is established on the basis of what is nameless, just as Tilapāyī does not truly eat oil, yet is forcibly said to eat oil. The two truths are likewise: because the ultimate expresses what is not ultimate and the conventional expresses what is not conventional, we conventionally speak of the ultimate and conventional. Because they are conventional words, names have no power to grasp things, and things have no real entity that corresponds to names. The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: 'From the root of non-abiding, all phenomena are established; non-abiding is having no root.' Hence it is said that both the subject and the object take non-abiding as their root. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra says: 'Prajñā is like the great earth, giving birth to the myriad things; prajñā, the correct Dharma, and non-abiding—these three are different names for the same thing.' If we distinguish the two truths within their function, they mutually establish names for each other: the conventional establishes the name for the ultimate, and 'worldly' establishes the name for 'paramārtha' (first/highest), as in saying 'because of the worldly, there is the highest.' Ultimate and conventional are also like this: 'ultimate' should correspond to 'worldly', and 'first' should correspond to 'second'. Yet now 'ultimate' corresponds to 'conventional', and 'worldly' corresponds to 'first'; these are not directly correlative in meaning, so the sages did not necessarily establish names by way of direct opposition. Hence the sūtra says: 'Phenomena have neither this nor that, because they are free from correlativity.' Next, to clarify correlativity: 'ultimate' and 'conventional' receive their names according to their intrinsic substances, whereas 'worldly' and 'first' are appellations used for praise and dispraise within application. Second is distinguishing the transcending of names. According to standard transmission, conventional truth does not transcend names. They cite a passage from the Tattvasiddhi: 'In the beginning of the kalpa, things did not yet have names; the sages established names, such as objects like vases and robes; therefore conventional truth does not transcend names.' Concerning the ultimate truth and the fruit of buddhahood, the three masters differ. Guangzhai said: 'Both of these do not transcend names: ultimate truth has names such as "suchness" and "reality-limit", and the fruit of buddhahood has names such as "permanence, bliss, self, and purity"; it merely transcends coarse names, but does not transcend subtle names.' Zhuangyan said: 'Both of these transcend names. The fruit of buddhahood transcends the two truths, and is therefore beyond names; ultimate truth is originally empty by nature, forgetting the catuṣkoṭi and cutting off the hundred negations, and therefore transcends names.' Kaishan said: 'Ultimate truth transcends names, but the fruit of buddhahood does not transcend names. The principle of ultimate truth transcends the catuṣkoṭi and the hundred negations, so it transcends names; the fruit of buddhahood belongs to conventional truth, which is why it does not transcend names; yet if the buddha-gnosis accords with suchness, it transcends names.' Now we explain: as a preliminary formulation, why should this not be acceptable? However, it is not an exposition of the real principle. We now ask: if things at the beginning of the kalpa were given names and designations, then since ultimate truth is nameless, how does designating things by conventional names differ from the ultimate? Furthermore, we ask: as for the name 'fire', is it identical to fire or separate from fire? If this name 'fire' were identical to fire, then calling out 'fire' would burn one's mouth; if the name 'fire' were separate from fire, why does it not refer to water? Therefore we know that it is neither identical to nor separate from the substance that has the name. If it is in the mouth and not upon the fire, then fire transcends the name. Moreover, regarding traditional names such as cnidium (shéchuáng) and knotweed (hǔzhàng), the conventional truth transcends these names. Furthermore, we ask: what sort of thing is a 'person'? Why are the human head, hands, and so forth called a 'person'? If names are forcibly established, how can they not all transcend names? Next, we challenge the three positions on the fruit of buddhahood. First, we challenge the first master. If one claims that ultimate truth and the fruit of buddhahood merely transcend coarse names but do not transcend subtle names, we now counter: they are profound originally because they transcend names; if they do not transcend names, they are not profound. We challenge the second master, who claims that ultimate truth and the fruit of buddhahood both transcend names: we now counter that if seeking the ultimate by means of names does not attain the ultimate, then this name has only the words and lacks the principle. If ultimate truth has words but lacks principle, it would be like a śrotāpanna speaking of nirvāṇa; if the fruit of buddhahood has principle but lacks words, it would be like the Vātsīputrīyas positing a pudgala. We challenge the third master, who claims that the fruit of buddhahood does not transcend names while ultimate truth transcends names: this is identical to what the previous two masters maintained, so it will not be distinguished in detail. Now we explain by distinguishing with the catuṣkoṭi: first, both transcend names; second, both do not transcend names; third, the ultimate transcends names while the conventional does not; fourth, the conventional transcends names while the ultimate does not. That both truths transcend names means: both truths are suchness, so how could they not both transcend names? That both truths do not transcend names means: attaining the mark of suchness is called the Tathāgata, and because he attains these two marks of suchness, neither of them transcends names. Moreover, it is said that the Tathāgata always preaches the Dharma relying on the two truths. