[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大乘玄論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853) › 5.10 # 大乘玄論 5.10 大乘玄論 5.10 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [5.10](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.5.10) 今次第二明四論宗旨義同異。問：四論既興，為當是一？為當是異？答：一往折疑不一不異。所以然者，八不是眾經之妙旨、方等之宏宗。此論啟初即明不生不滅、不一不異，故知四論非一不異。問：既不一不異，便應不四不論。若言四言論，即是一是異耶？答：只噵四論不一不異。若不言四論，語何物不一不異耶？如只噵色不生不滅、受想行識不生不滅，只噵五陰不生不滅、色心不空不有。若不言五陰，噵誰不生不滅？若不語色心，言何物不空不有？今亦爾，何不言四論，噵誰不一不異？問：以何義故言其不一？以何義故語其不異？釋云：以論四故，所以不一；以四論故，所以不異。故言不一不異也。問：若爾，論有四故彌見其是異，同是論故轉見是一，何得言不異不一？答曰：四若是異，四不四論；論若是一，論不論四。只為四非是異耶，所以四論；論非是一，所以論四也。問：若非是一異耶？答：既非一異，亦復非是非一異。既識非一異，則一異可明也。今亦可言同，亦可辨其異也。言同者，有二義：一者能造論人，同是四依、同稟佛教、同有二智也。二者所造之論，同是無依無得、同申正教。若是有得，即不名論，亦不能有所論；若是無得，方可名論，能有所論。是故若不依空，不成問答。故下文云「問不依空，問同答者疑。答不依空，答同問者所疑」也。問：此論若不依有，可不當有；既也依空，應是當空。若許當空，則成有當，何謂無依無當耶？答：今言依空者，一往對外人多住有故言依空耳。空依何所依？故是無依無當也。又云依空者乃了空，此依非謂有空之可依也。次辨異者，一捉《釋論》望三論辨異、二者就三論中自復有異也。捉《釋論》望三論異者，亦有多義：一者文義通別有殊、二者破收之異。文義通別殊者，若三論即別通論，通申一切諸教罄無不申，通破一切諸迷無迷不洗，故是別通論也。若是《釋論》即是通別論，意致乃復通漫，而的釋一部文言，是故名通別論也。二者收破之異者，若是三論望《釋論》，則唯破不收；若《釋論》望三論，亦收亦破。所以然者，三論橫破諸法、竪除五句，故下文云「無人亦無法，佛亦無所說。何處於何時，誰起是諸見。」即是橫破諸見也。又云「從因緣品來本末推求，有亦破、無亦破、亦有亦無亦破、非有非無亦破、非非有非非無亦破。」即是竪論破除五句。故三論唯破不收也。《釋論》亦破亦收者，破除稟教緣迷，申所迷之教也。問：三論破即是捨，《釋論》收即是取，乃是取捨心生，豈能息諸見？答：三論破，即不破而破；《釋論》收，即是不收而收。不破而破，破無所捨；不收而收，收無所取。乃顯不破不收、無捨無取，故能善息諸見也。傍明四句：一者但破而不收，如迦旃延子所造，自作此說，非佛三藏中義。二者收而不破，即顯佛方便教門也。三者亦破亦收，破能迷之緣，收所迷之教也。四者不收不破，破收非收、收破非破，非收非破乃名實也。此是三論望《釋論》竟。次就三論中自論異者，凡有八條：一者辨三論受名不同、二者宗旨有異、三者智有長短、四者破有內外、五者用假不同、六者申有遠近、七者破有傍正、八者論對與不對。今前辨三論受名不同。就論立名自有多種，或從譬、或從人，如此不定。如《甘露味毘曇》，從譬為名。若是《舍利弗毘曇》，則因人受稱。若如《成實》、《三論》，並從法作名也。若是《十二門》、《百論》此是理教為名，《中論》從教理為稱。通論三論，皆得顯中。然者三論同離斷常、俱顯正觀，豈不俱得名中耶？亦皆得從偈，三皆有偈數也。亦可俱得名門，門是能通，三論盡能通生觀解也。今就別義，有其強弱，故立名不同。若是《中論》，以二諦所顯中實當名；《百論》面折外道，由茲百偈，故以偈數為目；《十二》能通生觀解，故從門受稱也。第二辨三論宗旨有異。若是《中論》以智諦為宗。《百論》以諦智為旨。《十二門》大望同於《中論》也。《中論》以二諦為宗者，發初即唱不生不滅、不常不斷，即是二諦。《瓔珞經》云「二諦者不生不滅。」又下論文云「佛滅度後後五百歲像法中，人根轉鈍，聞大乘法中說畢竟空，不知何因緣故空。即生見疑：若都畢竟空，云何有罪福報應等。」如此則失世諦第一義諦，取是空相而起貪著。龍樹菩薩愍此等故，所以造論。既云愍失二諦所以作論，故論申二諦，故以二諦為宗也。《百論》以二智為宗者，提婆面折外道，巧用權實，故宜以二智為宗。此是師一時之語，通別圓偏之意耳。若守語作此解者，不可也。須具得通別別通之意，乃可明也。通義《中論》既以二諦為宗，《百論》亦爾；《百論》既用二智為旨，則《中論》亦然。若唯言《中論》二諦為宗、《百論》不爾，此為不可。言不可者，凡有二意：一者菩薩造論，只為欲申佛教。《中論》申教以二諦為宗，《百論》亦為申教，何不得以二諦為宗耶？二者親違關中論序。肇師論序云「通聖心之津塗，開真諦之要論」，豈不用二諦為宗？又云「仰慨聖教之陵遲」，寧非申教耶？《百論》末文云「佛說二諦，我今隨佛學，亦說二諦。」豈不用二諦為宗旨？故兩論皆得二諦為宗。次明《中》、《百》俱得二智為旨者，提婆面折邪峯，巧由權實，故用二智為旨者，《中論》主除於內執，亦巧由實方便慧，寧不以二智為旨耶？故二論俱可以二智為旨也。而今師云：《中論》二諦當宗，《百論》以二智為旨者，此取《中》、《百》兩相望強弱作此說也。第三明用智短長。若是《百論》則用權實二智，《中論》所用實方便智。然者《百論》主與外道鬪一時頰舌，折挫僧佉、衛世，此是權智之能。若《中論》主欲提綱振領、匡正佛法，辨教之大宗，非諍一時脣舌，故用實方便慧。匡持佛法，不可一時邪示，其用則長。若《百論》主，善巧一時折挫外道，未是要論佛法正，是權智之能，此用即短也。第四明破有內外，凡有兩義：一者若是《中論》破內迷，《百論》除外執。故序云「百論治外以閑邪，斯文祛內以流滯」也。二者《中論》破同學，《百論》破異學。然者龍樹與失教緣同稟佛教，但龍樹稟佛教悟解，發主中觀，中觀所吐名為中論。外人亦稟佛教，而顛倒不解，雖欲宣暢，並是斷常。雖同學佛教，而有悟迷。論主破彼斷常，令識佛教，故是破同學也。提婆所破不爾，論主自學佛經教，外道自稟僧佉之典，所習不同，故言破異學也。問：《中論》破復有收義，《百論》所破可得爾不？答：亦有此義。何以得知？故經云「圖書讖記文章呪術，皆是佛說，非外道說。」以外道迷不解故破，方便故須收也。問：《百論》對緣既有收義，《中論》所破亦應不收。答：亦有此義。雖學佛教，自作己解故。如迦旃延子所作，不得三藏中義，是故《中論》所破亦有不收義也。然《百論》所破緣，根性有三種：一者上根，聞提婆破即解。二者中根，聞提婆破不解，止生信心，讀佛經乃悟。三者下根，聞破不解，讀佛經亦不悟，看龍樹論始得悟解也。若上根人，則與《中論》所破緣得悟者齊；中下之徒，即挍一階也。第五明用假不同。假乃眾多，略明四種：一因緣、二隨緣、三就緣、四對緣。若辨甚深因緣義，即是因緣假。隨緣所宜而說，即是隨緣假。就緣撿責，即是就緣假。若一一須對破，如對常說無常等，即是對緣假也。就四緣中，則有偏圓圓偏義。若如因緣，隨就對及隨緣故說因緣，對緣如此。四假未曾相離，即是圓義也。若遂時，各用不同，即是偏義。問：四假，佛與菩薩為當盡具？為當不爾？答：差別無差別義、二不二義，佛菩薩皆具四假。若無差別差別不二二義，有具不具。佛當化主，所以具足四假。菩薩助申教旨，唯有兩假，所謂就緣、對緣。菩薩雖具二假，而用復有強弱，《百論》則就緣為弱、對緣是強，《中論》對緣為弱。就緣義強。何故爾？《中論》初云「諸論師種種說生相，就其責覓生相不得，故言不生。種種說滅相，責滅者不得，故言不滅。」即是就緣假義。《百論》借一對破異等，即是對緣假義也。第六明破申遠近。若兩論相望，《中論》近申，《百論》遠申。然者《中論》之緣，親稟佛經、親迷佛教，亦破即收，故申義成近。《百論》之緣，不親稟佛經、不親迷佛教，直是自樹己解，遠妨正教，破彼邪執方入佛法，故申義成遠也。第七明兩論破有正傍。《中論》正破內迷、傍除外執，《百論》正彈外執、傍淨內迷。何故爾？若外道所執與《中論》所破緣同者，是即從座被破，故《中論》正破內迷、傍洗外執。若有內學執與《百論》破緣同，亦從座被破，故《百論》正彈外執、傍洗內迷也。次明《中論》破有傍有正，若比《百論》並是傍破；《百論》破義有正有傍，比《中論》並是正破也。何故爾？明佛說教，本為眾生作明作導，欲令眾生因教悟道。眾生既不識教，則不能悟道。菩薩愍此失道眾生，故欲令佛教如本行世。若不破彼邪執，則正教不申，是故申義為正、破義居傍。《百論》破自樹外道，未曾稟學佛教，破彼邪執然後方入佛法，是故破正申傍也。第八明所破之緣有對不對。提婆面折外道，所以對緣；龍樹潛懷著筆，是故不對外人。問：何故一對、一不對？有釋云：龍樹妙思深遠、峯辨難當，外人無敢與敵，故不對外人。提婆所明，一時面折外人，所以相對也。然此釋極不可解。若言龍樹妙思深遠無敢與對者，提婆亦爾，便應不對。又且若言龍樹妙思深遠外人不能與對者，佛與外道相對，便應智淺耶？如來智深而與外道相對，故知不以龍樹智深故不對也。今不用此釋。問：若不爾，何得二人有對不對？答：此亦何定？自有須面折方破外道，自有須潛懷著筆用此破邪。問：只當如此？復有餘義？答？復有深致。何者？明龍樹出世之時，是正化之末、像法之初，眾生雖復尋教失旨，而佛法尚興、邪徒由翳，朋成大道眾生甚多、偏學小心其事蓋少。