[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大乘玄論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853) › 2.5 # 大乘玄論 2.5 大乘玄論 2.5 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [2.5.1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.2.5.1) 第二明三種中道。 成論師解八不不同：一云八不並是真諦中道，亦是真諦也。 二云不生不滅是中道，即是真諦不有不無中道，餘六不是，俗諦中道也。 今謂不然。 彼不解大乘論意，小乘義意判如此耳。 今云八不具三種中道，即是二諦也。 但成論師解三種中道：一世諦中道、二真諦中道、三真俗合論中道也。 世諦中道者，世諦不出三假，故依三假明中道。 一因成假，不一不異明中道也。 何者？ 一柱攬四微為一，是不一而一。 四塵同成，一假不異，而假實殊故。 異故不一、一故不異，異故不一不異，因成明中道也。 二相續不常不斷明中道。 但相續假不同：一云補處明續假也； 二云前玄與後一明續假，如識心之終、想心之初，當中央為假。 三龍光傳開善云明續假，後起接前、前轉作後，即是生至，共成假也。 雖三師說不同，而相與續故不斷、滅故不常，不斷不常明相續中道也。 三相待假明中道。 即是有開避相待，如色心等法，名為通待，亦名定待也。 如長短、君臣、父子等法，短不自短，形長故短； 長不自長，形短故長，如此相奪待。 乃至君臣父子等，名為別待，亦名不定待也。 通別雖殊，悉是相待假明中道。 假而非真，稱當於理故非虛，非真非虛，通明世諦中道也。 真諦中道，無名無相，寄名相待。 真待真無，故無表非無，亦復非有，非有非無名真諦中道也。 真俗合中道者，如俗諦言有，有非實有； 真諦名無，無非定無，非有非無名為兩合中道也。 梁武帝勅開善寺藏法師令作義疏，法師講務無閑，諸學士共議，出安城寺開公、安樂寺遠子，令代法師作疏。 此二人善能領語，精解外典，聽二遍成就十四卷，為一部上簡法師。 法師自手執疏讀一遍，印可言之，亦得去送之。 此疏云：二諦中道云何談物耶？ 以諸法起者，未契法性也。 既未契故有有，則此有是妄有，以其空故是俗也。 虛體即無相，無相即真也。 真諦非有非無而無也，以其非妄有故。 俗雖非有非無而有，以其假有故也。 與物舉體即真故非有，舉體即俗故非無，則非有非無真俗一中道也。 真諦無相故非有非無，真諦中道也。 俗諦是因假，即因非即果故非有，非不作果故非無，此非有非無俗諦中道也。 龍光作三種中道，與開善作三種中道，言方少異。 綽師有二體，藏師一體，而意趣是同，並是有所得，終恐不離斷常，須一一破之也。 先破俗諦中道。 汝因成中道，假名不一一，實法不異異。 且問：不異異為是二名詺二法？ 為詺一法？ 若謂汝四塵是異，異目四塵，四塵其實有異，何得言不異異？ 不異之名復可得安假上耶？ 汝言假名不二，一名詺假，不得目實，實名不一，只見兩名詺二法，云何是中道？ 若二名名二法而名為中道，總別二名名二法亦應中道，色心二名名二法亦應是中道。 若言色心異故不辨中者，如三聚成假，寧得假實明中道耶？ 若言相成故名中道者，色心相因故亦得論中也。 又汝言不一不異為中者，不一除四塵、不異除假名，除假除實，以何為中？ 兩除則無物，不可名大虛為中。 故安中無所，故虛妄說也。 破開善義：汝言有，即此有是妄有。 既言妄有，有箇妄有法，那得是中道？ 妄有則顛倒之別名，故非中道也。 又言即因非即果故非有，非無作果故非無。 此非有非無俗諦中道者，此是何物中道？ 可非似小兒戲耶？ 覩百草之中，非關佛法之中，正是外道義也。 《百論》云「迦毘羅弟子誦僧佉經，云：泥團非即瓶故非有，非不作瓶故非無，非有無為中道。 」若爾，豈非正是僧佉義耶？ 次破相續中道。 續假雖有三說，人所盛用，後起接前義也。 問：無常念念不住，豈得轉前作後、後起續前，令前不滅義？ 彼答云：有為法有二義，一念念滅，不論續； 二應滅而不滅，論相續假也。 今謂不然。 若言應滅而不滅者，亦應應有而不有。 > Second, explaining the three kinds of Middle Way. The Tattvasiddhi masters explain the eight negations differently: one says that all eight negations are the Middle Way of the ultimate truth, and are also the ultimate truth itself. Another says that neither arising nor ceasing is the Middle Way, which is the Middle Way of neither existence nor non-existence of the ultimate truth, whereas the remaining six negations are the Middle Way of the conventional truth. We say this is not so. They do not understand the purport of the Mahāyāna treatises; they only judge in this way according to the Hīnayāna sense. We now say that the eight negations possess three kinds of Middle Way, which are precisely the two truths. Yet the Tattvasiddhi masters explain three kinds of Middle Way: first, the Middle Way of the conventional truth; second, the Middle Way of the ultimate truth; third, the Middle Way that jointly discusses the ultimate and the conventional. As for the Middle Way of the conventional truth: since the conventional truth does not go beyond the three designations, they explain the Middle Way based on the three designations. First, the designation based on causal composition explains the Middle Way through neither identical nor different. How so? A single pillar gathers the four subtle \[elements\] into one; this is non-identical yet one. The four dusts \[sense-data\] together constitute one designation without difference, yet designation and substantial entity are distinct. Being distinct, they are not identical; being one, they are not different; being distinct, they are neither identical nor different: causal composition explains the Middle Way. Second, continuity explains the Middle Way through neither eternal nor severed. But the designation of continuity has different interpretations: one says that one in the stage of succession explains the designation of continuity; another says that the preceding subtle and the subsequent single \[moment\] explain the designation of continuity, like the end of the mind of consciousness and the beginning of the mind of ideation, with the exact middle as the designation. A third is what Longguang transmitted from Kaishan, saying that to explain the designation of continuity: the subsequent arising joins with the preceding, and the preceding transforms into the subsequent, which is arising and reaching, together constituting the designation. Although the explanations of the three masters differ, through mutual continuity it is not severed, and through cessation it is not eternal: neither severed nor eternal explains the Middle Way of continuity. Third, the Middle Way is explained through the designation of mutual dependence. That is to say, there is mutual dependence of opening and avoiding, like the phenomena of matter and mind, which are called universal dependence, and also called fixed dependence. Like the phenomena of long and short, ruler and minister, father and son: the short is not short in itself, but is short because it is compared to the long; the long is not long in itself, but is long because it is compared to the short; such is mutual deprivation and dependence. Up to ruler and minister, father and son, and so on, which are called particular dependence, and also called non-fixed dependence. Although universal and particular are distinct, they are all the Middle Way explained through the designation of mutual dependence. Being designated rather than real, it accords with principle and therefore is not empty; being neither real nor empty universally explains the Middle Way of the conventional truth. The Middle Way of the ultimate truth is without name and without characteristic, provisionally using names in mutual dependence. The ultimate depends on ultimate non-existence, and therefore non-existence expresses not being non-existent, and moreover not being existent; neither existent nor non-existent is called the Middle Way of the ultimate truth. As for the Middle Way uniting the ultimate and conventional: as when the conventional truth speaks of existence, existence is not true existence; the ultimate truth is named non-existence, non-existence