[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大乘玄論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853) › 2.6 # 大乘玄論 2.6 大乘玄論 2.6 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [2.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.2.6) 第三明智慧中道。所言二智中道者，二智是方便慧及以實慧，亦具三中道也。實方便，豈可言方便？豈可言非方便？方便實，豈可言實？豈可言不實？則是二慧各明中道。實方便則非方便，方便實則非實，非實非方便名為二慧合明中道也。然非實非方便名為一正觀，非真非俗名為一正中，亦得是正境，故《金光明經》云「遊於無量甚深法性」也。但是境智，是則非智；既是智境，是則非境。非智非境，眇然無際。前雖開境智，竟無所開；今雖泯智境，未曾是合也。若能如此演說，即能滅諸戲論故。亦有能說是因緣，是故龍樹致敬也。問：何故不例二諦三種中道，假方便智非方便智，假實智非實智，非方便非實明中道。假非方便智非不方便智，假非實智非不實智，非不方便非不實智合明中道等耶？答：亦得，但欲示多種勢耳。又明二智中道，然諦智非前非後亦非一時，故非諦非智。諦智因緣，假名不二而二，故如來內智明審潛謀密照、外彰口吐名諦也。然諦非二，亦復不一諦，此二緣故言二也，如二諦中說。而由智能諦所尋，此智何因而得？亦由悟諦故生，故諦能智所。能所因緣不一不二，乃至應波若，此能所則通也。若佛自然人，則佛智是能、諦是所。若弟子望此者，佛諦能論主智所。然此能所復何定？智生於境託諦則境也。論主智能照，境是所照，但此諦則是論主所也。佛非因非果，而詺如來為果。波若非因非果，而假名為因。故假名所設差別不同，或名生忍、法忍、順忍、違忍、無生忍等。十地亦名十忍，三十心亦名三十忍，即是一無量、無量一等也。然二諦明中道，諦智因緣不一不二，亦非前非後，而為前緣，開因緣前後方便之教。若無內智明審、外照根緣，何能吐此諦？故智能、諦所。但佛智不空，而已必由諦，故發諦能、智所。是論主只悟諦能為智所、智所見諦能，能所不一不異。二諦既論中道，在智亦名中道，觸事悉得也。但波若非因非果、非佛非菩薩，故假名佛菩薩。佛菩薩所行名為因，名為波若。菩薩佛所行名為果，名為薩波若。故無差別差別，說因為十地，始則歡喜、終乎法雲，五忍三十心非是竪論也。至論波若，非言可名，非能非所，第一義中行，為無學所行，諸佛能行。行亦不受，不行亦不受，行不行亦不受，非行非不行亦不受，不受亦不受。能說是因緣，正明二智中道。能說是佛智，能說於因緣八不正教也。又言：是論主稟佛正經生智，智所、諦能。論主得悟生智，智能、論所，能造論申經故。佛與論主，師弟相成，其道無異，即是入如來室、坐如來座也。論主歸敬，佛能說因緣正經，稟學得解，解由於佛。今申經造論，歸敬三寶，殊於外道。因緣之經，經常，無所從出也。諸說中第一者，如來雖復種種說法，及常合道說小乘教，未是了義之言，乃是大乘之由漸也。八不顯了究竟之說，故八不收束皆盡。諸佛同此一致，故言第一。又佛弟子說、仙人說、諸天說、變化人說，未是第一；今佛說因緣教，故云第一也。二智中道，由諦故智；二諦中道，由智故諦。所以諦智智諦、非諦非智，假名中道。佛意權實是因緣，如前說。亦有人言：論主能說生下論。今亦不乖此言，但今謂歎佛智明審鑒達根緣，能吐此二諦之八不正教，明諸法因緣一道清淨，故戲論門盡。故言為論，其意可明。故顯佛圓智能說誠諦之言，故是智是諦。故龍樹學佛所為，智之未足，故沒其智諦之名也。若未應波若以來，應有所為莫非戲論；若解教體理，能滅於戲論。凡夫二乘心所行無非戲論，理外行心無非戲論，應須消滅損之。凡有三種相對，或時四種。一者善惡相對。惡是墮墜，乖理無出功，故十惡為戲論。善是清昇，扶理有出之義，故十善非戲論。《成實論》亦云「一等四執為戲論。」又言「三性中善惡非戲論，無記是戲論。」何者？善惡二性有果可記，故非戲論。無記汎淡，無得果之功，故名為戲論也。今依《華嚴經》，云唯善非戲論，惡、無記並是戲論。明惡亦得苦果，但非是趣向歸理得佛義，故名為戲論。唯善法能得佛果，故《大經》云「雖復疊華千斤，不如真金一兩」也。二者有相無相相對明之，亦言有漏無漏相對也。有相是分別故為戲論，無相無分別故非戲論。有相善還屬戲論，故《大品經》云「相善不動不出，不為乘也。」故《佛藏經》云「為人說有相法，是眾生惡知識。為眾生說無相法，是眾生善知識。」有相乖理，故經云「寧起五逆一念，不起有相心。」經所以作此語者，明相心傷理大，故所以重，實是兩罪盡重。而起五逆者，五逆但損惱身，而不妨心用，得近理義。有相心傷理故，無得近理義，故求相善比丘則遠離於佛。所以相心現前，定無波若義也；五逆事雖起，而不妨用心見理義也。有漏即有相，無漏則是無相。有漏之善，唯得三有果報，未能出離生死，正是不動不出，故名戲論。無漏之法，破裂生死，故不名戲論也。又地、攝、成、數等師，恐落求相善比丘宗，彼聞之驚怖，而聽大乘無所得宗。人見此意耳，彼師徒無有覺此意也。三者一異相對。雖言有相是戲論、無相非戲論，若是有相異無相，便是戲論；見相無相不異，乃名非戲論。乃至善惡、生死、涅槃、解惑等並類然。故《大經》云「明與無明，凡夫謂二。智者了達，其性無二」也。故《大品經．三慧品》云「諸有二者名有所得，無有二者名無所得」也。又《大經》云「有所得者，無道無果；無所得者，有道有果」也。若以異為非、不二為是，此則不識不二，還成戲論。復須遣之，無一無二故。有時就四法辨行四句，是戲論；不行四句，則非戲論也。故《反折論》云「若言諸法有，是增益謗。若言諸法無，損減謗。若言諸法亦有亦無，是相違謗。若言諸法非有非無，是戲論謗。若言諸法非非有非非無，是無慚愧謗」也。故《思益經》云「一切法邪，一切法正」也。又《大品經》云「菩薩無方便，行色無常苦等，並是戲論。」故凡厥有所得行心，於波若紛然乖，則戲論師也。故因緣門中一不可得、二亦不可得、亦一亦二非一非二、非不一非不二皆不可得也。如五句三昧，不與二乘共廣大之用也。故四對此三，無出無離。何者？諸有所得，別有住處論其出。今謂本自不住，今亦無出無住，無出故非戲論。若言有戲論可滅是無戲論，亦是戲論。亦是戲論故，今明八不不戲論，非止滅戲論，不戲論亦滅。滅者非是小乘斷德之滅，此是大乘摩訶衍淨悟，諸法本來不生、今亦不滅，畢竟淨名滅，故言善也。故戲論、無戲論論，因緣具足，方便假名不一不二一道平等。戲論之善，是善巧權行故名善，善者能也。問：戲論不戲論等皆滅，即前來所明記無記乃至二不二善惡等望道悉非者。戲論既非，不戲論亦是戲論也。答：須識之。只八不不二善是非戲論，若是不二還成戲論，非謂不二不戲論。自非八不不者，則戲論不滅也。何異絕絕、絕不絕，即無絕無不絕，豈可以言言絕不絕耶？ > Third, explaining the Middle Way of wisdom. What is called the Middle Way of the two gnoses: the two gnoses are expedient wisdom and real wisdom; they also possess the three kinds of Middle Way. If the real is expedient, how could one say it is expedient? How could one say it is not expedient? If the expedient is real, how could one say it is real? How could one say it is not real? These are the two wisdoms each explaining the Middle Way. If the real is expedient, then it is not expedient; if the expedient is real, then it is not real. Neither real nor expedient is termed the Middle Way jointly explained by the two wisdoms. Moreover, neither real nor expedient is termed the single correct contemplation; neither ultimate nor conventional is termed the single correct middle, which may also be the correct cognitive object. Therefore the Suvarṇaprabhāsasūtra says, 'roaming in the immeasurable, profound Dharma-nature.' When there is only cognitive object and gnosis, this is non-gnosis; once it is the gnosis's cognitive object, this is non-cognitive object. Neither gnosis nor cognitive object, vast and boundless. Although previously cognitive object and gnosis were distinguished, in the end there was nothing distinguished; although now gnosis and cognitive object are obliterated, they