[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大乘玄論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853) › 4.14 # 大乘玄論 4.14 大乘玄論 4.14 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [4.14](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.4.14) 常無常門第十一。略明四句：一境智俱常。唯大乘有之，小乘無也，以小乘凡聖之智皆無常故。但大乘境智俱常，凡有三義：一常智照實相境，如果德觀照波若照實相波若。二常智照虛空常境。如《大經》云「一切常中，虛空第一。」今常智照此常境也。若以實相即是虛空，如《釋論》中說「虛空非有非無，言語道斷、心行處滅。」即是實相。今且據事，以虛空為常。此二句示境智二義也。三者常智還自照智，即是反照智義也。次常照無常，凡有二義：一照眾生無常、二照應迹無常也。次無常照常，凡為三句：一照虛空之常、二照實相境常、三照法身佛性常。但是照境，非照智常，以因中未有常智故也。次無常照無常，有二句：一照無常境、二者無常自照無常智。問：無常智還照無常智，與常智知常智何異？答：常智知常，唯有一義。無常智知無常，有二義：一者後念智知前念智。二者一念智，即自能知，得並觀者，具有二義；未能並者，但有前後相知也。常知於常，但有一念自知，無前後知也。問：北土論師云，初地已上即有常住法身，亦即有常智。是事云何？答：須詳此說意，為以證真之智為法身耶？取所證真如佛性為法身耶？若以能證之智為法身常者，是事不然，《釋論》云「在菩薩心名為波若，在佛心反名薩波若。」若是常者，則無明昧，不應有改反也。又《涅槃經》云「此常法稱，要是如來。」〈長壽品〉凡簡三法常義：一者外道、二者小乘、三者菩薩，並無常住。故以佛性常為法身者，此猶是江南舊宗，非北方異說也。問：有講攝大乘師云，初地見真，與佛地不異。是事云何？答：若爾，論何得云「在菩薩心名波若，在佛心反名薩婆若。」既其改反，即知有明昧不同。又論云「波若清淨反名方便。」則知六地波若未淨。又本以見真故斷惑，初地見真與佛不異，則一切惑斷。若不以見真斷惑者，便應是有智斷惑，故此說不然。如此皆是無分別中善巧分別。不爾者，淺學失於眉眼，為無巧方便。今既欲釋二智，即廣解方便。方便者，無差別差別智，故須善巧分別法門，然後無方無礙之用。後當廣敘得失，未可驚同舊宗也。今據此門，可有四句：一者語同意異。語同上來所辨，乃有常無常。問：何故語同耶？答：語出經論，經論共用，何得不同？而意異者，《中論》云「言語雖同，其心則異。」今明此是無分別中善巧分別，不二二義，故開常無常境智二義耳。既云不二二、即雖二不二、如《大經》云「我無我無有二相，常無常亦爾。」經云「愚人謂二，智者了達，知其無二。」復有愚者但謂不二，智人了知不二而二。何者？愚人不識常無常，不知境智，故是無明，無明故為愚。智人了知常無常，名為智者。是故名為語同意異也。二者語異意異。有所得人，不善分別；無所得大乘，能善分別，故名語異。一者是無所得心善分別、二者有所得心不善分別，故名意異。三者語同意同者，語與諸佛菩薩方等經論同，意與諸佛菩薩無依正觀亦同，故名語同意同。又語與有所得人語同，有所得人復有少分得處，今意亦與彼同，故云語同意同。四語異意同。語雖異經論，而意符合道，亦得用之。又語異舊宗，而意同會佛旨，亦得用之。宜以斯四句總貫諸門，不應一向偏有去取。問：何故明此四句？答：有二種人，一始學大乘，謂必須一向與舊宗為異，則成謗法。所以然者，語出經論，宜共用之。但得與無得，其心各別，不應以意異故令語亦異。二者學小乘人，玄與大乘異，強謂義同，是亦謗法。所以然者，小乘語意與大乘語意實不同，而強謂同。如學《成實論》者，謂無相滅諦與方等理均，故亦名謗法也。為此大小學人，宜開同異四句。 > Section 11: The Permanent and the Impermanent. We briefly explain the four propositions. First, both cognitive object and gnosis are permanent. This exists only in the Mahāyāna, not in the Hīnayāna, because in the Hīnayāna the gnosis of both ordinary persons and nobles is impermanent. Yet in the Mahāyāna, both cognitive object and gnosis being permanent comprises three meanings in all: (1) permanent gnosis illuminating the cognitive object of true reality, as when the prajñā of contemplative illumination of the fruition virtues illuminates the prajñā of true reality; (2) permanent gnosis illuminating the permanent cognitive object of space, as the Great Sūtra states: "Among all that is permanent, space is foremost"—here permanent gnosis illuminates this permanent cognitive object (if true reality is taken to be identical with space, as the \*Treatise\* says: "Space is neither existent nor non-existent; the path of words is cut off, and the place of mental activity is extinguished"—that is true reality itself; here, relying provisionally on phenomenal convention, space is taken as permanent; these two lines indicate the two meanings of cognitive object and gnosis); (3) permanent gnosis reflexively illuminating gnosis itself—this is the meaning of reflexive illumination of gnosis. Next, the permanent illuminating the impermanent comprises two meanings in all: (1) illuminating the impermanence of sentient beings; (2) illuminating the impermanence of the responsive trace. Next, the impermanent illuminating the permanent comprises three propositions in all: (1) illuminating the permanence of space; (2) illuminating the permanence of the cognitive object of true reality; (3) illuminating the permanence of the dharmakāya and buddha-nature (this is only illuminating cognitive objects, not illuminating the permanence of gnosis, because within the causal stage there is not yet permanent gnosis). Next, the impermanent illuminating the impermanent comprises two propositions: (1) illuminating an impermanent cognitive object; (2) impermanence itself reflexively illuminating impermanent gnosis. Question: What is the difference between impermanent gnosis reflexively illuminating impermanent gnosis, and permanent gnosis knowing permanent gnosis? Answer: Permanent gnosis knowing the permanent has only