龍樹既興，望風懸揖，止須著筆，邪徒自喪，無敢對面與共擊揚，是故龍樹不對也。提婆出世，是八百餘年，去聖既遠，邪儻盛興、正化訛替。故序云「邪辨逼真，殆亂正道。金石一貫，得失莫分。」菩薩雖興，猶生拒抗，自非對面折挫、辭屈言下，邪心轉熾無肯改迷，故提婆面對群邪。所以二人有對不對，其意爾也。 > Next, second, is to clarify the identity and difference of the central doctrines of the four treatises. Question: Since the four treatises have arisen, are they identical, or are they different? Answer: To summarily dispel doubts, they are neither identical nor different. Why is this? The eight negations are the wondrous purport of the numerous sūtras and the vast central doctrine of the Mahāyāna scriptures. At its very opening, this treatise clarifies neither arising nor ceasing, neither identity nor difference; therefore we know that the four treatises are neither identical nor different. Question: Since they are neither identical nor different, then they should be neither four nor treatises. If one speaks of 'four' and speaks of 'treatises', is that identity or difference? Answer: We only say that the four treatises are neither identical nor different. If one did not speak of the four treatises, of what thing could one say that it is neither identical nor different? Just as one only says that form does not arise and does not cease, feeling, perception, karmic formations, and consciousness do not arise and do not cease; one only says that the five aggregates do not arise and do not cease, and form and mind are neither empty nor existent. If one did not speak of the five aggregates, of whom would one say that they do not arise and do not cease? If one did not speak of form and mind, of what thing would one say that it is neither empty nor existent? The present case is also like this: why not speak of the four treatises, and say who is neither identical nor different? Question: By what meaning is it said that they are not identical? By what meaning is it said that they are not different? Explanation: Because there are four treatises, they are therefore not identical; because they are all four treatises, they are therefore not different. Hence it is said that they are neither identical nor different. Question: If so, because there are four treatises one all the more sees that they are different, and because they are equally treatises one further sees that they are identical—how can one say that they are neither different nor identical? Answer: If the four were inherently different, the four would not be the four treatises; if the treatises were inherently identical, the treatises would not treat of the four. It is simply because the four is not difference that there are the four treatises; because treatise is not identity, it treats of the four. Question: If they are not identity or difference, \[what are they\]? Answer: Since they are neither identity nor difference, they are also not the assertion of being neither identity nor difference. Once one recognizes neither identity nor difference, then identity and difference can be clarified. Now one can also speak of their identity, and one can also distinguish their difference. Speaking of identity, there are two meanings: First, the persons who composed the treatises are equally among the four refuges, equally receive the Buddha's teaching, and equally possess the two kinds of gnosis. Second, the treatises that were composed are equally without reliance and without attainment, and equally expound the correct teaching. If there were attainment, it would not be called a treatise, nor could it discuss anything; if there is non-attainment, only then can it be called a treatise and be able to discuss something. Therefore, if one does not rely on emptiness, question and answer cannot be established. Hence the lower text says: 'If the question does not rely on emptiness, the question shares the doubt of the respondent; if the answer does not rely on emptiness, the answer shares the doubt of the questioner.' Question: If this treatise does not rely on existence, it may well not correspond to existence; since it also relies on emptiness, it should correspond