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: 'Dharmas such as vases and robes exist in the worldly siddhānta, but do not exist in the paramārtha siddhānta. Suchness, the reality-limit, and so forth exist in the paramārtha siddhānta, but do not exist in the worldly siddhānta.' These names alternately exist and do not exist; therefore we know that both kinds both transcend and do not transcend names. Third, the ultimate transcends names while the conventional does not: texts for this are numerous, as the sūtra says, 'Spoken according to conventional dharmas, not according to the ultimate.' Fourth, the conventional transcends names while the ultimate does not, as in the statement: 'Arising cannot be spoken of; non-arising also cannot be spoken of; both arising and non-arising cannot be spoken of; neither arising nor non-arising cannot be spoken of.' All four propositions are ineffable, which means that conventional truth transcends names. Now we formulate another perspective: conventional truth transcends the real but does not transcend the conventional, while ultimate truth transcends the conventional and also transcends the real. How so? Sentient beings cling to existence as existence and cling to non-existence as non-existence; these notions of existence and non-existence are the two views of annihilationism and eternalism, which are substantive realities. Now, to refute existence we say 'not existent', and to refute non-existence we say 'not non-existent'; thus we clarify that the Buddha taught conventional existence and conventional non-existence as conventional truth, and this conventional existence is not called existence, and this conventional non-existence is not called non-existence. Question: What kind of existence is this conventional existence? Answer: We clarify that this conventional existence is not called real existence, and conventional non-existence is also not called real non-existence. Thus, this conventional existence and conventional non-existence are called conventional truth; because they are not called real existence and real non-existence, they are said to transcend names. Yet this 'not existent' establishes conventional existence, and this 'not non-existent' establishes conventional non-existence; this is the meaning of not transcending the conventional. If we say that both truths transcend names, ultimate truth transcends the catuṣkoṭi and is free from the hundred negations, and conventional truth also transcends the catuṣkoṭi and is free from the hundred negations. However, this meaning has never existed before; only our school possesses it. Saying that both truths transcend the catuṣkoṭi and are free from the hundred negations means: the conventional is not definitely conventional, so the conventional is called ultimate conventional; the ultimate is not definitely ultimate, so the ultimate is called conventional ultimate. The ultimate conventional is conventional conventionality, and the conventional ultimate is conventional ultimacy. For conventional conventionality, a hundred affirmations cannot affirm it, and a hundred negations cannot negate it; conventional ultimacy is also like this. How so? Conventional conventionality is affirmation, yet affirmation cannot affirm it, nor can a hundred affirmations affirm it; non-negation cannot negate it, nor can a hundred negations negate it. Conventional ultimacy is negation, yet affirmation cannot affirm it, nor can a hundred affirmations affirm it; affirmative negation cannot negate it, nor can a hundred negations negate it. Therefore, both are free from the catuṣkoṭi and cut off from the hundred negations. Although both truths are free from the catuṣkoṭi and cut off from the hundred negations, the way both truths transcend names is greatly different. How so? The conventional truth's transcendence is the transcendence of the real, whereas the ultimate truth's transcendence is the transcendence of the conventional. For conventional truth to transcend the real: an affirmation of affirmation is a real affirmation, and a negation of negation is an intrinsic negation. Because conventional truth transcends the real, an affirmation of affirmation cannot affirm it, nor can a hundred affirmations affirm it; a negation of negation cannot negate it, nor can a hundred negations negate it. For ultimate truth to transcend the conventional: it is neither an affirmation of affirmation nor a conventional affirmation, neither a negation of negation nor a conventional negation, because ultimate truth transcends intrinsic conventionality. Not only can an affirmation of affirmation not affirm it, but a non-affirmation also cannot affirm it; not only can a negation of negation not negate it, but an affirmative negation also cannot negate it. Both an affirmation of affirmation and a non-affirmation entirely fail to affirm it; both a negation of negation and an affirmative negation entirely fail to negate it. Ultimate truth doubly transcends, while conventional truth transcends the real; this is a gradual relinquishment that explains the meaning of both truths transcending names, with conventional truth transcending the real and ultimate truth transcending both conventional and real. Next, secondly, to explain the meaning of both truths transcending names from the perspective of the level path: the conventional is not definitely conventional, for it is conventional because of the ultimate; the ultimate is not definitely ultimate, for it is ultimate because of the conventional. Because it is conventional through the ultimate, the conventional is conventional conventionality; because the ultimate exists through the conventional conventionality, the ultimate is conventional ultimacy. Since it is called conventional conventionality, all four propositions are transcended: conventional conventionality is not conventional, conventional conventionality is not non-conventional, conventional conventionality is not both conventional and non-conventional, and conventional conventionality is not neither conventional nor non-conventional; conventional ultimacy is also like this. Third is discussing borrowed names. Regarding borrowing and not borrowing, this corresponds to transcending and not transcending. If both truths transcend names, then both kinds borrow names; if neither transcends names, then neither borrows from the other. Now we also turn to critique what the previous three masters said. Those three masters all uniformly explained: conventional truth has things and has names, and by using names to summon things they are attained, hence it does not borrow names. Concerning ultimate truth and the fruit of buddhahood, there were three masters' interpretations. Now we first challenge conventional truth's not transcending names. If conventional truth having things means