one meaning. Impermanent gnosis knowing the impermanent has two meanings: first, gnosis in a subsequent moment knowing gnosis in a prior moment; second, gnosis in a single moment being directly capable of self-knowledge. For one who attains simultaneous contemplation, both meanings are present; for one who cannot yet contemplate simultaneously, there is only successive mutual knowledge. Permanent knowing of the permanent has only self-knowledge within a single moment, without prior and subsequent knowing. Question: The treatise masters of the Northern regions say that from the first bhūmi upwards there is already the eternally abiding dharmakāya, and likewise there is permanent gnosis. How is it with this matter? Answer: One must closely examine the intent of this statement: do they take the gnosis that realizes reality to be the dharmakāya, or do they take the realized suchness and buddha-nature to be the dharmakāya? If one takes the realizing gnosis to be the permanent dharmakāya, this is not correct. The \*Treatise\* states: "In the mind of a bodhisattva it is called prajñā; in the mind of a Buddha it turns to be named sarvajñā." If it were permanent, then there would be no distinction of light and obscurity, and there should not be any change and transformation. Furthermore, the \*Nirvāṇa Sūtra\* states: "This designation 'permanent Dharma' applies only to the Tathāgata." The "Chapter on Longevity" generally excludes the meaning of permanence in three dharmas: first, non-Buddhists; second, the Hīnayāna; third, bodhisattvas—none of them are eternally abiding. Therefore, taking the permanence of buddha-nature as the dharmakāya is still the old tradition of Jiangnan, not a distinct doctrine of the North. Question: Masters who lecture on the \*Mahāyānasaṃgraha\* say that seeing reality on the first bhūmi is not different from the Buddha bhūmi. How is it with this matter? Answer: If so, how could the \*Treatise\* state: "In the mind of a bodhisattva it is called prajñā; in the mind of a Buddha it turns to be named sarvajñā"? Since there is change and transformation, one knows there is a difference between light and obscurity. Furthermore, the \*Treatise\* states: "When prajñā is purified, it turns to be named expedient means." Then one knows that on the sixth bhūmi prajñā is not yet pure. Moreover, it is fundamentally because of seeing reality that afflictions are severed; if seeing reality on the first bhūmi were not different from the Buddha, then all afflictions would be severed. If afflictions were not severed by seeing reality, then it would be that gnosis with attainment severs afflictions; hence this statement is not correct. All these are skillful distinctions within the non-discriminative. If it were not so, shallow students would lose their eyebrows and eyes, being devoid of skillful expedient means. Now, since we intend to explain the two gnoses, we broadly unpack expedient means. Expedient means is the gnosis of distinction within the non-distinct; hence one must skillfully distinguish Dharma gates, and only then will there be application that is unfettered and unobstructed. Later we will broadly set forth the merits and faults; one should not be alarmed into conflating this with the old traditions. Now, relying on this gate, there may be four propositions: First, the words are identical but the intention is different. The words are identical with what was analyzed above, having permanence and impermanence. Question: Why are the words identical? Answer: The words come from the sūtras and treatises; since sūtras and treatises use them in common, how could they not be identical? Yet their intention is different, as the \*Madhyamakaśāstra\* says: "Though the words are identical, the mind is different." Now we explain that this is skillful distinction within the non-discriminative, the two meanings of non-dual yet dual; therefore we open up the two meanings of permanent and impermanent cognitive objects and gnoses. Since