to emptiness. If you allow that it corresponds to emptiness, then it becomes having a correspondence; why call it without reliance and without correspondence? Answer: Now, when we say 'relying on emptiness', it is summarily said in opposition to outsiders who mostly abide in existence that one relies on emptiness. What does emptiness rely on to have a reliance? Therefore it is without reliance and without correspondence. Furthermore, saying 'relying on emptiness' means understanding emptiness; this reliance does not mean that there is an emptiness that can be relied upon. Next, to distinguish their differences: first, taking the Dazhidulun in comparison with the three treatises to distinguish their differences; second, within the three treatises themselves there are further differences. In taking the Dazhidulun in comparison with the three treatises, there are also many meanings: first, there is a divergence between the general and the specific in text and meaning; second, there is a difference between refutation and acceptance. Regarding the divergence between the general and the specific in text and meaning: the three treatises are 'specifically general treatises', comprehensively expounding all teachings without leaving any unexpounded, and comprehensively refuting all delusions without leaving any unwashed away; therefore they are 'specifically general treatises'. As for the Dazhidulun, it is a 'generally specific treatise'; its purport is extensive and pervasive, yet it specifically comments on the text and words of a single work; therefore it is called a 'generally specific treatise'. Second, regarding the difference between acceptance and refutation: if the three treatises are compared to the Dazhidulun, they only refute and do not accept; if the Dazhidulun is compared to the three treatises, it both accepts and refutes. Why is this? The three treatises horizontally refute all phenomena and vertically eliminate the five propositions. Hence the text below says: 'There is neither person nor phenomenon, nor did the Buddha preach anything. Where, at what time, would anyone give rise to these views?' This is the horizontal refutation of all views. Furthermore, it says: 'Investigating from the beginning to the end starting from the Chapter on Conditions, existence is refuted, non-existence is refuted, both existence and non-existence are refuted, neither existence nor non-existence is refuted, and neither non-existence nor non-non-existence is refuted.' This is vertically refuting and eliminating the five propositions. Therefore the three treatises only refute and do not accept. The Dazhidulun both refutes and accepts, because it refutes and eliminates the delusions of circumstances regarding receiving the teaching, while upholding the teaching about which they were deluded. Question: The refutation of the three treatises is relinquishment, and the acceptance of the Dazhidulun is grasping; this is the arising of a mind of grasping and relinquishment—how could it put an end to all views? Answer: The refutation of the three treatises is refuting without refuting; the acceptance of the Dazhidulun is accepting without accepting. Refuting without refuting, in refutation there is nothing relinquished; accepting without accepting, in acceptance there is nothing grasped. This reveals non-refutation and non-acceptance, no relinquishment and no grasping; therefore it can skillfully put an end to all views. Collaterally clarifying the four propositions: First, only refuting and not accepting, as composed by Kātyāyanīputra, who made this statement himself, which is not the meaning found in the Buddha's Tripiṭaka. Second, accepting and not refuting, which manifests the Buddha's gate of expedient teachings. Third, both refuting and accepting, refuting the circumstances capable of delusion, and accepting the teaching about which they are deluded. Fourth, neither accepting nor refuting: refuting acceptance is not acceptance, accepting refutation is not