[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大乘玄論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853) › 3.9 # 大乘玄論 3.9 大乘玄論 3.9 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [3.9](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.3.9) 本有始有第六。問：佛性為是本有？為是始有？答：經有兩文。一云：眾生佛性，譬如暗室瓶瓫、力士額珠、貧女寶藏、雪山甜藥，本自有之，非適今也。所以《如來藏經》明有九種法身義。二云：佛果從妙因生，責騲馬直不責駒直也。明當服蘇，今已噵臭，食中已有不淨、麻中已有油，則是因中言有之過。故知佛性是始有。經既有兩文，人釋亦成兩種。一師云：眾生佛性本來自有，理性、真神、阿梨耶識故。涅槃亦有二種，性淨涅槃本來清淨、方便淨涅槃從修始成也。第二解云：經既說佛果從妙因而生，何容食中已有不淨？故知佛性始有。復有人言：本有於當，故名本有。問：若爾便是本有耶？答：復有始有義。又問：若始有，應是無常。答：我復有本有義。此何異二人作劫張王互答耶？彼若如本有，應如《如來藏經》諸喻。若言始有，應是無常。而言本有於當，此是何語？定本定當耶？無量世界無邊佛智應不圓耶？若言如無邊而照可自破之，何勞更難。照若窮盡，即是有邊；照若不盡，智則不圓。此難那得去？本有始有義亦如是，一切有所得義，無不自死，而人不覺耳。故一切諸人莫不網羅於其中矣，若執本有則非始有、若執始有則非本有，各執一文，不得會通經意。是非諍競，作滅佛法輪，不可具陳。但地論師云：佛性有二種，一是理性、二是行性。理非物造，故言本有；行藉修成，故言始有。若有所得心，望之一往消文，似如得旨。然尋推經意，未必如此。何者？但大聖善巧方便，逐物所宜，破病說法。何曾說言理性本有、行性始有耶？例如說如來藏義，《楞伽經》說無我為如來藏，《涅槃》說我為如來藏。此兩文復若為配當耶？本有始有其義亦爾。若言理性本有非始行性，始有非本者，更執成病，聖教非藥。而世間淺識之人，但見其語，定以為是，以成迷執也。今一家相傳明佛性義，非有非無、非本非始亦非當現。故經云「但以世俗文字數故說有三世，非謂菩提有去來今。」以非本非始故、有因緣故，亦可得說故。如《涅槃．性品》明「佛性本有，如貧女寶藏。」而諸眾生執教成病，故下文即明始有，故知佛性非本非始，但為眾生說言本始也。問：若言佛性非本始者，以何義故說本始？答：至論佛性，理實非本始，但如來方便，為破眾生無常病故，說言一切眾生佛性本來自有，以是因緣得成佛道。但眾生無方便故，執言佛性性、現相常樂。是故如來為破眾生現相病故，隱本明始。至論佛性，不但非是本始，亦非是非本非始，為破本始，故假言非本非始。若能得悟本始非本始是非平等，始可得名正因佛性，眾生因是深保成佛道。若不如是，非佛性也。若廣論本有始有義，例如新故。何者？第一念是新、第二念是故。譬如新米，初出者是新、次者非復是新。亦得第一念為故、第二念為新，先者名故、後始起者是新。是則先後皆得名新，故言新新生滅。亦可初後皆得名故，故言初故後亦故。新故既通初後，本有始有義亦復然。新故義通初後，但說初故名新、久新名故，定知何者為新？何者為故？故知都無新無故。故釋十號文云「上者名新，士者名故，體大涅槃無新無故。」既言體大涅槃無新無故，亦得言體大涅槃無本無始。此一往明無本無始義。然無本無始義，此是清淨體，亦何失寄言本始義耶？今約事論之。如無明初念始起為新，佛果後起為故。何異先兩念相望，初念為新、後念為故耶？亦得佛果始起此則名新，無明住地已久此則名為故。何異兩念相望，初念名故、後念名新。然本始只是新故，本只是故、始只是新。無明初念與佛果相望，既皆得是新、皆得是故，亦皆得是始、皆得是本。無明與佛果既得如此，生死涅槃亦爾，皆得是始、皆得是本。是故生死為始、涅槃為本，涅槃為始、生死為本。生死始有、涅槃本有，何異第一念為新、第二念為故。生死本有、涅槃始有，何異第一念為故、第二念為新。故生死涅槃、不是本有、不是始有，而終是無本無始。而今假名說故，更互為本始無異。經言「本有今無，本無今有。」本若是有，今則是無；本若是無，今則是有。故今之與本，皆得名有、皆得名無。此文意終為明無本無今義。故下文即結言「三世有法無有是處」，故知三世皆不得言有，但今假名說，故本有今無、本無今有。通生死涅槃皆是有無，若悟假名論有論無，至竟終是無有無無，故言三世有法無有是處。何異說新故本始，至竟終是無有新故本始義耶？當知說新故，本來指新為故、指故為新。本始亦爾，指本為始、指始為本。指始為本，故此本是始本；指本為始，故此始是本始。本始非始、始本非本，故云至竟終是無本無始義也。 > Sixth: Originally existent or newly existent. Question: Is buddha-nature originally existent or newly existent? Answer: The sūtras have two texts. The first says: sentient beings' buddha-nature is like a jar in a dark room, a jewel in a champion's forehead, a poor woman's treasure, or the sweet medicine on the snowy mountains—it is originally present of itself and did not just appear now. This is why the \*Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra\* explains the doctrine of the nine kinds of dharmakāya. The second says: the fruit of buddhahood is born from marvelous causes; one demands the price of a mare, not the price of a foal. Explaining that when ghee should be taken, one already claims it is foul-smelling, that there is already impurity in food, or that there is already oil in sesame seeds—these are the errors of speaking of existence in the cause. Therefore we know that buddha-nature is newly existent. Since the sūtras have two texts, people's interpretations also divide into two kinds. One master says: sentient beings' buddha-nature is originally present of itself because of the nature of principle, the true spirit, and the ālaya-vijñāna. Nirvāṇa also has two kinds: the nirvāṇa of intrinsic purity is originally pure, while the nirvāṇa of purity through expedients is newly accomplished through practice. A second interpretation says: since the sūtras state that the fruit of buddhahood is born from marvelous causes, how could there already be impurity in food? Therefore we know that buddha-nature is newly existent. There is also someone who says: it is originally existent in the future, so it is called 'originally existent.' Question: If so, then is it just originally existent? Answer: There is also the sense of being newly existent. Question again: If it is newly existent, it should be impermanent. Answer: I also have the sense of originally existent. How is this different from two people posing as robbers, Zhang and Wang, answering each other back and forth? If it is like originally existent, it should be like the various parables in the \*Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra\*. If it is newly existent, it should be impermanent. Yet saying 'it is originally existent in the future'—what kind of speech is this? Is it definitively original or definitively future? Would not the boundless buddha-gnosis of immeasurable worlds then fail to be complete? If one says that like boundless illumination it can defeat itself, why labor further to refute it? If illumination is exhausted, it is bounded; if illumination is not exhausted, then gnosis is not complete. How can such a dilemma be removed? The senses of originally existent and newly existent