[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大乘玄論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853) › 1.7 # 大乘玄論 1.7 大乘玄論 1.7 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [1.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.1.7) 有無第四。今先辨假有、後辨假無。常途所明，凡有三種假名：一者因成假，以四微成柱、五陰成人，故言因成。二者相續假，前念自滅、續成後念，兩念接連，故言相續假。三者相待假，如君臣父子大小，名字不定，皆相隨待，故言相待假。若入道所捉，三乘不同：聲聞用因成、緣覺用相續、菩薩用相待。而《成論》三藏為宗，多明因成以入道。所以然者，凡有二義：一者因成是世諦體、續待為用，若體已空，用即自遣。二者因成多重數、觀行自淺至深，初捉五根以空眾生，次捉四大四微以折法，所以多捉因成。若是續待二假，即無此重，故不用。今明正《大品》中三假為宗：一者法、二者受、三名。解三假不同，今所用者，以四微成根大，並法假；眾生假人，此是受假；一切名，皆是名假。名假本通，就名假中取能成義為法假，所成義為受假。不如他家法假為體，餘二為用。故《大品》云「波若及五陰為法假，菩薩為受假，一切名字為名假。」內法如此。外法可知，四微四大為法假，世界為受假，一切名字為名假。今明相待為本者，欲明大士觀行凡有三義：一者相待假通，無非是待；因續二假，未必盡假。二者相待假，無有實法，遣病即淨；因續二假，即有實法，遣病有餘。三者相待假無礙，長既待短、短還待長；因續二假，即成義有礙，唯以四微成大、不以大成四微，唯得續前、不得續後，故用相待假。若是聲聞，因成為體，續待為用，體空用自去。今觀相待體，本來不生，今亦無滅。因續用去，從來有通別相待，通是開避相待、別是相集相待，如人瓶衣柱是通相待，長短方圓等是別相待。問：若相待空因續自去者，觀相待時觀何物相待？豈非先有因成、後有續待？答：不然。小乘觀行，先有法體折法入空，故但見於空，不見不空。今大乘觀相待者，不立法體，諸法本來不生，今即無滅。初念為無礙道，後念為解脫道。是故經言「不但見空，亦見佛性不空。」問曰：非有非無而有而無，為疎假？為是密假？答曰：此是疎假。何故爾？以其兩來就有無二法辨，故是疎假。若辨密假，非有非不有而有而不有，以其就一法明義。是即兩法為疎，一法故密。今何故辨此疎密？疎密者，為明經中兩種百非、兩種對治。若言苦樂無我等，此是疎對治；若言實不實、眾生非眾生、安非安等，密對治。若言如來涅槃非有非無，此是疎百非；若言非因非不因、非果非不果，此是密義辨非。此明假有疎密。問：前言非有非無，何物非有非無耶？答：前非有非無，非性有無，為成世諦如義。問：後明非有非不有，何物有不有耶？答：今如是假有不有，故言非有非不有。言非有者，非不有有；言非不有者，非有不有。此既壞假，成真諦如。問：有不有是何物？答：諸法本從無生，皆以阿字為本，是即諸法皆歸阿字一無生門。故經言「四十二字，皆歸阿字」也。 > Fourth, existence and non-existence. Now we first explain provisional existence, and then provisional non-existence. What is ordinarily explained is that altogether there are three kinds of conventional designations: first, designation through causal composition (hetu-samākhyā), where four subtle elements compose a pillar or the five aggregates compose a person, hence called causally composed; second, designation through succession (saṃtatya-samākhyā), where the preceding thought-moment ceases of itself and continues on to form the subsequent thought-moment, the two thought-moments being linked, hence called designation through succession; third, designation through mutual dependence (apekṣā-samākhyā), where, like lord and minister, father and son, or great and small, the designations are not fixed and all follow and depend on one another, hence called designation through mutual dependence. As for what is grasped when entering the path, the three vehicles differ: the śrāvaka uses causal composition, the pratyekabuddha uses succession, and the bodhisattva uses mutual dependence. But the \*Tattvasiddhi\* takes the Tripiṭaka as its doctrine and mostly explains causal composition to enter the path. The reason for this is twofold: first, causal composition is the substance of conventional truth, while succession and mutual dependence are its functions; if the substance is already empty, the functions are naturally dispelled. Second, causal composition has multiple tiers, and the practice of contemplation proceeds from shallow to deep: initially one grasps the five sense faculties to empty the sentient being, and next grasps the four great elements and four subtle elements to break down phenomena; therefore it mostly grasps causal composition. As for the two designations of succession and mutual dependence, they do not have these tiers, and hence it does not use them. Now we clarify that taking the three designations in the \*Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra\* as orthodox is our doctrine: first, \[designation of\] phenomena (dharma-prajñapti); second, \[designation of\] grasping/appropriation (upādāna-prajñapti); third, \[designation of\] names (nāma-prajñapti). Explanations of the three designations differ. What we now use is this: the four subtle elements composing sense faculties and great elements are all the designation of phenomena; the sentient being as a provisional person is the designation of grasping; and all names are the designation of names. The designation of names is fundamentally pervasive: within the designation of names, taking the sense of that which can compose is the designation of phenomena, while taking the sense of that which is composed is the designation of grasping. It is not like other schools where the designation of phenomena is the substance and the other two are functions. Therefore the \*Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā\* says: “Prajñā and the five aggregates are the designation of phenomena; the bodhisattva is the designation of grasping; and all names and designations are the designation of names.” The internal phenomena are like this. External phenomena can be understood accordingly: the four subtle elements and four great elements are the designation of phenomena, the world is the designation of grasping, and all names and designations are the designation of names. Now, in clarifying that mutual dependence is primary, we intend to clarify that the great being’s contemplative practice has three meanings: first, the designation of mutual dependence is pervasive, such that there is nothing that is not dependent; whereas the two designations of