it immediately has names, then at the beginning of the kalpa there should already have been names, without needing the sages to establish names for them. If things originally had no names, how is this different from ultimate truth originally having no names, with names later established for the ultimate? We ask: if this is borrowing names conventionally, why would establishing names for things later not be borrowing names? If you seek the ultimate through names, you are far removed from the ultimate; we also say that seeking things through names is far removed from the things. Furthermore, we ask: now in conventional truth, if one seeks things through names and things correspond to names, let us ask: does the name 'vase' reside on the vase, or does it reside in the mouth? It is entirely as previously challenged. If it resides on the vase, in what place is the name? If it resides in the mouth, then the vase lacks a name—how is this not transcending names? How does this differ from the ultimate? If it is said that the ultimate originally lacks names and borrows them from conventional truth: if there were a name for the ultimate in conventional truth, one could say it borrows it; but now in conventional truth there is no dharma called suchness, which transcends and is detached—how can one speak of borrowing? Moreover, the sūtra says, 'The ultimate truth has names and has realities.' When did it say it lacks names? The sūtra also says, 'All dharmas merely have conventional names.' Because there are only names without realities, it is said to transcend names; because there are only names, it is called borrowing. If there are names, they are merely provisional positing. Why? Emptiness borrows names from existence, but existence does not borrow names from emptiness. Therefore, if one says ultimate truth is nameless and borrows names from conventional truth, this principle is untenable. Now we ask: if seeking the ultimate by names is far removed from the ultimate, does this name 'ultimate' express the ultimate principle or not? If this name expresses the principle, and one attains the principle relying on the name, why say that the ultimate principle transcends names? The name would then be useless. Since this name does not attain the principle, this name is ultimately idle talk; it could be said to have principle but lack words. The standard approaches to ultimate truth and the fruit of buddhahood have three masters: Guangzhai held that neither of the two transcends subtle names, so neither needs to borrow. Zhuangyan said both transcend names, which is why both must borrow. Kaishan explained that the fruit of buddhahood belongs to conventional truth and has names, so it does not need to borrow, while ultimate truth is nameless, so it must borrow. These three interpretations should be challenged based on the above; they will not be repeated here, as they can be understood from the foregoing. Now we clarify that borrowing is another name for conventionality (prajñapti); yet this is not found in sūtras or treatises, nor is this formulation recorded in the Mahāyāna or Hīnayāna scriptures, so we fear the word 'borrow' should not be used. If we now speak of borrowing, it is merely accommodating others' intentions. Now we clarify that borrowing is another name for conventionality. Now, since the two truths have the catuṣkoṭi to distinguish the meaning of transcending and not transcending names, borrowing and not borrowing can be understood by analogy with this. If both transcend names, then neither truth borrows. If neither truth transcends names, then both borrow. If one transcends and one does not, then one borrows and one does not. If we say both truths transcend names and then discuss the meaning of borrowing, we explain that the ultimate cannot be designated by a name, and as for the names of the two truths, there is no dharma that can be spoken of. Because both truths transcend names, we do not speak of borrowing. Now, through non-ultimate we conventionally speak of ultimate, and through non-conventional we can speak of conventional; because the conventional depends on the ultimate, we say the conventional borrows names from the ultimate; because the ultimate depends on the conventional, we say the ultimate borrows names from the conventional. Therefore, both truths do not transcend names, and we conventionally speak of borrowed names, yet this borrowing of names is also non-borrowing. Now, because the ultimate is not ultimate of itself, it is spoken of through the conventional. Because the ultimate is not of itself, it requires the other, and therefore we speak of borrowing. If it is non-borrowing: we explain that if the ultimate were spoken of by virtue of the ultimate, that could be borrowing. But since the conventional is by virtue of the ultimate, how could that be borrowing? Therefore it is said that this conventional is also non-borrowing. Discussing borrowed names horizontally is like this. If discussed vertically: the ultimate borrows names from the non-ultimate, and the conventional borrows names from the non-conventional. Another question is raised: 'If it borrows names from the non-ultimate, the ultimate should merely be named "non-ultimate"; how could it be named "ultimate"? The conventional is also like this.' Answer: We now clarify that between the ultimate and non-ultimate, one cannot borrow if they are identical, nor can one borrow if they are different; it is by dependent co-arising and conventional designations that we speak of borrowing. Borrowing is an alternative name for dependency: if one does not depend on the non-ultimate, one cannot speak of the ultimate. Because of the non-ultimate there is the ultimate; because of the ultimate there is the non-ultimate. The ultimate and the non-ultimate are conventional designations of dependent co-arising, hence we speak of borrowing. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 1.5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.1.5) - [Next: 1.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.1.7) - [Up: 1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.1) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853~en-mt.1.6) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [二諦義](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1854.3.28) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.1.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.1.6) · Pramāṇa