are also like this: all doctrines with attainment invariably defeat themselves, yet people do not realize it. Thus all people are caught in their snare. If one clings to original existence, then it is not new existence; if one clings to new existence, then it is not original existence. Each clings to a single text and fails to harmonize the intention of the sūtras. Disputing over right and wrong, they create the destruction of the wheel of the Buddha's Dharma, which cannot be fully recounted. However, the Daśabhūmivyākhyāna masters say: buddha-nature is of two kinds: the first is the nature of principle, and the second is the nature of practice. Principle is not created by things, so it is called originally existent; practice relies on cultivation to be accomplished, so it is called newly existent. If one looks at this with a mind of attainment, parsing the text at first glance seems to grasp the purport. Yet when investigating the sūtra's intention, it is not necessarily so. Why? The Great Sage simply employed skillful expedients, adapting to what suited beings, preaching the Dharma to cure their diseases. When did he ever say that the nature of principle is originally existent and the nature of practice newly existent? For example, regarding the doctrine of the tathāgatagarbha: the \*Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra\* states that non-self is the tathāgatagarbha, while the \*Nirvāṇa-sūtra\* states that the self is the tathāgatagarbha. How could these two texts be matched up? The meaning of originally existent and newly existent is just the same. If one says that the nature of principle is originally existent and not newly practiced, and that the nature of practice is newly existent and not original, then clinging further creates an illness, and the holy teaching ceases to be medicine. Shallow-minded people of the world merely look at the words and definitively take them to be so, thereby generating deluded attachments. Now, in the transmission of our own school explaining the meaning of buddha-nature, it is neither existent nor non-existent, neither original nor new, neither future nor present. Thus the sūtra says: 'It is only through the reckoning of conventional words that the three periods of time are spoken of; it is not that bodhi has past, future, and present.' Because it is neither original nor new, and because dependent co-arising exists, it can also be spoken of. For instance, the 'Chapter on the Nature' in the \*Nirvāṇa-sūtra\* explains that 'buddha-nature is originally existent, like the poor woman's treasure.' But since sentient beings clung to the teaching and made it an illness, the subsequent text immediately explained that it is newly existent. Thus we know that buddha-nature is neither original nor new; it is only for the sake of sentient beings that it is spoken of as original and new. Question: If buddha-nature is neither original nor new, for what reason are original and new spoken of? Answer: Ultimately speaking of buddha-nature, principle is in truth neither original nor new. It is only the Tathāgata's expedient: to destroy sentient beings' illness of impermanence, he said that the buddha-nature of all sentient beings is originally present of itself, and by this cause and condition they can attain the Buddha path. But because sentient beings lack expedients, they cling to the claim that the nature of buddha-nature is manifested as permanent and blissful. Therefore, to destroy sentient beings' illness of manifested characteristics, the Tathāgata concealed the original and illuminated the new. Ultimately speaking of buddha-nature, not only is it neither original nor new, it is also not neither-original-nor-new; to destroy original and new, it is provisionally said to be neither original nor new. If one can awaken to the equality of right and wrong concerning original, new, and neither-original-nor-new, only then can it be called the direct cause buddha-nature, and based on this, sentient beings deeply secure their attainment of the Buddha path. If it is not like this, it is not buddha-nature. If we broadly discuss the meaning of originally existent and newly existent, it is like new and old. Why? The first moment is new, and the second moment is old. For example, with fresh rice, what comes out first is new, and what comes next is no longer new. One can also take the first moment as old and the second moment as new: that which preceded is called old, and that which arises newly afterward is new. In this case, both earlier and later can be called new; hence it is said, 'moment by moment arising and ceasing anew.' One can also take both beginning and end as old; hence it is said, 'the beginning is old, and the end is also