refutation; being neither acceptance nor refutation is what is termed ultimate reality. This concludes comparing the three treatises to the Dazhidulun. Next, discussing the differences within the three treatises themselves, there are altogether eight items: 1. Distinguishing the different names received by the three treatises; 2. Their central doctrines differ; 3. Their gnosis has length and brevity; 4. Their refutation pertains to internal and external; 5. Their employment of conventional designations differs; 6. Their expounding is proximate or distant; 7. Their refutation has secondary and primary; 8. The treatise confronts or does not confront an opponent directly. Now, first, distinguishing the different names received by the three treatises: in giving names to treatises there are many types; some are based on a metaphor, some on a person—it is variable like this. For example, the Amṛtarasaśāstra derives its name from a metaphor. In the case of the Śāriputrābhidharma, it receives its title from a person. In cases like the Tattvasiddhi and the Sanlun, they all take their names from phenomena. The Dvādaśanikāyaśāstra and the Śataśāstra take their names from principle and teaching, while the Madhyamakaśāstra derives its title from teaching and principle. Generally speaking, all three treatises are able to reveal the Middle. If so, since the three treatises equally depart from annihilationism and eternalism and together reveal correct contemplation, could they not all receive the name 'Middle'? They could also all be named after verses, as all three have a number of verses. They could also all receive the name 'gate', for a gate is what can provide access, and all three treatises can provide access to generating contemplative understanding. Now, based on specific meanings, there are strengths and weaknesses; hence they establish different names. The Madhyamakaśāstra takes its name from the middle reality revealed by the two truths; the Śataśāstra directly refuted outsiders by means of these one hundred verses, hence it takes the number of verses as its designation; the Dvādaśanikāyaśāstra can provide access to generating contemplative understanding, hence it receives its title from 'gate'. Second, distinguishing the differences in the central doctrines of the three treatises: the Madhyamakaśāstra takes gnosis and truth as its doctrine; the Śataśāstra takes truth and gnosis as its purport; the Dvādaśanikāyaśāstra in general view is the same as the Madhyamakaśāstra. That the Madhyamakaśāstra takes the two truths as its doctrine is because at its very beginning it proclaims neither arising nor ceasing, neither permanence nor annihilation, which are the two truths. The Yingluo jing says: 'The two truths are neither arising nor ceasing.' Furthermore, the lower treatise text says: 'In the semblance dharma era, in the last five hundred years after the Buddha's extinction, people's faculties grew increasingly dull. Hearing the Mahāyāna teaching expound ultimate emptiness, they did not know for what causes and conditions it is empty. Thereupon they gave rise to views and doubts: 'If all is ultimately empty, how can there be retribution for sin and merit, and so forth?' In this way they lost the conventional truth and the ultimate truth, grasped at this mark of emptiness, and gave rise to greed and attachment. Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna took pity on such people and therefore composed this treatise.' Since it says that he composed the treatise out of pity for their losing the two truths, the treatise expounds the two truths; therefore it takes the two truths as its doctrine. The Śataśāstra takes the two kinds of gnosis as its doctrine because Āryadeva directly refuted outsiders, skillfully employing the provisional and the real; hence it is appropriate to take the two kinds of gnosis as its doctrine. This was a master's provisional remark, an idea of general, specific, complete, or partial. If one clings to words to make this