is not fixed non-existence; neither existent nor non-existent is called the Middle Way uniting both. Emperor Wu of the Liang ordered Dharma Master Zang of Kaishan Monastery to compose a subcommentary on the meaning. The Dharma master had no leisure from his lecturing duties, so the scholars consulted together and chose Master Kai of Ancheng Monastery and Master Yuan of Anle Monastery to compose the subcommentary on the Dharma master's behalf. These two men were adept at capturing the meaning and had refined comprehension of the non-Buddhist classics; having listened twice, they completed fourteen fascicles, which formed one work and submitted it to the Dharma master for selection. The Dharma master held the subcommentary in his own hands, read it through once, approved it, and said it could be sent out. This subcommentary says: 'How do the two truths and the Middle Way discuss things? Because the arising of phenomena is not yet in accord with the dharmatā. Not yet in accord, there is existence; thus this existence is illusory existence; because it is empty, it is conventional. Its insubstantial essence is precisely devoid of characteristics; devoid of characteristics, it is precisely ultimate. The ultimate truth is neither existent nor non-existent, yet non-existent, because it is not illusory existence. Although the conventional is neither existent nor non-existent, it is existent, because it is provisional existence. In relation to things, the entire essence is ultimate, and therefore non-existent; the entire essence is conventional, and therefore not non-existent; thus, neither existent nor non-existent is the single Middle Way of the ultimate and conventional. The ultimate truth is devoid of characteristics, hence neither existent nor non-existent: the Middle Way of the ultimate truth. The conventional truth is the causal designation: the cause is not identical with the fruit, hence non-existent; it is not that it does not produce the fruit, hence not non-existent: this neither existent nor non-existent is the Middle Way of the conventional truth.' Longguang's formulation of the three kinds of Middle Way differs slightly in phrasing from Kaishan's formulation of the three kinds of Middle Way. Master Chao posited two essences, while Master Zang posited one essence; yet their purports are the same, both involving attainment, and in the end they fearfully cannot escape eternity and severance, so they must be refuted one by one. First, refuting the Middle Way of the conventional truth: your Middle Way of causal composition holds that the conventional designation is not identical and one, while the substantial entity is not different and distinct. Let us ask: do 'not different' and 'distinct' use two names to designate two phenomena, or do they designate one phenomenon? If you say that your four dusts are distinct, and 'distinct' refers to the four dusts, then the four dusts in reality have differences; how can you say they are not different and distinct? Can the name 'not different' furthermore be applied to the designation? You say that the conventional designation is non-dual: one name designates the designation and cannot refer to the substantial; the substantial is named non-identical. One only sees two names designating two phenomena; how is this the Middle Way? If two names naming two phenomena is called the Middle Way, then the two names 'general' and 'particular' naming two phenomena should also be the Middle Way, and the two names 'matter' and 'mind' naming two phenomena should also be the Middle Way. If you say that because matter and mind are different they cannot explain the middle, then as the three aggregates constitute a designation, how could designation and substantial explain the Middle Way? If you say that because they mutually constitute each other it is called the Middle Way, then because matter and mind are causally conditioned by each other, one could also discuss the middle. Furthermore, you say that neither identical nor different is the middle: 'not identical' eliminates the four dusts, 'not different' eliminates the conventional designation; eliminating the designation and eliminating the substantial, what is taken as the middle? Eliminating both, there is no thing; one cannot call the great void the middle. Therefore, positing the middle has no place, hence it is a false and empty explanation. Refuting Kaishan's meaning: you say there is existence, and this existence is illusory existence. Since you say illusory existence, there is a phenomenon of illusory existence; how can that be the Middle Way? 'Illusory existence' is simply an alternative name for inverted error; therefore it is not the Middle Way. Furthermore, you say that because the cause is not identical with the fruit it is non-existent, and because it is not that it does not produce the fruit it is not non-existent. As for this 'neither existent nor non-existent is the Middle Way of the conventional truth': what kind of Middle Way is this? Can it not be like child's play? Looking at the middle among the hundred grasses has nothing to do with the middle of the Buddha's Dharma; it is precisely a non-Buddhist doctrine. The Śataśāstra says: 'A disciple of Kapila recited a Sāṃkhya sūtra, saying: "The lump of clay is not identical with the jar, hence non-existent; it is not that it does not make a jar, hence not non-existent; neither existent nor non-existent is the Middle Way."' If so, is this not precisely Sāṃkhya doctrine? Next, refuting the Middle Way of continuity: although there are three explanations of the designation of continuity, what people widely employ is the meaning of the subsequent arising joining with the preceding. Question: impermanence does not abide from thought-moment to thought-moment; how could the preceding transform into the subsequent and the subsequent arise to continue the preceding, making the preceding not cease? They reply: conditioned phenomena have two meanings: first, they cease from thought-moment to thought-moment, without discussing continuity; second, what ought to cease does not cease, discussing the designation of continuity. We now say this is not so. If you say what ought to cease does not cease, then what ought to exist should also not exist. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) ### [2.5.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.2.5.2) 而諸法無非有，新新生滅。 如《居士經》云「即生即老即死。 」寧有應滅而不滅？ 舉體遂不滅者，復誰滅耶？ 若舉體滅者，復誰在不滅耶？ 而滅者剎那念念恒滅，不曾不滅； 不滅者恒不滅。 只見斷常兩片，何得中道？ 彼謂一法有此滅不滅二義，故得明中道也。 今謂不然。 一法有滅有不滅義者，滅義邊無有一法不滅，舉體消亡，何處有不滅義辨相續假耶？ 又汝為是一法為中？ 為是二名為中？ 若二名為中，二名詺何物？ 為目二法？ 為目一法？ 若二名目二法，只見兩名兩法，何得是中耶？ 若二名詺一法，只見一法上有兩名，如童子上眼目二名，寧得是中道耶？ 汝言安何處一法有滅不滅義？ 安一法上。 一法是何物？ 是心？ 是虛空？ 是心者，心是事有，故非中也。 應滅不滅，兩義復相違，故非中也。 若一名名中者，如色一名名一色，亦應是中道如向無與。 向有二義，上兩名目者，只見二名詺二義，不見中道。 若兩除則無所，無所何為中也？ 次破相待假明中，彼云因成假為體、相續為用。 相待為法立名。 若言假故不真，不真是虛，稱當於理不虛者； 此假虛是當理，當理故不虛，以何言耶？ 若言外道說為虛，故不此虛者，他假不當稱理，汝假當理之假虛，不虛不真安何處耶？ 又若約長短明中者，亦不然。 以五尺為短、一丈為長，長自在長，不在於短； 短自在短，不在於長。 只見長短兩片，中名出何處耶？ 若長自長，長則不須短者，亦應只用長成於中。 若不爾者，二物共為一長。 二物共長，定是誰長耶？ 又言不短不長不彼不此名為中者，此則成兩除則無所，無所何名為中？ 如是應廣破。 如論品品悉破相待，自現於文中，如《燃可燃品》中破也。 次破真諦中道。 彼云：真不生不滅、無相無名，所以寄名名真。 無而非無、有而非有，寄名名中道也。 今云不然。 若言真無名寄名、名真為中者，有能寄、有所寄以不？ 若有所寄，即有所名物。 若無所寄，非能非所者，則無真理，則同邪見也。 若言真是世諦假名寄名真諦者，世諦虛假，何者為真？ 真名為實，世諦浮虛，何得名實？ 又真諦絕名，何勞須寄名？ 名若可寄，則不應絕，絕則不須寄也。 又行人尋真得真，得云何名中道？ 若寄名名真，所寄之理不可寄者，只不可寄是名，何謂是無名也？ 若寄名詺真，真理無名無相者，亦不應言智會真。 真不被會，故亦無人會真斷結。 若言實理可會者，亦應實理有名。 若言世諦有中、真理無中不中，此乃是世諦中道。 真理無中，云何言真諦中道？ 開善義本言虛體則無相，無相是真諦者，虛是俗理、無相是真理，既有二理即是二物，云何是中道也？ 又真理非有非無而無也。 此而無之無，非無為無。 既言非無，那是無？ 若言對有之無，此無是偏無，故非中也。 次破合二諦辨中道。 彼言：世諦言非無，真諦言非有，非有非無合明中道也。 今謂不然。 既言兩捨，何名中道？ 又非無則是有世諦，非有只是真諦無，兩名兩處。 兩名兩處不同，何得名中道耶？ 開善義本云：舉體即真故非有，舉體即俗故非無，則非有非無真俗一中道也。 今云不然。 既言舉體即真，即是無相無名則失俗，復有何物而言相即、非有非無為中道耶？ 故雖有三種中道，撿之無所無當，故但有語言，非佛法中道也。 次破《地論》中道。 彼云「阿梨耶識本來不生不滅，古今常定，非始非終。 」但違真故起妄想，故彼云「六識熾惱，隨覆梨耶，名為如來藏。 後修十地之解，分分斷除妄想六識。 六識既盡，妄想之解亦除，顯真成用，名為法身。 」譬如風起雲除，風息皎日獨朗。 法身既顯，有諸應能，所以不生現生、不滅現滅，不因不果。 因果等諸用非一，故經云「佛真法身猶如虛空，應物現形如水中月」也。 今謂不然。 法身本有，為何因可得？ > Yet phenomena are not non-existent; they arise and perish anew at every moment. As the Layman Sūtra says, "Immediate arising is immediate aging, which is immediate dying." How could there be something that should perish yet does not perish? If the entire substance does not perish, who then perishes? If the entire substance perishes, who remains and does not perish? What perishes is constantly perishing from kṣaṇa to kṣaṇa and thought-moment to thought-moment, never not perishing; what does not perish is constantly non-perishing. One only sees two fragments of annihilation and permanence; how can this attain the Middle Way? They claim that one phenomenon possesses these two aspects of perishing and non-perishing, and therefore can elucidate the Middle Way. Now I say this is not so. If one phenomenon has the aspects of perishing and non-perishing, on the side of the aspect of perishing there is not a single phenomenon that does not perish, completely dissolving; where then is the aspect of non-perishing to explain continuity-designation? Furthermore, do you take one phenomenon to be the middle? Or do you take the two designations to be the middle? If the two designations are the middle, what thing do the two designations designate? Do they denote two phenomena? Or do they denote one phenomenon? If the two designations denote two phenomena, one merely sees two designations and two phenomena; how can this be the middle? If the two designations designate one phenomenon, one merely sees two designations upon one phenomenon, like the two designations "pupil" and "eye" upon a child; how can that be the Middle Way? You ask, upon what one phenomenon are the aspects of perishing and non-perishing posited? Posited upon one phenomenon. What kind of thing is this one phenomenon? Is it mind? Is it space? If it is mind, mind is a factual existent, hence it is not the middle. That which should perish and that which does not perish—the two aspects are, moreover, mutually contradictory; hence it is not the middle. If a single designation is termed "middle", just as a single designation "form" designates a single form, it should also be the Middle Way, as before with no difference. In what preceded, where there were two aspects, and the two designations above denoted them, one merely saw two designations designating two aspects and did not see the Middle Way. If both are removed, there is nothing left; when there is nothing, how could it be the middle? Next, in refuting that the conditional designation elucidates the middle, they claim that the causal-formation-designation is the substance, continuity is the function, and conditional designation establishes the designation for phenomena. If they say: because it is conventional it is not real; not real is empty; and matching the principle it is not empty—then does this conventional emptiness match the principle? Matching the principle, therefore it is not empty: on what basis is this said? If they say that non-Buddhists call it empty, hence it is not that \[kind of\] empty, the other's designation does not properly match the principle, whereas your designation is a conventional emptiness that matches the principle: where then are not-empty and not-real posited? Furthermore, if one explains the middle in terms of long and short, that is also not so. Taking five feet as short and one zhang as long, long exists of itself as long and does not depend on short; short exists of itself as short and does not depend on long. One only sees two fragments, long and short; from where does the name "middle" emerge? If long is long of itself, and long does not require short, one should also just use long to constitute the middle. If it is not so, then two objects together make one length. If two objects share a length, whose length is it definitively? Furthermore, if one says that neither short nor long, neither that nor this, is named the middle, then this becomes: both being removed, there is nothing left; when there is nothing, how can it be named the middle? One should refute this extensively in this manner. Just as chapter by chapter the treatise completely refutes mutual dependence, it naturally appears in the text, as refuted in the "Chapter on the Burning and the Burnable". Next, in refuting the ultimate-truth Middle Way: they claim that the ultimate neither arises nor perishes, is devoid of marks and designations, and therefore a designation is borrowed to name it "ultimate"; it is non-existent yet not non-existent, existent yet not existent, and a designation is borrowed to name it the "Middle Way". Now I say this is not so. If it is said that the ultimate is devoid of designations and a designation is borrowed, naming the ultimate to be the middle, is there that which borrows and that which is borrowed, or not? If there is that which is borrowed, then there is a thing that is named. If there is no that which is borrowed, being neither subject nor object \[of borrowing\], then there is no ultimate principle, which is identical to wrong views. If it is said that the ultimate is a conventional designation of conventional truth borrowed to designate the ultimate truth, conventional truth is empty and false; what could be the ultimate? "Ultimate" is named real; conventional truth is floating and empty; how can it be named real? Furthermore, ultimate truth transcends designations; why should it need a borrowed designation? If a designation can be borrowed, it should not transcend; if it transcends, it does not need borrowing. Furthermore, when a practitioner seeks the ultimate and attains the ultimate, how can attainment be called the Middle Way? If a designation is borrowed to name the ultimate, and the principle that is borrowed cannot be borrowed, then merely "cannot be borrowed" is a designation; how can it be said to be devoid of designations? If a designation is borrowed to designate the ultimate, and the ultimate principle is devoid of marks and designations, one should also not say that gnosis accords with the ultimate. If the ultimate cannot be accorded with, there is also no person who accords with the ultimate to sever defilements. If it is said that the real principle can be accorded with, then the real principle should also have a designation. If it is said that conventional truth has a middle, while the ultimate principle has neither middle nor non-middle, this is merely the Middle Way of conventional truth. If the ultimate principle lacks the middle, how can one speak of an ultimate-truth Middle Way? Kaishan's fundamental doctrine states that an empty substance is without marks, and being without marks is the ultimate truth: emptiness is the conventional principle, and marklessness is the ultimate principle. Since there are two principles, these are two things; how can this be the Middle Way? Furthermore, the ultimate principle is neither existent nor non-existent, yet non-existent. This non-existence of "yet non-existent" takes non-non-existence as non-existence. Since it says "non-non-existence", how can it be non-existence? If one speaks of the non-existence that is paired with existence, this non-existence is a one-sided non-existence; hence it is not the middle. Next, in refuting the combination of the two truths to explain the Middle Way: they say that conventional truth speaks of non-non-existence and ultimate truth speaks of non-existence, and neither existent nor non-existent are combined to elucidate the Middle Way. Now I say this is not so. Since it speaks of abandoning both, how can it be called the Middle Way? Furthermore, non-non-existence is existence—conventional truth; non-existence is merely ultimate truth's non-existence: two designations in two places. If the two designations and two places are different, how can it be called the Middle Way? Kaishan's fundamental doctrine says: the entire substance is identical to the ultimate, hence not existent; the entire substance is identical to the conventional, hence not non-existent; thus neither existent nor non-existent is the single Middle Way of ultimate and conventional. Now I say this is not so. Since it is said that the entire substance is identical to the ultimate, which is markless and nameless, then the conventional is lost; what thing remains such that one can speak of mutual identity and take neither existent nor non-existent as the Middle Way? Therefore, although there are three kinds of Middle Way, when examined they have no referent and correspond to nothing; hence they are mere words and not the Middle Way of the Buddhadharma. Next, in refuting the Middle Way of the Daśabhūmivyākhyāna: they say, "The ālaya-consciousness is originally unarising and unperishing, constantly fixed from ancient times to the present, having neither beginning nor end." It is only because of violating the real that deluded thoughts arise; thus they say, "The six consciousnesses blaze in distress, accordingly obscuring the ālaya; this is named the tathāgatagarbha. Later, cultivating the understanding of the ten stages, one severs the deluded six consciousnesses stage by stage. Once the six consciousnesses are exhausted, the understanding of deluded thoughts is also removed, manifesting the real to accomplish function; this is named the dharmakāya." It is like the wind rising and clearing the clouds: when the wind ceases, the bright sun shines alone. Once the dharmakāya is manifested, it possesses various adaptive capabilities; therefore, unarising, it manifests arising; unperishing, it manifests perishing; it is neither cause nor effect. Its various functions such as cause and effect are not singular; therefore the sūtra says: "The Buddha's true dharmakāya is like empty space; / adapting to things, it manifests forms like the moon in water." Now I say this is not so. If the dharmakāya is fundamentally existent, by what cause can it be attained? > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) ### [2.5.