we speak of non-dual yet dual, it is also dual yet non-dual; as the Great Sūtra says: "Self and non-self have no dual marks; the permanent and the impermanent are also like this." The sūtra says: "The foolish person says they are two; the wise person understands thoroughly, knowing that they are not two." There are also foolish people who merely say they are non-dual; the wise person knows thoroughly that they are non-dual and yet dual. Why is this? The foolish person does not recognize the permanent and the impermanent, and does not know cognitive object and gnosis; hence it is ignorance, and being ignorant, they are foolish. The wise person understands thoroughly the permanent and the impermanent, and is called a wise person. Therefore this is called identical words but different intention. Second, the words are different and the intention is different. Persons of attainment do not make distinctions skillfully; the Mahāyāna of non-attainment is capable of making distinctions skillfully; hence it is called different words. One is making skillful distinctions with a mind of non-attainment; the other is making unskillful distinctions with a mind of attainment; hence it is called different intention. Third, identical words and identical intention: the words are identical with the vaipulya sūtras and treatises of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, and the intention is likewise identical with the correct contemplation of non-dependence of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas; hence it is called identical words and identical intention. Furthermore, the words are identical with the words of persons of attainment, and persons of attainment also have minor areas of attainment where our present intention is also identical with theirs; hence we say identical words and identical intention. Fourth, different words and identical intention: though the words differ from the sūtras and treatises, yet if the intention accords with the Way, they may also be used. Furthermore, though the words differ from the old traditions, yet if the intention joins with the Buddha's meaning, they may also be used. One ought to link all the gates using these four propositions, and must not rigidly lean toward accepting or rejecting. Question: Why explain these four propositions? Answer: There are two kinds of people. First, those who begin to study the Mahāyāna and think it must rigidly differ from the old tradition; then they commit the offense of slandering the Dharma. Why is this? The words come from the sūtras and treatises, and ought to be used in common. However, attainment and non-attainment have distinct minds; one should not cause the words also to be different just because the intention is different. Second, students of the Hīnayāna, which is profoundly different from the Mahāyāna, forcefully assert that the meaning is identical; this is also slandering the Dharma. Why is this? The words and intention of the Hīnayāna are genuinely different from the words and intention of the Mahāyāna, yet they forcefully assert they are identical. For instance, students of the \*Tattvasiddhi\* claim that the unconditioned cessation truth is equal to the principle of the vaipulya; hence this is also called slandering the Dharma. For the sake of these students of the Great and Small \[Vehicles\], one ought to open up the four propositions of identity and difference. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 4.13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.4.13) - [Next: 4.15](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.4.15) - [Up: 4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.4) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853~en-mt.4.14) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [淨名玄論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.6.2) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.4.14](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.4.14) · Pramāṇa