interpretation, it is not permissible. One must fully grasp the sense of general-in-specific and specific-in-general before it can be understood. In the general sense, since the Madhyamakaśāstra takes the two truths as its doctrine, so too does the Śataśāstra; since the Śataśāstra uses the two kinds of gnosis as its purport, the Madhyamakaśāstra does likewise. If one only says that the Madhyamakaśāstra takes the two truths as its doctrine while the Śataśāstra does not, this is impermissible. That it is impermissible has two meanings: First, bodhisattvas compose treatises solely to expound the Buddha's teaching. The Madhyamakaśāstra expounds the teaching with the two truths as its doctrine; the Śataśāstra was also made to expound the teaching—why could it not take the two truths as its doctrine? Second, it directly contradicts Master Sengzhao's preface to the treatise written in the Guanzhong region. Master Zhao's preface says: 'It opens the ford of the Sage's mind, and unfolds the essential discourse on the ultimate truth'—how could this not take the two truths as its doctrine? Furthermore, it says: 'Looking up, he lamented the decline of the holy teaching'—how is this not expounding the teaching? The closing text of the Śataśāstra says: 'The Buddha taught the two truths; I now study in accordance with the Buddha and also teach the two truths.' How could this not use the two truths as its central doctrine? Therefore both treatises can take the two truths as their doctrine. Next, clarifying that both the Madhyamakaśāstra and the Śataśāstra can take the two kinds of gnosis as their purport: Āryadeva directly broke the peak of heterodoxy, skillfully relying on the provisional and the real; therefore he used the two kinds of gnosis as his purport. The author of the Madhyamakaśāstra eliminated internal attachments and also skillfully relied on real and expedient wisdom; how could he not take the two kinds of gnosis as his purport? Hence both treatises can use the two kinds of gnosis as their purport. But modern masters say: 'The Madhyamakaśāstra takes the two truths as its doctrine, while the Śataśāstra takes the two kinds of gnosis as its purport'—this statement was made by taking into account the relative strengths and weaknesses when comparing the Madhyamakaśāstra and the Śataśāstra. Third, clarifying the length and brevity in the employment of gnosis: the Śataśāstra employs the two kinds of gnosis, provisional and real; what the Madhyamakaśāstra employs is real and expedient gnosis. The author of the Śataśāstra engaged in temporary verbal battles with outsiders, refuting the Sāṃkhya and the Vaiśeṣika; this is the capacity of provisional gnosis. If the author of the Madhyamakaśāstra wished to grasp the main thread and lift the collar, to rectify the Buddha Dharma and distinguish the great doctrine of the teaching, rather than disputing temporary lip and tongue, he therefore employed real and expedient wisdom. Rectifying and upholding the Buddha Dharma cannot be demonstrated through temporary heterodoxy; its function is therefore long-lasting. As for the author of the Śataśāstra, skillfully refuting outsiders on a temporary occasion was not yet the primary discourse on the correctness of the Buddha Dharma; it is the capacity of provisional gnosis, so this function is brief. Fourth, clarifying that refutation pertains to internal and external, there are altogether two meanings: First, the Madhyamakaśāstra refutes internal delusions, while the Śataśāstra eliminates external attachments. Hence the preface says: 'The Śataśāstra cures the external so as to ward off heterodoxy; this text eliminates the internal so as to disperse stagnation.' Second, the Madhyamakaśāstra refutes fellow students, while the Śataśāstra refutes students of different traditions. Nāgārjuna and those who lost the teaching equally received the Buddha's teaching; but Nāgārjuna received the Buddha's teaching and awakened to understanding, giving rise primarily to the Middle