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.2.5.3) 若為因得則非本有，無因則同外道義。 若言本有，何以名中道耶？ 又本來有此，四句百非，清淨法自應遣顛倒，那急為煩惱所覆，後修得十地之解尚能遣煩惱，本來常定法身不能遣之，翻成未之修解却惑？ 本即不能，未亦不能也。 今大乘無所得義，約八不明三種中道，言方新舊不同，而意無異趣也。 山中師對寂正作之，語待不語、不語待語，語不語並是相待假名，故假語不名語、假不語不名不語。 不名不語不為無、不名語不為有，即是不有不無世諦中道。 但相待假，故可有說生、可無說滅，故以生滅合為世諦也。 真諦亦然，假不語不名不語、假非不語不名非不語。 不名非不語，不為非不無； 不名不語，不為非不有，則是非不有非不無真諦中道也。 相待假故，可有說不滅、可無說不生，即是不生不滅，故合為真諦也。 二諦合明中道者，假語不名語、假不語不名不語，非語非不語，即是非有非不有、非無非不無，二諦合明中道也。 生滅不生滅合明，類此可尋也。 今明必須對他故起，他有有可有，則有生可生、有滅可滅。 有生可生，生是定生； 有滅可滅； 滅是定滅。 生是定生； 生在滅外； 滅是定滅，滅在生外。 生在滅外，生不待滅； 滅在生外，滅不待生。 生不待滅，生則獨存； 滅不待生，滅則孤立。 如斯生滅，皆是自性，非因緣義宗也。 今則不爾，無有可有，以空故有； 無生可生，亦無滅可滅。 但以世諦故，假名說生滅。 假生，生非定生； 假滅，滅非定滅。 生非定生，滅外無生； 滅非定滅，生外無滅。 滅外無生，由滅故生； 生外無滅，由生故滅。 由滅故生，生不獨存； 由生故滅，滅不孤立。 此之生滅，皆是因緣假名。 因緣生生而不起，所以不生； 因緣滅滅而不失，所以不滅，故不生不滅名為世諦中道也。 餘句，例之可尋，不復具出也。 次明對世諦有生滅，故名真諦不生不滅。 所以空有為世諦，假生假滅； 有空為真諦，假不生假不滅。 此不生不滅，非自不生不滅，待世諦假生滅，明真諦假不生滅。 世諦假生滅既非生滅，真諦假不生滅亦非不生滅，故非不生非不滅為真諦中道也。 餘句，不例之可知也。 次明二諦合中道者，有為世諦有生有滅，空為真諦不生不滅。 此不生滅，即是生滅不生滅； 此生滅，即是不生滅生滅。 不生滅生滅，是則非生滅； 生滅不生滅，是即非不生滅。 故非生滅非不生滅，是二諦合明中道也。 生滅既爾，餘句應例可解也。 又論釋不常不斷，文言「有人不受不生不滅，而信不常不斷也。 」成實師釋文云：以相續故常，念念生滅不自顧為斷。 以見斷常故，所以不信不常不斷。 須廣破，如前說也。 論言「有人不受不生不滅而信不常不斷」者，一云：不受不生不滅者，即是悟不生不滅。 而於不常不斷等未悟故，言而信不常不斷，以見有斷常故也。 二云：長安影法師云，非是不信不常不斷，但自有人得悟不同、解心未遍，雖知諸法不生不滅，而未悟不常不斷。 如前說也。 今謂諸法究竟不生，理自不滅。 以不生故，何得有常？ 以無常故，何得有斷？ 若望論文，後解為勝。 文言「雖聞不生不滅與不常不斷，猶謂四門成諸法故也。 」若例者，雖聞不生不滅，猶謂六門成諸法者未悟也。 故《大品經．相行品》云「行亦不受，不行亦不受，行不行亦不受，非行非不行亦不受，不受亦不受也。 」又似如《成論．賢聖品》云「知不作者，不信作等，是名上人也。 」不常不斷者，若以有為有，則常是實常、斷是實斷也。 今以空故有，常不名常、斷不名斷，世諦假名說有常有斷。 假常不可常、假斷不可斷，即是不斷不常世諦中道也。 不一不異者，然不一或可對二，乃至百千等。 而言對不異者，異一之外，二三等悉是異，謂有一異也。 但成論師明假實有一異義。 > If it were attained through causes, it would not be fundamentally existing; if it lacked causes, it would be identical to heterodox doctrines. If one says that it is fundamentally existing, why is it called the Middle Way? Furthermore, if this \[dharmakāya\], free of the four propositions and hundred negations, were originally possessed, the pure Dharma itself ought to dispel inversion; how could it be urgently covered by defilements, such that the understanding of the ten stages cultivated and attained subsequently can still dispel defilements, while the fundamentally eternally settled dharmakāya cannot dispel them, turning out conversely that defilements are cleared away by what has not yet been cultivated and understood? If what is fundamental cannot do so, what is subsequent cannot do so either. Now, the Mahāyāna doctrine of non-attainment explains the three kinds of the Middle Way in terms of the eight negations; although the old and new methods of expression differ, their intent has no divergence. The master of the mountain \[Sengquan\] formulated this with respect to \[the state of\] tranquility: speech depends on non-speech, and non-speech depends on speech; speech and non-speech are both dependently co-arisen conventional designations. Therefore, conventional speech is not termed speech, and conventional non-speech is not termed non-speech. Being not termed non-speech does not make it non-existent; being not termed speech does not make it existent—this is the conventional truth Middle Way of neither existent nor non-existent. It is merely a conventional designation through mutual dependence; therefore, where there may be existence, one speaks of arising, and where there may be non-existence, one speaks of cessation; hence arising and cessation together constitute conventional truth. Ultimate truth is also like this: conventional non-speech is not termed non-speech, and conventional non-non-speech is not termed non-non-speech. Being not termed non-non-speech does not make it not non-existent; being not termed non-speech does not make it not existent—this is the ultimate truth Middle Way of neither not existent nor not non-existent. Because it is a conventional designation through mutual dependence, where there may be existence, one speaks of non-cessation, and where there may be non-existence, one speaks of non-arising; this is neither arising nor cessation, and hence they are combined as ultimate truth. As for explaining the Middle Way through combining the two truths: conventional speech is not termed speech, and conventional non-speech is not termed non-speech; being neither speech nor non-speech is simply being neither existent nor not existent, neither non-existent nor not non-existent—this is explaining the Middle Way by combining the two truths. Explaining by combining arising and cessation with non-arising and non-cessation can be understood analogously to this. Now we clarify that it must arise in opposition to the other: if the other possesses an existence that can be existent, then there is an arising that can arise, and a cessation that can cease. If there is an arising that can arise, arising is definitely arising; if there is a cessation that can cease, cessation is definitely cessation. Arising is definitely arising; arising lies outside cessation. Cessation is definitely cessation; cessation lies outside arising. Arising lies outside cessation, so arising does not depend on cessation; cessation lies outside arising, so cessation does not depend on arising. Arising does not depend on cessation, so arising subsists alone; cessation does not depend on arising, so cessation stands in isolation. Such arising and cessation are all intrinsic nature, not the thesis of dependent co-arising. Now, it is not so: there is no existence that can be existent, because of emptiness there is existence; there is no arising that can arise, nor is there any cessation that can cease. It is only because of conventional truth that one conventionally designates and speaks of arising and cessation. As conventional arising, arising is not definitely arising; as conventional cessation, cessation is not definitely cessation. Arising is not definitely arising, so outside of cessation there is no arising; cessation