were never merged. If one can expound in this way, one is able to extinguish all proliferation; also, there is \[the Buddha\] who is able to teach this dependent co-arising, and for this reason Nāgārjuna pays homage. Question: Why not follow the analogy of the three kinds of Middle Way of the two truths—conventional expedient gnosis is not expedient gnosis, conventional real gnosis is not real gnosis, neither expedient nor real explains the Middle Way; conventional non-expedient gnosis is not non-expedient gnosis, conventional non-real gnosis is not non-real gnosis, neither non-expedient nor non-real gnosis jointly explains the Middle Way, and so forth? Answer: That is also permissible, but \[the author\] only wishes to show a variety of approaches. Furthermore, explaining the Middle Way of the two gnoses: the truth and gnosis are neither prior nor posterior, nor are they simultaneous; hence neither truth nor gnosis. By dependent co-arising of truth and gnosis, conventional designations are non-dual yet dual. Thus the Tathāgata's inner gnosis is luminous and precise, silently planning and secretly illuminating, while outwardly manifested and spoken from the mouth it is called truth. Yet the truth is not two, nor is it one truth; it is said to be two because of these two conditions, as explained under the two truths. Since gnosis is what can investigate the truth, by what cause is this gnosis attained? It is also born from awakening to the truth; hence the truth is the agent and gnosis is the object. The dependent co-arising of agent and object is neither one nor two, and so on up to responding to prajñā, this agent and object pervade throughout. If the Buddha is the self-arisen person, then the Buddha's gnosis is the agent and the truth is the object. If a disciple looks toward this, the Buddha's truth is the agent and the treatise master's gnosis is the object. Yet how could this agent and object be fixed? When gnosis arises from the cognitive object and relies on the truth, it is the cognitive object. The treatise master's gnosis can illuminate, and the cognitive object is what is illuminated, but this truth is the treatise master's object. The Buddha is neither cause nor fruit, yet the Tathāgata is designated as fruit. Prajñā is neither cause nor fruit, yet it is conventionally designated as cause. Thus the distinctions established by conventional designation are diverse: sometimes termed the forbearance with beings, forbearance with phenomena, conformable forbearance, contrary forbearance, forbearance with the unborn, and so forth. The ten grounds are also called the ten forbearances; the thirty minds are also called the thirty forbearances; this is the one as immeasurable, the immeasurable as one, and so on. Furthermore, when the two truths explain the Middle Way, the dependent co-arising of truth and gnosis is neither one nor two, nor is it prior or posterior; yet for the sake of previous conditions, the expedient teachings of prior and posterior dependent co-arising are established. If there were no inner luminous and precise gnosis that outwardly illuminates capacities and conditions, how could one utter this truth? Hence gnosis is the agent, and truth is the object. But the Buddha's gnosis is not empty, and must depend on the truth; hence arising from the truth, truth is the agent and gnosis is the object. This treatise master merely awakened to the truth as agent being the object of gnosis, and what is seen by gnosis as object is the truth as agent; agent and object are neither one nor different. Since the two truths discuss the Middle Way, when in gnosis it is also called the Middle Way; encountering anything, it is always obtained. But prajñā is neither cause nor fruit, neither Buddha nor bodhisattva; hence Buddha and bodhisattva are conventional designations. What is practiced by Buddhas and bodhisattvas is called cause, called prajñā. What is practiced by bodhisattvas and Buddhas is called fruit, called sarvajñā. Therefore, within the non-differentiated there are differentiations, speaking of the cause as the ten grounds, beginning with Joy and ending in the Cloud of Dharma; the five forbearances and thirty minds are not a vertical progression. When it comes to discussing prajñā, it cannot be designated by words; it is neither agent nor object. Practiced in the ultimate truth, it is what is practiced by the non-learners, what all Buddhas are able to practice. Practicing is not grasped; not practicing is not grasped; both practicing and not practicing are not grasped; neither practicing nor not practicing is not grasped; not grasping is also not grasped. 