[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大乘玄論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853) › 2.5.1 # 大乘玄論 2.5.1 大乘玄論 2.5.1 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [2.5.1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.2.5.1) 第二明三種中道。 成論師解八不不同：一云八不並是真諦中道，亦是真諦也。 二云不生不滅是中道，即是真諦不有不無中道，餘六不是，俗諦中道也。 今謂不然。 彼不解大乘論意，小乘義意判如此耳。 今云八不具三種中道，即是二諦也。 但成論師解三種中道：一世諦中道、二真諦中道、三真俗合論中道也。 世諦中道者，世諦不出三假，故依三假明中道。 一因成假，不一不異明中道也。 何者？ 一柱攬四微為一，是不一而一。 四塵同成，一假不異，而假實殊故。 異故不一、一故不異，異故不一不異，因成明中道也。 二相續不常不斷明中道。 但相續假不同：一云補處明續假也； 二云前玄與後一明續假，如識心之終、想心之初，當中央為假。 三龍光傳開善云明續假，後起接前、前轉作後，即是生至，共成假也。 雖三師說不同，而相與續故不斷、滅故不常，不斷不常明相續中道也。 三相待假明中道。 即是有開避相待，如色心等法，名為通待，亦名定待也。 如長短、君臣、父子等法，短不自短，形長故短； 長不自長，形短故長，如此相奪待。 乃至君臣父子等，名為別待，亦名不定待也。 通別雖殊，悉是相待假明中道。 假而非真，稱當於理故非虛，非真非虛，通明世諦中道也。 真諦中道，無名無相，寄名相待。 真待真無，故無表非無，亦復非有，非有非無名真諦中道也。 真俗合中道者，如俗諦言有，有非實有； 真諦名無，無非定無，非有非無名為兩合中道也。 梁武帝勅開善寺藏法師令作義疏，法師講務無閑，諸學士共議，出安城寺開公、安樂寺遠子，令代法師作疏。 此二人善能領語，精解外典，聽二遍成就十四卷，為一部上簡法師。 法師自手執疏讀一遍，印可言之，亦得去送之。 此疏云：二諦中道云何談物耶？ 以諸法起者，未契法性也。 既未契故有有，則此有是妄有，以其空故是俗也。 虛體即無相，無相即真也。 真諦非有非無而無也，以其非妄有故。 俗雖非有非無而有，以其假有故也。 與物舉體即真故非有，舉體即俗故非無，則非有非無真俗一中道也。 真諦無相故非有非無，真諦中道也。 俗諦是因假，即因非即果故非有，非不作果故非無，此非有非無俗諦中道也。 龍光作三種中道，與開善作三種中道，言方少異。 綽師有二體，藏師一體，而意趣是同，並是有所得，終恐不離斷常，須一一破之也。 先破俗諦中道。 汝因成中道，假名不一一，實法不異異。 且問：不異異為是二名詺二法？ 為詺一法？ 若謂汝四塵是異，異目四塵，四塵其實有異，何得言不異異？ 不異之名復可得安假上耶？ 汝言假名不二，一名詺假，不得目實，實名不一，只見兩名詺二法，云何是中道？ 若二名名二法而名為中道，總別二名名二法亦應中道，色心二名名二法亦應是中道。 若言色心異故不辨中者，如三聚成假，寧得假實明中道耶？ 若言相成故名中道者，色心相因故亦得論中也。 又汝言不一不異為中者，不一除四塵、不異除假名，除假除實，以何為中？ 兩除則無物，不可名大虛為中。 故安中無所，故虛妄說也。 破開善義：汝言有，即此有是妄有。 既言妄有，有箇妄有法，那得是中道？ 妄有則顛倒之別名，故非中道也。 又言即因非即果故非有，非無作果故非無。 此非有非無俗諦中道者，此是何物中道？ 可非似小兒戲耶？ 覩百草之中，非關佛法之中，正是外道義也。 《百論》云「迦毘羅弟子誦僧佉經，云：泥團非即瓶故非有，非不作瓶故非無，非有無為中道。 」若爾，豈非正是僧佉義耶？ 次破相續中道。 續假雖有三說，人所盛用，後起接前義也。 問：無常念念不住，豈得轉前作後、後起續前，令前不滅義？ 彼答云：有為法有二義，一念念滅，不論續； 二應滅而不滅，論相續假也。 今謂不然。 若言應滅而不滅者，亦應應有而不有。 > Second, explaining the three kinds of Middle Way. The Tattvasiddhi masters explain the eight negations differently: one says that all eight negations are the Middle Way of the ultimate truth, and are also the ultimate truth itself. Another says that neither arising nor ceasing is the Middle Way, which is the Middle Way of neither existence nor non-existence of the ultimate truth, whereas the remaining six negations are the Middle Way of the conventional truth. We say this is not so. They do not understand the purport of the Mahāyāna treatises; they only judge in this way according to the Hīnayāna sense. We now say that the eight negations possess three kinds of Middle Way, which are precisely the two truths. Yet the Tattvasiddhi masters explain three kinds of Middle Way: first, the Middle Way of the conventional truth; second, the Middle Way of the ultimate truth; third, the Middle Way that jointly discusses the ultimate and the conventional. As for the Middle Way of the conventional truth: since the conventional truth does not go beyond the three designations, they explain the Middle Way based on the three designations. First, the designation based on causal composition explains the Middle Way through neither identical nor different. How so? A single pillar gathers the four subtle \[elements\] into one; this is non-identical yet one. The four dusts \[sense-data\] together constitute one designation without difference, yet designation and substantial entity are distinct. Being distinct, they are not identical; being one, they are not different; being distinct, they are neither identical nor different: causal composition explains the Middle Way. Second, continuity explains the Middle Way through neither eternal nor severed. But the designation of continuity has different interpretations: one says that one in the stage of succession explains the designation of continuity; another says that the preceding subtle and the subsequent single \[moment\] explain the designation of continuity, like the end of the mind of consciousness and the beginning of the mind of ideation, with the exact middle as the designation. A third is what Longguang transmitted from Kaishan, saying that to explain the designation of continuity: the subsequent arising joins with the preceding, and the preceding transforms into the subsequent, which is arising and reaching, together constituting the designation. Although the explanations of the three