[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大乘玄論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853) › 2.5.3 # 大乘玄論 2.5.3 大乘玄論 2.5.3 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [2.5.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.2.5.3) 若為因得則非本有，無因則同外道義。 若言本有，何以名中道耶？ 又本來有此，四句百非，清淨法自應遣顛倒，那急為煩惱所覆，後修得十地之解尚能遣煩惱，本來常定法身不能遣之，翻成未之修解却惑？ 本即不能，未亦不能也。 今大乘無所得義，約八不明三種中道，言方新舊不同，而意無異趣也。 山中師對寂正作之，語待不語、不語待語，語不語並是相待假名，故假語不名語、假不語不名不語。 不名不語不為無、不名語不為有，即是不有不無世諦中道。 但相待假，故可有說生、可無說滅，故以生滅合為世諦也。 真諦亦然，假不語不名不語、假非不語不名非不語。 不名非不語，不為非不無； 不名不語，不為非不有，則是非不有非不無真諦中道也。 相待假故，可有說不滅、可無說不生，即是不生不滅，故合為真諦也。 二諦合明中道者，假語不名語、假不語不名不語，非語非不語，即是非有非不有、非無非不無，二諦合明中道也。 生滅不生滅合明，類此可尋也。 今明必須對他故起，他有有可有，則有生可生、有滅可滅。 有生可生，生是定生； 有滅可滅； 滅是定滅。 生是定生； 生在滅外； 滅是定滅，滅在生外。 生在滅外，生不待滅； 滅在生外，滅不待生。 生不待滅，生則獨存； 滅不待生，滅則孤立。 如斯生滅，皆是自性，非因緣義宗也。 今則不爾，無有可有，以空故有； 無生可生，亦無滅可滅。 但以世諦故，假名說生滅。 假生，生非定生； 假滅，滅非定滅。 生非定生，滅外無生； 滅非定滅，生外無滅。 滅外無生，由滅故生； 生外無滅，由生故滅。 由滅故生，生不獨存； 由生故滅，滅不孤立。 此之生滅，皆是因緣假名。 因緣生生而不起，所以不生； 因緣滅滅而不失，所以不滅，故不生不滅名為世諦中道也。 餘句，例之可尋，不復具出也。 次明對世諦有生滅，故名真諦不生不滅。 所以空有為世諦，假生假滅； 有空為真諦，假不生假不滅。 此不生不滅，非自不生不滅，待世諦假生滅，明真諦假不生滅。 世諦假生滅既非生滅，真諦假不生滅亦非不生滅，故非不生非不滅為真諦中道也。 餘句，不例之可知也。 次明二諦合中道者，有為世諦有生有滅，空為真諦不生不滅。 此不生滅，即是生滅不生滅； 此生滅，即是不生滅生滅。 不生滅生滅，是則非生滅； 生滅不生滅，是即非不生滅。 故非生滅非不生滅，是二諦合明中道也。 生滅既爾，餘句應例可解也。 又論釋不常不斷，文言「有人不受不生不滅，而信不常不斷也。 」成實師釋文云：以相續故常，念念生滅不自顧為斷。 以見斷常故，所以不信不常不斷。 須廣破，如前說也。 論言「有人不受不生不滅而信不常不斷」者，一云：不受不生不滅者，即是悟不生不滅。 而於不常不斷等未悟故，言而信不常不斷，以見有斷常故也。 二云：長安影法師云，非是不信不常不斷，但自有人得悟不同、解心未遍，雖知諸法不生不滅，而未悟不常不斷。 如前說也。 今謂諸法究竟不生，理自不滅。 以不生故，何得有常？ 以無常故，何得有斷？ 若望論文，後解為勝。 文言「雖聞不生不滅與不常不斷，猶謂四門成諸法故也。 」若例者，雖聞不生不滅，猶謂六門成諸法者未悟也。 故《大品經．相行品》云「行亦不受，不行亦不受，行不行亦不受，非行非不行亦不受，不受亦不受也。 」又似如《成論．賢聖品》云「知不作者，不信作等，是名上人也。 」不常不斷者，若以有為有，則常是實常、斷是實斷也。 今以空故有，常不名常、斷不名斷，世諦假名說有常有斷。 假常不可常、假斷不可斷，即是不斷不常世諦中道也。 不一不異者，然不一或可對二，乃至百千等。 而言對不異者，異一之外，二三等悉是異，謂有一異也。 但成論師明假實有一異義。 > If it were attained through causes, it would not be fundamentally existing; if it lacked causes, it would be identical to heterodox doctrines. If one says that it is fundamentally existing, why is it called the Middle Way? Furthermore, if this \[dharmakāya\], free of the four propositions and hundred negations, were originally possessed, the pure Dharma itself ought to dispel inversion; how could it be urgently covered by defilements, such that the understanding of the ten stages cultivated and attained subsequently can still dispel defilements, while the fundamentally eternally settled dharmakāya cannot dispel them, turning out conversely that defilements are cleared away by what has not yet been cultivated and understood? If what is fundamental cannot do so, what is subsequent cannot do so either. Now, the Mahāyāna doctrine of non-attainment explains the three kinds of the Middle Way in terms of the eight negations; although the old and new methods of expression differ, their intent has no divergence. The master of the mountain \[Sengquan\] formulated this with respect to \[the state of\] tranquility: speech depends on non-speech, and non-speech depends on speech; speech and non-speech are both dependently co-arisen conventional designations. Therefore, conventional speech is not termed speech, and conventional non-speech is not termed non-speech. Being not termed non-speech does not make it non-existent; being not termed speech does not make it existent—this is the conventional truth Middle Way of neither existent nor non-existent. It is merely a conventional designation through mutual dependence; therefore, where there may be existence, one speaks of arising, and where there may be non-existence, one speaks of cessation; hence arising and cessation together constitute conventional truth. Ultimate truth is also like this: conventional non-speech is not termed non-speech, and conventional non-non-speech is not termed non-non-speech. Being not termed non-non-speech does not make it not non-existent; being not termed non-speech does not make it not existent—this is the ultimate truth Middle Way of neither not existent nor not non-existent. Because it is a conventional designation through mutual dependence, where there may be existence, one speaks of non-cessation, and where there may be non-existence, one speaks of non-arising; this is neither arising nor cessation, and hence they are combined as ultimate truth. As for explaining the Middle Way through combining the two truths: conventional speech is not