'Able to teach this dependent co-arising' directly clarifies the Middle Way of the two gnoses. The one able to teach is the Buddha's gnosis, able to teach the correct doctrine of the eight negations in dependent co-arising. It is also said: this treatise master, receiving the Buddha's correct sūtras, gave rise to gnosis; gnosis was the object, and the truth was the agent. The treatise master attained awakening and gave rise to gnosis; gnosis was the agent, and the treatise was the object, because he was able to compose the treatise to expound the sūtras. The Buddha and the treatise master, master and disciple completing each other, have no difference in their Path; this is entering the Tathāgata's room and sitting on the Tathāgata's seat. The treatise master pays homage because the Buddha was able to teach the correct sūtras of dependent co-arising, and by receiving and studying them he attained understanding; the understanding was due to the Buddha. Now expounding the sūtras and composing the treatise, he pays homage to the Three Jewels, distinct from the non-Buddhists. As for the sūtras of dependent co-arising, the sūtra is constant, having nowhere from which it emerges. 'Foremost among all teachings': although the Tathāgata taught the Dharma in various ways and constantly taught the Hīnayāna teaching in accord with the Path, these were not yet definitive words, but were the gradual steps toward the Mahāyāna. The eight negations are the explicit and ultimate teaching; therefore the eight negations encompass and exhaust everything. All Buddhas share this same consistency; hence it is said to be foremost. Furthermore, what is spoken by disciples of the Buddha, by ṛṣis, by devas, and by apparitional beings is not yet foremost; now the Buddha's teaching of dependent co-arising is spoken, hence it is said to be foremost. In the Middle Way of the two gnoses, gnosis is due to truth; in the Middle Way of the two truths, truth is due to gnosis. Therefore truth is gnosis, gnosis is truth, neither truth nor gnosis, conventionally designated the Middle Way. The Buddha's intention of provisional and real is dependent co-arising, as stated earlier. Some also say: the treatise master was able to teach, giving rise to the subsequent treatise. The present \[view\] does not contradict these words either, but now we say it praises the Buddha's gnosis, luminous and precise, discerning capacities and conditions, able to utter this correct teaching of the eight negations of the two truths, clarifying that all phenomena in dependent co-arising are purely of a single path, so that the gates of proliferation are exhausted. Hence, stated as a treatise, its meaning can be clear. Therefore it reveals that the Buddha's perfect gnosis can speak words of sincere truth; hence it is gnosis and it is truth. Therefore Nāgārjuna learned what the Buddha did; his gnosis was not yet complete, so the names of gnosis and truth were submerged. Prior to responding to prajñā, whatever is undertaken is nothing other than proliferation; if one understands the essence of the teaching and the principle, one can extinguish proliferation. What is practiced by the minds of ordinary persons and the two vehicles is nothing other than proliferation; minds practicing outside principle are nothing other than proliferation, which ought to be extinguished and diminished. Generally there are three kinds of contrast, or sometimes four kinds. First, the contrast between good and evil. Evil is downfall; running contrary to principle, it has no merit of transcendence, so the ten unwholesome deeds are proliferation. Good is pure elevation; supporting principle, it has the meaning of