masters differ, through mutual continuity it is not severed, and through cessation it is not eternal: neither severed nor eternal explains the Middle Way of continuity. Third, the Middle Way is explained through the designation of mutual dependence. That is to say, there is mutual dependence of opening and avoiding, like the phenomena of matter and mind, which are called universal dependence, and also called fixed dependence. Like the phenomena of long and short, ruler and minister, father and son: the short is not short in itself, but is short because it is compared to the long; the long is not long in itself, but is long because it is compared to the short; such is mutual deprivation and dependence. Up to ruler and minister, father and son, and so on, which are called particular dependence, and also called non-fixed dependence. Although universal and particular are distinct, they are all the Middle Way explained through the designation of mutual dependence. Being designated rather than real, it accords with principle and therefore is not empty; being neither real nor empty universally explains the Middle Way of the conventional truth. The Middle Way of the ultimate truth is without name and without characteristic, provisionally using names in mutual dependence. The ultimate depends on ultimate non-existence, and therefore non-existence expresses not being non-existent, and moreover not being existent; neither existent nor non-existent is called the Middle Way of the ultimate truth. As for the Middle Way uniting the ultimate and conventional: as when the conventional truth speaks of existence, existence is not true existence; the ultimate truth is named non-existence, non-existence is not fixed non-existence; neither existent nor non-existent is called the Middle Way uniting both. Emperor Wu of the Liang ordered Dharma Master Zang of Kaishan Monastery to compose a subcommentary on the meaning. The Dharma master had no leisure from his lecturing duties, so the scholars consulted together and chose Master Kai of Ancheng Monastery and Master Yuan of Anle Monastery to compose the subcommentary on the Dharma master's behalf. These two men were adept at capturing the meaning and had refined comprehension of the non-Buddhist classics; having listened twice, they completed fourteen fascicles, which formed one work and submitted it to the Dharma master for selection. The Dharma master held the subcommentary in his own hands, read it through once, approved it, and said it could be sent out. This subcommentary says: 'How do the two truths and the Middle Way discuss things? Because the arising of phenomena is not yet in accord with the dharmatā. Not yet in accord, there is existence; thus this existence is illusory existence; because it is empty, it is conventional. Its insubstantial essence is precisely devoid of characteristics; devoid of characteristics, it is precisely ultimate. The ultimate truth is neither existent nor non-existent, yet non-existent, because it is not illusory existence. Although the conventional is neither existent nor non-existent, it is existent, because it is provisional existence. In relation to things, the entire essence is ultimate, and therefore non-existent; the entire essence is conventional, and therefore not non-existent; thus, neither existent nor non-existent is the single Middle Way of the ultimate and conventional. The ultimate truth is devoid of characteristics, hence neither existent nor non-existent: the Middle Way of the ultimate truth. The conventional truth is the causal designation: the cause is not identical with the fruit, hence non-existent; it is not that it does not produce the fruit, hence not non-existent: this neither existent nor non-existent is the Middle Way of the conventional truth.' Longguang's formulation of the three kinds of Middle Way differs slightly in phrasing from Kaishan's formulation of the three kinds of Middle Way. Master Chao posited two essences, while Master Zang posited one essence; yet their purports are the same, both involving attainment, and in the end they fearfully cannot escape eternity and severance, so they must be refuted one by one. First, refuting the Middle Way of the