contemplation, and what was expressed by this Middle contemplation is called the Madhyamakaśāstra. Outsiders also received the Buddha's teaching, yet were inverted and did not understand; although they wished to propagate it, it was all annihilationism or eternalism. Although they studied the Buddha's teaching together, there were awakening and delusion. The treatise master refuted their annihilationism and eternalism to make them recognize the Buddha's teaching; hence it is refuting fellow students. What Āryadeva refuted was not like this: the treatise master himself studied Buddhist sūtras and teachings, whereas outsiders independently received the scriptures of the Sāṃkhya; what they practiced was different, hence it is called refuting students of different traditions. Question: The Madhyamakaśāstra's refutation also contains the meaning of acceptance; does what the Śataśāstra refutes also have this? Answer: It also has this meaning. How is this known? For the sūtra says: 'Divination charts, apocryphal records, literary writings, and incantations are all spoken by the Buddha, not spoken by outsiders.' Because outsiders are deluded and do not understand, they are refuted; as an expedient, they must be accepted. Question: Since there is the meaning of acceptance regarding the circumstances addressed by the Śataśāstra, what is refuted by the Madhyamakaśāstra should likewise not be accepted. Answer: There is also this meaning. Although they studied the Buddha's teaching, they produced their own interpretations. For example, what was composed by Kātyāyanīputra did not attain the meaning within the Tripiṭaka; therefore what is refuted by the Madhyamakaśāstra also contains the meaning of non-acceptance. However, among the circumstances refuted by the Śataśāstra, there are three grades of faculties: First, superior faculties: hearing Āryadeva's refutation, they immediately understand. Second, medium faculties: hearing Āryadeva's refutation, they do not understand, but merely generate faith; reading Buddhist sūtras, they then awaken. Third, inferior faculties: hearing the refutation, they do not understand; reading Buddhist sūtras, they also do not awaken; only after reading Nāgārjuna's treatises do they attain awakening and understanding. A person of superior faculties is equal to those who attain awakening among the circumstances refuted by the Madhyamakaśāstra; the medium and inferior sorts are one step lower. Fifth, clarifying the different employments of conventional designations: although conventional designations are numerous, four kinds are briefly clarified: 1. Conventional designation based on causes and conditions; 2. Conventional designation following circumstances; 3. Conventional designation addressing circumstances; 4. Conventional designation opposing circumstances. Distinguishing the profound meaning of dependent co-arising is conventional designation based on causes and conditions. Preaching according to what is suitable to the circumstances is conventional designation following circumstances. Examining and reproaching circumstances based on them is conventional designation addressing circumstances. If each must be refuted in opposition, such as speaking of impermanence in opposition to permanence, this is conventional designation opposing circumstances. Among the four circumstances, there are meanings of partial-in-complete and complete-in-partial. If, like causes and conditions, one speaks of causes and conditions because of following, addressing, and opposing, as well as following circumstances, opposing circumstances is likewise. That the four conventional designations are never separated from one another is the complete meaning. If, adapting to the occasion, their respective employments differ, this is the partial meaning. Question: As for the four conventional designations, do the Buddha and bodhisattvas both fully possess them, or do they not? Answer: In terms of the non-difference of difference and the non-duality of duality, both