is not definitely cessation, so outside of arising there is no cessation. Outside of cessation there is no arising, so because of cessation there is arising; outside of arising there is no cessation, so because of arising there is cessation. Because of cessation there is arising, so arising does not subsist alone; because of arising there is cessation, so cessation does not stand in isolation. Such arising and cessation are entirely conventional designations of dependent co-arising. Dependent co-arising arises, yet arising does not occur, and therefore it does not arise; dependent co-arising ceases, yet ceasing does not perish, and therefore it does not cease; hence non-arising and non-cessation are called the conventional truth Middle Way. The remaining phrases can be understood by analogy and need not be fully set forth. Next, we clarify that in opposition to the existence of arising and cessation in conventional truth, it is called the non-arising and non-cessation of ultimate truth. Therefore, emptiness and existence serve as conventional truth, with conventional arising and conventional cessation; existence and emptiness serve as ultimate truth, with conventional non-arising and conventional non-cessation. This non-arising and non-cessation is not inherently non-arising and non-cessation; depending on the conventional arising and cessation of conventional truth, one clarifies the conventional non-arising and non-cessation of ultimate truth. Since the conventional arising and cessation of conventional truth are neither arising nor cessation, the conventional non-arising and non-cessation of ultimate truth are also neither non-arising nor non-cessation; hence neither non-arising nor non-cessation is the ultimate truth Middle Way. The remaining phrases can be known without analogy. Next, to clarify the Middle Way combining the two truths: existence serves as conventional truth, having arising and having cessation; emptiness serves as ultimate truth, being non-arising and non-cessation. This non-arising and non-cessation is itself the non-arising and non-cessation of arising and cessation; this arising and cessation is itself the arising and cessation of non-arising and non-cessation. The arising and cessation of non-arising and non-cessation is therefore not arising and cessation; the non-arising and non-cessation of arising and cessation is therefore not non-arising and non-cessation. Therefore, neither arising and cessation nor non-arising and non-cessation is the Middle Way explained by combining the two truths. Since arising and cessation are thus, the remaining phrases should be understood by analogy. Furthermore, the treatise explains neither permanence nor annihilation, the text stating: 'There are people who do not accept neither arising nor cessation, yet believe in neither permanence nor annihilation.' The Tattvasiddhi masters explain the text saying: because of continuity there is permanence, and momentary arising and cessation without regard for oneself is annihilation. Because they see annihilation and permanence, they do not believe in neither permanence nor annihilation. This must be broadly refuted, as discussed before. Regarding the treatise's statement, 'There are people who do not accept neither arising nor cessation yet believe in neither permanence nor annihilation': One explanation says: 'not accepting neither arising nor cessation' means awakening to neither arising nor cessation. Yet, because they have not yet awakened to neither permanence nor annihilation, etc., it says, 'yet believe in neither permanence nor annihilation' because they see the existence of annihilation and permanence. The second explanation says: Master Ying of Chang'an says that it is not that they do not believe in neither permanence nor annihilation, but merely that different people attain awakening differently and their understanding mind is not yet pervasive; although they know that all phenomena are neither arising nor ceasing, they have not yet awakened to neither permanence nor annihilation, as discussed before. We now say that all phenomena are ultimately non-arising, and by principle naturally do not cease. Because they do not arise, how could there be permanence? Because there is no permanence, how could there be annihilation? If judged against the text of the treatise, the latter explanation is superior. The text says: 'Although they hear of neither arising nor cessation and neither permanence nor annihilation, they still say that the four gates constitute all phenomena.' By analogy, although they hear of neither arising nor cessation, those who still say that the six gates constitute all phenomena have not awakened. Therefore, the \*Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra\*, 'Chapter on Signs and Practice', states: 'One does not accept practice, nor does one accept non-practice; one does not accept practice and non-practice, nor does one accept neither practice nor non-practice; non-acceptance also is not accepted.' Again, it resembles the \*Tattvasiddhi-śāstra\*, 'Chapter on the Worthies and Nobles', which says: 'One who knows non-action does not believe in action and the like; such a one is called a superior person.' As for neither permanence nor annihilation: if one takes existence to be existent, then permanence is real permanence, and annihilation is real annihilation. Now, because of emptiness there is existence; permanence is not termed permanence, and annihilation is not termed annihilation. Conventional truth conventionally designates and speaks of having permanence and having annihilation. Conventional permanence cannot be permanent, and conventional annihilation cannot be annihilated; this is the conventional truth Middle Way of neither annihilation nor permanence. As for neither unity nor difference: 'not one' can perhaps be opposed to two, up to a hundred or a thousand. Yet the reason it is said in opposition to 'not different' is that outside of the different and the one, two, three, and so forth are all difference; this refers to having unity and difference. However, the Tattvasiddhi masters clarify that conventional and real have the meaning of unity and difference. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) ### [2.5.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.2.5.4) 若以有故有，即是實一異，如前破也。 亦如論說「若言有一，不應為諸法成，以不一故。 如手足等諸分成身，何得言異相？ 」異相亦不可得，故論破云「若一者，不應芽莖等別。 若謂穀有可芽葉等別異者，等是異相，何不名樹等芽葉耶？ 故知不異。 」亦復不一故，諸法本來不生，何得有一異？ 但一是不一一、異是不異異，假一不可為一、假異不可為異。 既無一無異，即是世諦中道也。 不來不出者，既言不來，則應對不去。 而言不出者，義有所兼，非止此八，則應有無量。 不來則應對有不去，不出應對有不入，是互舉耳。 凡有二義：一者示有所兼非止有八事。 二者雖異而內有所兼者，既有不來則有不去，既有不出則有不入。 不生不滅、不有不無等，一切諸法相攝門也。 如《成論》與外道師等所計，或言從冥初來、微塵世性等來，亦如初流水反去出離等。 今大乘明義，由出故去，出即是去； 由入故來，入即是來。 若有來去說作來去者，即實來實去。 今明以空來去，故不名來去。 以世諦假說來去，雖來不可來、雖去不可去，故來無所從、去無所至。 故《金剛波若經》云「若言如來有來有去者，是人不解佛所說義。 」若言空故說來去，則來無所從、去無所至，故言如來也。 有《淨名經》云「對文殊言：『不來相而來，不見相而見。 』文殊答云：『如居士言。 來不更來，去不更去。 』」若來有所從，則來已更來； 若去有所至，則去已更去。 故今來無所從、去無所至也。 故論云「如蛇從穴出，鳥來栖樹等。 」不見有如是等相，故知無有來出也。 問：八不中何故云不來不出是攝法有所兼，而不生不滅等非耶？ 答：不生不滅等亦是攝法，如不生則攝一切有生等皆盡，不滅則收一切滅無等。 此二自足，收攝悉盡。 但為得悟者不同，雖聞不生不滅，而信不常不斷，故須說不常不斷，欲令觀行周普故。 今不來不出亦然，而言攝法者，為不來應對不去、出即對入。 來出既不對，故以來攝去、出攝入。 生滅既對，對故不言攝。 如不生外，如是不不生，豈得不攝？ 須得此意釋之，可尋也。 但明對有二義：一者對治，如不淨觀治貪欲、慈悲治瞋恚等，皆是相對治明對義。 二者相對，名味敵對，如《大經》言「常樂觀察諸對治門，所謂苦樂乃至恒不恒。 」恒應對不暫不恒，而不無賖切，亦是攝法意也。 苦樂對義則切，止明二法，異外如是不攝。 若言苦不苦異，苦外如是不苦，攝義則廣遠。 如淨不淨，淨對穢等，一切例然，皆有賖切意可尋，不須復歷法辨也。 作三種中道，相多種勢，意終是同，但方言異耳。 今二種方法作，如前所說也。 問：何故世諦假生假滅，真諦假不生假不滅耶？ 答：有二種勢。 一者世諦破性明性空，即是假生假滅； 真諦破假明因緣空故，即是假不生假不滅也。 問：世諦破性明性空，性空為世諦中道，應用性有為世諦。 既以假有為世諦，則用假空為中道也。 答：今明無別有性空，只詺假為性空，從功用作名。 誰能空此性？ 假能空此性，名假作性空。 性空邊故即是中道，假故即名世諦也。 二者假生假滅，自是不生不滅中； 假不生假不滅，自是非不生非不滅中，即是表義。 但橫兩相望，自是因緣義，則遣二執也。 又攝嶺師云：假前明中是體中，假後明中是用中。 中前明假是用假、中後明假是體假，故非有非無而有而無是體中； 假有不名有、假無不名無，故非有非無是用中。 非有非無而有而無是體假，假有不名有、假無不名無是用假，故用中假皆屬能表之教，無假無中乃是所表之理也。 > If being exists through being, that is real oneness or difference, as refuted before. Also, as the treatise says: 'If it is said that there is oneness, it should not be formed of various phenomena, because it is not one. Just as various parts such as hands and feet form a body, how can one speak of a different mark?' A different mark is also unobtainable; therefore the treatise refutes it, saying: 'If it were one, there should be no distinction of sprout, stalk, and so forth. If one says that grain has differences such as sprout and leaf, since these are equally different marks, why are they not called the sprout and leaf of a tree, etc.? Hence we know they are not different.' Nor are they one; therefore all phenomena are originally unborn—how could there be oneness and difference? Rather, oneness is the oneness of non-oneness; difference is the difference of non-difference. Conventional oneness cannot be taken as oneness; conventional difference cannot be taken as difference. Since there is neither oneness nor difference, this is the Middle Way of conventional truth. Regarding 'neither coming nor going forth' (pu lai pu chu): since it says 'neither coming', it ought to be paired with 'nor going away' (pu qu). That it says 'nor going forth' is because the meaning embraces more—it is not limited to these eight, but should be immeasurable. 'Neither coming' ought to be paired with 'not going away'; 'nor going forth' ought to be paired with 'not entering'. These are mutually mentioned, that is all. In general there are two meanings: First, to show that more is embraced and not limited to eight matters. Second, though they differ, what is inwardly embraced is: since there is 'neither coming', there is 'nor going away'; since there is 'nor going forth', there is 'nor entering'. 'Neither arising nor ceasing', 'neither existence nor non-existence', and so forth, are approaches of mutually subsuming all phenomena. As held by the Tattvasiddhi and non-Buddhist teachers, etc., who say that they come from the primordial darkness (prakṛti), from subtle atoms, from world-nature, and so forth; or like the first flowing water turning back, going forth, and departing. Now the Mahāyāna clarifies the meaning: because of going forth, there is going away—going forth is just going away; because of entering, there is coming—entering is just coming. If there were coming and going, and one spoke of making coming and going, that would be real coming and real going. Now it is clarified that because of emptiness there is coming and going; hence it is not called coming and going. Through conventional truth, coming and going are conventionally spoken of: although coming, there can be no coming; although going, there can be no going. Therefore, coming has no place whence it comes, and going has no place whither it goes. Therefore the Diamond Prajñā Sūtra says: 'If someone says that the Tathāgata comes or goes, this person does not understand the meaning of what the Buddha taught.' If one says that because of emptiness coming and going are spoken of, then coming has no place whence it comes, and going has no place whither it goes; therefore he is called Tathāgata. The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: 'Addressing Mañjuśrī, he said: "Coming through the mark of not coming; seeing through the mark of not seeing." Mañjuśrī replied: "It is as the upāsaka says. Coming does not come again; going does not go again."' If coming had a place whence it comes, then having come it would come again; if going had a place whither it goes, then having gone it would go again. Therefore now coming has no place whence it comes, and going has no place whither it goes. Hence the treatise says: 'Like a snake emerging from a hole, a bird coming to roost in a tree, and so forth.' One does not see such marks; hence we know there is neither coming nor going forth. Question: Why is it said that in the eight negations, 'neither coming nor going forth' subsumes phenomena and embraces more, while 'neither arising nor ceasing' and so forth do not? Answer: 'Neither arising nor ceasing' and