termed speech, and conventional non-speech is not termed non-speech; being neither speech nor non-speech is simply being neither existent nor not existent, neither non-existent nor not non-existent—this is explaining the Middle Way by combining the two truths. Explaining by combining arising and cessation with non-arising and non-cessation can be understood analogously to this. Now we clarify that it must arise in opposition to the other: if the other possesses an existence that can be existent, then there is an arising that can arise, and a cessation that can cease. If there is an arising that can arise, arising is definitely arising; if there is a cessation that can cease, cessation is definitely cessation. Arising is definitely arising; arising lies outside cessation. Cessation is definitely cessation; cessation lies outside arising. Arising lies outside cessation, so arising does not depend on cessation; cessation lies outside arising, so cessation does not depend on arising. Arising does not depend on cessation, so arising subsists alone; cessation does not depend on arising, so cessation stands in isolation. Such arising and cessation are all intrinsic nature, not the thesis of dependent co-arising. Now, it is not so: there is no existence that can be existent, because of emptiness there is existence; there is no arising that can arise, nor is there any cessation that can cease. It is only because of conventional truth that one conventionally designates and speaks of arising and cessation. As conventional arising, arising is not definitely arising; as conventional cessation, cessation is not definitely cessation. Arising is not definitely arising, so outside of cessation there is no arising; cessation is not definitely cessation, so outside of arising there is no cessation. Outside of cessation there is no arising, so because of cessation there is arising; outside of arising there is no cessation, so because of arising there is cessation. Because of cessation there is arising, so arising does not subsist alone; because of arising there is cessation, so cessation does not stand in isolation. Such arising and cessation are entirely conventional designations of dependent co-arising. Dependent co-arising arises, yet arising does not occur, and therefore it does not arise; dependent co-arising ceases, yet ceasing does not perish, and therefore it does not cease; hence non-arising and non-cessation are called the conventional truth Middle Way. The remaining phrases can be understood by analogy and need not be fully set forth. Next, we clarify that in opposition to the existence of arising and cessation in conventional truth, it is called the non-arising and non-cessation of ultimate truth. Therefore, emptiness and existence serve as conventional truth, with conventional arising and conventional cessation; existence and emptiness serve as ultimate truth, with conventional non-arising and conventional non-cessation. This non-arising and non-cessation is not inherently non-arising and non-cessation; depending on the conventional arising and cessation of conventional truth, one clarifies the conventional non-arising and non-cessation of ultimate truth. Since the conventional arising and cessation of conventional truth are neither arising nor cessation, the conventional non-arising and non-cessation of ultimate truth are also neither non-arising nor non-cessation; hence neither non-arising nor non-cessation is the ultimate truth Middle Way. The remaining phrases can be known without analogy. Next, to clarify the Middle Way combining the two truths: existence serves as conventional truth, having arising and having cessation; emptiness serves as ultimate truth, being non-arising and non-cessation. This non-arising and non-cessation is itself the non-arising and non-cessation of arising and cessation; this arising and cessation is itself the arising and cessation of non-arising and non-cessation. The arising and cessation of non-arising and non-cessation is therefore not arising and cessation; the non-arising and non-cessation of arising and cessation is therefore not non-arising and non-cessation. Therefore, neither arising and cessation nor non-arising and non-cessation is the Middle Way explained by combining the two truths. Since