the Buddha and bodhisattvas fully possess the four conventional designations. In terms of the difference of non-difference and the duality of non-duality, there is having them fully and not having them fully. The Buddha acts as the host of conversion, and therefore fully possesses the four conventional designations. Bodhisattvas merely assist in expounding the purport of the teaching, and possess only two conventional designations, namely, addressing circumstances and opposing circumstances. Although bodhisattvas possess both conventional designations, their employment also has strength and weakness: in the Śataśāstra, addressing circumstances is weak and opposing circumstances is strong; in the Madhyamakaśāstra, opposing circumstances is weak and addressing circumstances is strong. Why is this? The beginning of the Madhyamakaśāstra says: 'Various treatise masters speak of the characteristic of arising in various ways; addressing them and seeking the characteristic of arising, it cannot be found; hence it is called non-arising. They speak of the characteristic of ceasing in various ways; reproaching those who speak of ceasing, it cannot be found; hence it is called non-ceasing.' This is the meaning of conventional designation addressing circumstances. The Śataśāstra's borrowing of oneness to refute difference and so forth is the meaning of conventional designation opposing circumstances. Sixth, clarifying the proximity and distance of refutation and expounding: if the two treatises are compared, the Madhyamakaśāstra expounds proximately, and the Śataśāstra expounds distantly. The circumstances of the Madhyamakaśāstra directly received the Buddhist sūtras and were directly deluded about the Buddha's teaching; in refuting them one also immediately accepts them, hence the meaning of expounding is proximate. The circumstances of the Śataśāstra did not directly receive the Buddhist sūtras and were not directly deluded about the Buddha's teaching; they simply established their own interpretations, which distantly obstructed the correct teaching; only after refuting their perverse attachments do they enter the Buddha Dharma, hence the meaning of expounding is distant. Seventh, clarifying that in both treatises refutation has primary and secondary: the Madhyamakaśāstra primarily refutes internal delusions and secondarily eliminates external attachments; the Śataśāstra primarily attacks external attachments and secondarily purifies internal delusions. Why is this? If what is clung to by outsiders is identical to the circumstances refuted by the Madhyamakaśāstra, they are thereby refuted where they sit; hence the Madhyamakaśāstra primarily refutes internal delusions and secondarily washes away external attachments. If an internal student has an attachment identical to the circumstances refuted by the Śataśāstra, they are also refuted where they sit; hence the Śataśāstra primarily attacks external attachments and secondarily washes away internal delusions. Next, clarifying that the Madhyamakaśāstra's refutation has secondary and primary: compared with the Śataśāstra, it is entirely secondary refutation; the Śataśāstra's meaning of refutation has primary and secondary: compared with the Madhyamakaśāstra, it is entirely primary refutation. Why is this? The Buddha expounded the teaching originally to serve as an illumination and guide for sentient beings, wishing to make sentient beings awaken to the Way through the teaching. Since sentient beings do not recognize the teaching, they cannot awaken to the Way. Bodhisattvas take pity on these sentient beings who have lost the Way, and therefore wish to cause the Buddha's teaching to operate in the world according to its origin. If they do not refute those perverse attachments, the correct teaching cannot be expounded; therefore the meaning of expounding is primary, and the meaning of refutation occupies a secondary position. The Śataśāstra refutes outsiders who established their views independently and had