so forth are also subsumptive of phenomena. For example, 'not arising' completely subsumes all existent arising and so forth; 'not ceasing' gathers all cessation and non-existence, and so forth. These two are self-sufficient, gathering and subsuming completely. But because those who attain awakening are not all the same—though they hear 'neither arising nor ceasing', they have faith in 'neither eternal nor annihilated'—it is therefore necessary to speak of 'neither eternal nor annihilated', desiring to make contemplation and practice comprehensive. Now, 'neither coming nor going forth' is also like this; that it is spoken of as subsuming phenomena is because 'not coming' should be paired with 'not going', and 'going forth' is paired with 'entering'. Since coming and going forth are not paired, therefore by 'coming' it subsumes 'going', and by 'going forth' it subsumes 'entering'. Since arising and ceasing are already paired, because of being paired it is not said that they subsume. Just as outside of 'not arising', is it not so that 'not not-arising' must be subsumed? One must grasp this intention in explaining it, and it can be pursued. However, clarifying 'pairing' has two meanings: First, counteractive pairing (pratipakṣa), such as contemplation on impurity counteracting greed and desire, or loving-kindness and compassion counteracting anger and hatred, etc.—these are all clarifying the meaning of pairing through mutual counteraction. Second, relative pairing, where names and connotations directly confront each other, as the Great Sūtra says: 'Constantly delight in observing the gates of all counteragents, namely suffering and pleasure, up to permanent and impermanent.' 'Permanent' should be paired with 'not temporary and not permanent', yet it is not without broad and narrow senses; this is also the intention of subsuming phenomena. The paired meaning of suffering and pleasure is narrow, clarifying only two phenomena; outside of what is different, it is not subsumed in this way. If one speaks of the difference between suffering and non-suffering, outside of suffering it is non-suffering in this way, so the subsumptive meaning is broad and far-reaching. Just as with pure and impure, pure paired with defiled, and so forth—all are analogous to this, and all have broad and narrow senses that can be pursued; there is no need to examine each phenomenon again. In formulating the three kinds of Middle Way, the aspects have multiple tendencies, but the intent in the end is identical; it is merely that regional expressions differ. Formulating them through the two kinds of method now is as spoken before. Question: Why is it that in conventional truth there is conventional arising and conventional ceasing, while in ultimate truth there is conventional non-arising and conventional non-ceasing? Answer: There are two tendencies. First, conventional truth refutes intrinsic nature to clarify the emptiness of intrinsic nature, which is conventional arising and conventional ceasing; ultimate truth refutes the conventional to clarify emptiness of dependent co-arising, which is conventional non-arising and conventional non-ceasing. Question: Conventional truth refutes intrinsic nature to clarify the emptiness of intrinsic nature, taking emptiness of intrinsic nature as the Middle Way of conventional truth, so it should use existence of intrinsic nature as conventional truth. Since it takes conventional existence as conventional truth, it then uses conventional emptiness as the Middle Way. Answer: We now clarify that there is no separate emptiness of intrinsic nature; it merely names the conventional as the emptiness of intrinsic nature, taking its name from its function. What is able to empty this intrinsic nature? The conventional is able to empty this intrinsic nature, so the conventional is named the emptiness of intrinsic nature. On the side of the emptiness of intrinsic nature, it is therefore the Middle Way; on the side of being conventional, it is therefore named conventional truth. Second, conventional arising and conventional ceasing are themselves the Middle of non-arising and non-ceasing; conventional non-arising and conventional non-ceasing are themselves the Middle of neither non-arising nor non-ceasing—this is expressing the meaning. But viewing the two horizontally across from each other is itself the meaning of dependent co-arising, which dispels the two attachments. Furthermore, the master of Sheling said: clarifying the Middle before the conventional is the Middle of substance; clarifying the Middle after the conventional is the Middle of function. Clarifying the conventional before the Middle is the conventional of function; clarifying the conventional after the Middle is the conventional of substance. Therefore, being neither existent nor non-existent yet existent and non-existent is the Middle of substance; conventional existence not being called existence and conventional non-existence not being called non-existence, hence being neither existent nor non-existent, is the Middle of function. Being neither existent nor non-existent yet existent and non-existent is the conventional of substance; conventional existence not being called existence and conventional non-existence not being called non-existence is the conventional of function. Therefore, both the functional Middle and the functional conventional belong to the teaching that is capable of expressing; that which has neither conventional nor Middle is the principle that is expressed. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853~en-mt.2.5.1) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [大智度論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.prajnaparamita.pancavimsatisahasrika!mahaprajnaparamitopadesa*zh-kumarajiva.43.64) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.2.5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.2.5) · Pramāṇa