causality and succession are not necessarily entirely provisional. Second, in the designation of mutual dependence, there are no real phenomena; once the ailment is dispelled, purity is attained; whereas in the two designations of causality and succession, there remain real phenomena, so dispelling the ailment leaves a residue. Third, the designation of mutual dependence is unimpeded: just as long depends on short, short also depends on long; whereas the two designations of causality and succession are impeded in their sense of composition, for the subtle elements only compose the great elements, but the great elements do not compose the subtle elements; and they only succeed what precedes, not what succeeds; hence we use the designation of mutual dependence. In the case of the śrāvaka, causal composition is the substance, while succession and mutual dependence are the functions; when the substance is empty, the functions depart of themselves. Now we contemplate that the substance of mutual dependence is originally unborn and currently unceasing. As the functions of causality and succession depart, there have always been general and specific mutual dependence: general is mutual dependence of differentiation, and specific is mutual dependence of co-aggregation, just as person, vase, cloth, and pillar are general mutual dependence, while long, short, square, and round are specific mutual dependence. Question: If when mutual dependence is empty, causality and succession depart of themselves, when contemplating mutual dependence, what object’s mutual dependence does one contemplate? Is it not that causal composition comes first, and succession and mutual dependence come afterward? Answer: Not so. In Hīnayāna contemplative practice, there are first substantial phenomena, which are broken down to enter emptiness; therefore they only see emptiness, but do not see non-emptiness. Now, when the Mahāyāna contemplates mutual dependence, it posits no substantial phenomena: all phenomena are originally unborn and currently unceasing. The initial thought-moment is the unimpeded path; the subsequent thought-moment is the path of liberation. Therefore the sūtra says: “Not only does one see emptiness, one also sees the non-emptiness of buddha-nature.” Question: Is being neither existent nor non-existent and yet existent and non-existent a coarse provisionality or a subtle provisionality? Answer: This is a coarse provisionality. Why so? Because it is explained by taking both the two phenomena of existence and non-existence together, it is a coarse provisionality. If one explains subtle provisionality, it is neither existent nor not-existent, and yet existent and not-existent, because it clarifies the meaning with respect to a single phenomenon. Thus, two phenomena constitute the coarse, and a single phenomenon constitutes the subtle. Why do we now distinguish this coarse and subtle? Coarse and subtle are distinguished in order to clarify the two kinds of hundred negations and two kinds of antidotes in the sūtras. If one speaks of suffering, pleasure, non-self, and so on, this is a coarse antidote; if one speaks of real and unreal, sentient being and non-sentient being, secure and insecure, and so on, this is a subtle antidote. If one says that the Tathāgata’s nirvāṇa is neither existent nor non-existent, this is a coarse hundred negations; if one says neither cause nor not-cause, neither result nor not-result, this explains negation through subtle meaning. This clarifies the coarse and subtle of provisional existence. Question: Earlier it was said “neither existent nor non-existent”; what thing is neither existent nor non-existent? Answer: The earlier “neither existent nor non-existent” negates intrinsic existence and non-existence, in order to establish the suchness of conventional truth. Question: Later it explains “neither existent nor not-existent”; what thing is existent or not-existent? Answer: It is provisionally existent and not-existent in this way, hence it is said “neither existent nor not-existent.” Saying “neither existent” means not-existent existence; saying “neither not-existent” means not non-existent non-existence. This both deconstructs the provisional and establishes the suchness of ultimate truth. Question: What thing is existent and not-existent? Answer: All phenomena originally arise from the unborn; all take the letter \*A\* as their foundation. That is, all phenomena return to the single gate of the unborn of the letter \*A\*. Therefore the sūtra says: “The forty-two letters all return to the letter \*A\*.” > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 1.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.1.6) - [Next: 1.8](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.1.8) - [Up: 1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.1) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853~en-mt.1.7) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.1.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.1.7) · Pramāṇa