never studied the Buddha's teaching; only after refuting their perverse attachments do they enter the Buddha Dharma; therefore refutation is primary and expounding is secondary. Eighth, clarifying that the circumstances refuted involve direct confrontation or non-confrontation: Āryadeva directly refuted outsiders face to face, and so confronted them; Nāgārjuna harbored thoughts inwardly and put brush to paper, and therefore did not confront outsiders. Question: Why did one confront and one not confront? There is an explanation that says: 'Nāgārjuna's wondrous thoughts were deep and far-reaching, and his lofty eloquence was hard to withstand, so that no outsider dared to rival him; hence he did not confront outsiders. What Āryadeva clarified was to defeat outsiders face to face on a temporary occasion, so he confronted them.' However, this explanation is extremely untenable. If one says that Nāgārjuna's wondrous thoughts were deep and far-reaching so that none dared to confront him, Āryadeva was also like this, so he too should not have confronted them. Furthermore, if one says that Nāgārjuna's wondrous thoughts were deep and far-reaching so that outsiders could not confront him, then when the Buddha confronted outsiders, should his gnosis have been shallow? The Tathāgata's gnosis was deep, yet he confronted outsiders; therefore we know that it was not because Nāgārjuna's gnosis was deep that he did not confront them. We now do not use this explanation. Question: If not so, why did the two persons have confrontation and non-confrontation? Answer: How could this be fixed? There are cases where one must confront them face to face before outsiders can be refuted; there are cases where one must harbor thoughts inwardly and put brush to paper to use this to refute heterodoxy. Question: Is it only like this, or is there another meaning? Answer: There is also a profound reason. What is it? When Nāgārjuna appeared in the world, it was at the end of the true dharma era and the beginning of the semblance dharma era; although sentient beings examined the teaching and lost its purport, the Buddha Dharma was still flourishing and heterodox factions were obscured; sentient beings who formed companions to achieve the Great Way were very numerous, while those of biased study and narrow minds were rather few. Once Nāgārjuna arose, they bowed to him from afar upon hearing his wind; it was only necessary to put brush to paper and the heterodox factions disintegrated of themselves, none daring to clash with him face to face; therefore Nāgārjuna did not confront them. When Āryadeva appeared in the world, it was more than eight hundred years \[after the Buddha's demise\]; being far removed from the Sage, heterodox factions flourished greatly and the true conversion had deteriorated. Hence the preface says: 'Heterodox eloquence pressed close to the truth, almost throwing the correct Way into disorder; gold and stone were strung on the same cord, gain and loss indistinguishable.' Although the bodhisattva arose, they still mounted resistance; unless he refuted them face to face and reduced them to silence under his words, their heterodox minds would blaze ever more and none would be willing to reform their delusion. Therefore Āryadeva confronted the multitudes of heterodoxy face to face. The reason why the two persons had confrontation and non-confrontation is precisely this. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 5.9.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.5.9.3) - [Next: 5.11](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.5.11) - [Up: 5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.5) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853~en-mt.5.10) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [中論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.madhyamaka.mmk!pingala*zh-kumarajiva.4.268) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.5.10](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.5.10) · Pramāṇa