conventional truth: your Middle Way of causal composition holds that the conventional designation is not identical and one, while the substantial entity is not different and distinct. Let us ask: do 'not different' and 'distinct' use two names to designate two phenomena, or do they designate one phenomenon? If you say that your four dusts are distinct, and 'distinct' refers to the four dusts, then the four dusts in reality have differences; how can you say they are not different and distinct? Can the name 'not different' furthermore be applied to the designation? You say that the conventional designation is non-dual: one name designates the designation and cannot refer to the substantial; the substantial is named non-identical. One only sees two names designating two phenomena; how is this the Middle Way? If two names naming two phenomena is called the Middle Way, then the two names 'general' and 'particular' naming two phenomena should also be the Middle Way, and the two names 'matter' and 'mind' naming two phenomena should also be the Middle Way. If you say that because matter and mind are different they cannot explain the middle, then as the three aggregates constitute a designation, how could designation and substantial explain the Middle Way? If you say that because they mutually constitute each other it is called the Middle Way, then because matter and mind are causally conditioned by each other, one could also discuss the middle. Furthermore, you say that neither identical nor different is the middle: 'not identical' eliminates the four dusts, 'not different' eliminates the conventional designation; eliminating the designation and eliminating the substantial, what is taken as the middle? Eliminating both, there is no thing; one cannot call the great void the middle. Therefore, positing the middle has no place, hence it is a false and empty explanation. Refuting Kaishan's meaning: you say there is existence, and this existence is illusory existence. Since you say illusory existence, there is a phenomenon of illusory existence; how can that be the Middle Way? 'Illusory existence' is simply an alternative name for inverted error; therefore it is not the Middle Way. Furthermore, you say that because the cause is not identical with the fruit it is non-existent, and because it is not that it does not produce the fruit it is not non-existent. As for this 'neither existent nor non-existent is the Middle Way of the conventional truth': what kind of Middle Way is this? Can it not be like child's play? Looking at the middle among the hundred grasses has nothing to do with the middle of the Buddha's Dharma; it is precisely a non-Buddhist doctrine. The Śataśāstra says: 'A disciple of Kapila recited a Sāṃkhya sūtra, saying: "The lump of clay is not identical with the jar, hence non-existent; it is not that it does not make a jar, hence not non-existent; neither existent nor non-existent is the Middle Way."' If so, is this not precisely Sāṃkhya doctrine? Next, refuting the Middle Way of continuity: although there are three explanations of the designation of continuity, what people widely employ is the meaning of the subsequent arising joining with the preceding. Question: impermanence does not abide from thought-moment to thought-moment; how could the preceding transform into the subsequent and the subsequent arise to continue the preceding, making the preceding not cease? They reply: conditioned phenomena have two meanings: first, they cease from thought-moment to thought-moment, without discussing continuity; second, what ought to cease does not cease, discussing the designation of continuity. We now say this is not so. If you say what ought to cease does not cease, then what ought to exist should also not exist. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 2.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.2.4) - [Next: 2.5.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.2.5.2) - [Up: 2.5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.2.5) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853~en-mt.2.5.1) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.2.5.1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.2.5.1) · Pramāṇa