arising and cessation are thus, the remaining phrases should be understood by analogy. Furthermore, the treatise explains neither permanence nor annihilation, the text stating: 'There are people who do not accept neither arising nor cessation, yet believe in neither permanence nor annihilation.' The Tattvasiddhi masters explain the text saying: because of continuity there is permanence, and momentary arising and cessation without regard for oneself is annihilation. Because they see annihilation and permanence, they do not believe in neither permanence nor annihilation. This must be broadly refuted, as discussed before. Regarding the treatise's statement, 'There are people who do not accept neither arising nor cessation yet believe in neither permanence nor annihilation': One explanation says: 'not accepting neither arising nor cessation' means awakening to neither arising nor cessation. Yet, because they have not yet awakened to neither permanence nor annihilation, etc., it says, 'yet believe in neither permanence nor annihilation' because they see the existence of annihilation and permanence. The second explanation says: Master Ying of Chang'an says that it is not that they do not believe in neither permanence nor annihilation, but merely that different people attain awakening differently and their understanding mind is not yet pervasive; although they know that all phenomena are neither arising nor ceasing, they have not yet awakened to neither permanence nor annihilation, as discussed before. We now say that all phenomena are ultimately non-arising, and by principle naturally do not cease. Because they do not arise, how could there be permanence? Because there is no permanence, how could there be annihilation? If judged against the text of the treatise, the latter explanation is superior. The text says: 'Although they hear of neither arising nor cessation and neither permanence nor annihilation, they still say that the four gates constitute all phenomena.' By analogy, although they hear of neither arising nor cessation, those who still say that the six gates constitute all phenomena have not awakened. Therefore, the \*Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra\*, 'Chapter on Signs and Practice', states: 'One does not accept practice, nor does one accept non-practice; one does not accept practice and non-practice, nor does one accept neither practice nor non-practice; non-acceptance also is not accepted.' Again, it resembles the \*Tattvasiddhi-śāstra\*, 'Chapter on the Worthies and Nobles', which says: 'One who knows non-action does not believe in action and the like; such a one is called a superior person.' As for neither permanence nor annihilation: if one takes existence to be existent, then permanence is real permanence, and annihilation is real annihilation. Now, because of emptiness there is existence; permanence is not termed permanence, and annihilation is not termed annihilation. Conventional truth conventionally designates and speaks of having permanence and having annihilation. Conventional permanence cannot be permanent, and conventional annihilation cannot be annihilated; this is the conventional truth Middle Way of neither annihilation nor permanence. As for neither unity nor difference: 'not one' can perhaps be opposed to two, up to a hundred or a thousand. Yet the reason it is said in opposition to 'not different' is that outside of the different and the one, two, three, and so forth are all difference; this refers to having unity and difference. However, the Tattvasiddhi masters clarify that conventional and real have the meaning of unity and difference. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 2.5.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.2.5.2) - [Next: 2.5.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.2.5.4) - [Up: 2.5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.2.5) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853~en-mt.2.5.3) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [大智度論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.prajnaparamita.pancavimsatisahasrika!mahaprajnaparamitopadesa*zh-kumarajiva.43.64) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.2.5.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.2.5.3) · Pramāṇa