transcendence, so the ten wholesome deeds are not proliferation. The Tattvasiddhi-śāstra also says, 'The four attachments such as oneness are proliferation.' It also says, 'Among the three natures, good and evil are not proliferation; the indeterminate is proliferation.' Why? The two natures of good and evil have fruits that can be recorded, so they are not proliferation. The indeterminate is superficial and weak, having no efficacy in attaining fruit, so it is called proliferation. Now, relying on the Avataṃsakasūtra, only good is non-proliferation, while evil and the indeterminate are both proliferation. Clarifying that evil also obtains the fruit of suffering, yet because it does not head toward and take refuge in principle to attain buddhahood, it is called proliferation. Only wholesome dharmas can attain the fruit of buddhahood; hence the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra says, 'Even a thousand catties of piled flowers do not equal one ounce of pure gold.' Second, explaining it by the contrast between possessing marks and lacking marks, also termed the contrast between defiled and undefiled. Possessing marks is conceptual discrimination, hence proliferation; lacking marks has no conceptual discrimination, hence non-proliferation. Wholesomeness with marks still belongs to proliferation; hence the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra says, 'Wholesomeness with marks does not move and does not transcend; it is not a vehicle.' Therefore the Buddhapiṭaka-sūtra says, 'Teaching dharmas with marks for people is being an evil friend to sentient beings. Teaching dharmas without marks for sentient beings is being a good friend to sentient beings.' Possessing marks runs contrary to principle, so the sūtra says, 'Rather give rise to a single thought of the five heinous crimes than give rise to a mind possessing marks.' The reason the sūtra makes this statement is to clarify that a mind with marks damages principle greatly, and that is why it is severe; in reality both transgressions are entirely severe. But as for giving rise to the five heinous crimes, the five heinous crimes only harm the body without obstructing the mental function from approaching the meaning of principle. Because a mind with marks damages principle, it has no approach to the meaning of principle; thus a monk who seeks wholesomeness with marks is far removed from the Buddha. Therefore, when a mind with marks is present, there is definitely no meaning of prajñā; although an act of the five heinous crimes may arise, it does not obstruct the application of mind from seeing the meaning of principle. Defiled is possessing marks, while undefiled is lacking marks. Defiled wholesomeness only obtains the retributions of the three realms of existence, unable to transcend birth-and-death; this is precisely not moving and not transcending, so it is called proliferation. Undefiled dharmas rupture birth-and-death, so they are not called proliferation. Furthermore, masters of the Daśabhūmika, Mahāyānasaṃgraha, Tattvasiddhi, and Abhidharma, fearing they would fall under the school of monks seeking wholesomeness with marks, were terrified on hearing this, yet listened to the Mahāyāna school of non-attainment. People have seen this meaning; those masters and disciples had no awareness of this meaning. Third, the contrast between oneness and difference. Although it is said that possessing marks is proliferation and lacking marks is non-proliferation, if possessing marks is different from lacking marks, that is proliferation; only when seeing that marks and lack of marks are not different is it called non-proliferation. So too by analogy with good and evil, birth-and-death, nirvāṇa, understanding and delusion, and so forth. Therefore the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra says, 'Light and ignorance: the ordinary person deems them two; the wise comprehend that their nature is non-dual.' Therefore the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra's Chapter on the Three Wisdoms says, 'Whatever has duality is called attainment; what has no duality is called non-attainment.' Furthermore, the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra says, 'Those with attainment have neither Path nor fruit; those of non-attainment have Path and fruit.' If one takes difference as wrong and non-duality as right, this fails to recognize non-duality and turns back into proliferation. It must again be eliminated, because there is neither oneness nor duality. Sometimes, in terms of four dharmas, distinguishing practicing the catuṣkoṭi as proliferation, and not practicing the catuṣkoṭi as non-proliferation. Therefore the Fan zhe lun says, 'If one says all dharmas exist, this is the slander of superimposition. If one says all dharmas do not exist, this is the slander of deprecation. If one says all dharmas both exist and do not exist, this is the slander of contradiction. If one says all dharmas are neither existent nor non-existent, this is the slander of proliferation. If one says all dharmas are not non-existent and not not-non-existent, this is the slander of shamelessness.' Therefore the Viśeṣacintibrahmaparipṛcchāsūtra says, 'All dharmas are wrong; all dharmas are right.' Furthermore, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra says, 'A bodhisattva without expedients who practices impermanence, suffering, and so forth in form is entirely in proliferation.' Therefore, whenever there is an aspiring mind of attainment, it is in confused conflict with prajñā, and is a master of proliferation. Hence within the gate of dependent co-arising, oneness cannot be apprehended, duality also cannot be apprehended, both one and two, neither one nor two, and neither not-one nor not-two, all cannot be apprehended. Like the five-phrase samādhi, it is a vast functioning not shared with the two vehicles. Therefore, these four contrasts to these three have neither transcendence nor departure. Why? Wherever there is attainment, there is a separate dwelling place in terms of which transcendence is discussed. Now we say: fundamentally there is no dwelling, and now also neither transcendence nor dwelling; having no transcendence, it is not proliferation. If one says there is proliferation that can be extinguished and that is non-proliferation, that too is proliferation. Because it too is proliferation, now it is explained that the eight negations are non-proliferation: not only is proliferation extinguished, but non-proliferation is also extinguished. Extinction is not the extinction of the abandonment-virtue of the Hīnayāna; this is the Mahāyāna's pure awakening that all dharmas are originally unborn and now also unextinguished, ultimately pure, which is called extinction, and is therefore called good. Hence proliferation and non-proliferation discussed together are complete in dependent co-arising, expedient conventional designations, neither one nor two, equal in the single Path. The good of proliferation is skillful provisional practice, hence called good; 'good' means capable. Question: Proliferation, non-proliferation, and so forth are all extinguished; that is, what was previously clarified regarding recorded, indeterminate, up to dual, non-dual, good, evil, and so forth are all rejected when looked at from the Path. Since proliferation is rejected, non-proliferation is also proliferation. Answer: One must understand this. Only the non-dual goodness of the eight negations is non-proliferation; if non-duality turns back into proliferation, it does not mean non-duality is non-proliferation. Unless one applies the negation of the eight negations, proliferation is not extinguished. How is this different from cutting off cutting-off, and cutting off non-cutting-off, so that there is neither cutting off nor non-cutting-off? How could one speak in words of cutting off and non-cutting-off? > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 2.5.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.2.5.4) - [Next: 2.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.2.7) - [Up: 2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.2) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853~en-mt.2.6) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.2.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.2.6) · Pramāṇa