old.' Since new and old apply equally to beginning and end, the meaning of originally existent and newly existent is also like this. The meaning of new and old applies equally to beginning and end: we merely call the earlier old 'new' and the long-standing new 'old.' How can one definitively know which is new and which is old? Thus we know that there is fundamentally neither new nor old. Therefore the text explaining the ten epithets states: 'The superior (shang) is called new, and the person (shi) is called old; the essence of great nirvāṇa has neither new nor old.' Since it says the essence of great nirvāṇa has neither new nor old, one can also say the essence of great nirvāṇa has neither origin nor beginning. This explains, at first glance, the meaning of having neither origin nor beginning. Yet this meaning of having neither origin nor beginning is the pure essence; how does it forfeit lodging words in original and new? Now we discuss it in terms of actualities: just as the very first thought of ignorance that newly arises is new, and the fruit of buddhahood that arises subsequently is old. How is this different from comparing the two earlier thoughts, where the first thought is new and the subsequent thought is old? One can also say that the fruit of buddhahood newly arising is called new, while the ground of ignorance having abided for long is called old. How is this different from comparing the two thoughts, where the first thought is called old and the subsequent thought is called new? Now, original and new are just old and new: original is just old, and new is just new. Comparing the first thought of ignorance with the fruit of buddhahood, since both can be new and both can be old, both can also be new and both can be original. Since ignorance and the fruit of buddhahood can be like this, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are also like this: both can be new, and both can be original. Therefore, saṃsāra is new and nirvāṇa is original; nirvāṇa is new and saṃsāra is original. Saṃsāra is newly existent and nirvāṇa is originally existent: how is this different from the first thought being new and the second thought being old? Saṃsāra is originally existent and nirvāṇa is newly existent: how is this different from the first thought being old and the second thought being new? Therefore, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are neither originally existent nor newly existent, and ultimately have neither origin nor beginning. Yet now, spoken through conventional designations, their alternating roles as original and new are no different. The sūtra says: 'Originally existent and now non-existent; originally non-existent and now existent.' If it originally existed, it is now non-existent; if it originally did not exist, it is now existent. Thus both now and originally can be called existent, and both can be called non-existent. The ultimate intention of this text is to clarify the meaning of having neither origin nor present. Therefore the subsequent text concludes: 'It is impossible that there exist dharmas in the three periods of time.' Thus we know that the three periods of time cannot be spoken of as existent; it is only spoken through conventional designations now that there is 'originally existent and now non-existent, originally non-existent and now existent.' Applying to both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, all are existence and non-existence. If one awakens to discussing existence and non-existence through conventional designations, ultimately there is neither existence nor non-existence; hence it is said, 'It is impossible that there exist dharmas in the three periods of time.' How is this different from speaking of new and old, original and new, where ultimately there is no meaning of new, old, original, or new? One should know that when speaking of new and old, one fundamentally points to new as old and points to old as new. Original and new are also like this: one points to original as new and points to new as original. Pointing to new as original, this original is a new-original; pointing to original as new, this new is an original-new. Original-new is not new, and new-original is not original; therefore it is said that ultimately there is neither origin nor beginning. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 3.8](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.3.8) - [Next: 3.10](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.3.10) - [Up: 3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.3) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853~en-mt.3.9) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.3.9](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.3.9) · Pramāṇa