[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大乘玄論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853) › 5.9.3 # 大乘玄論 5.9.3 大乘玄論 5.9.3 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [5.9.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.5.9.3) 言應例者，佛說經教，龍樹說論教也。 言不例者，雖同感而感不同，佛為感緣所感，感佛說二諦教； 龍樹雖為感緣所感，但感龍樹破邪，破邪令識佛教也。 問：雖同感，感不同，佛與論主雖同照，照亦不同。 答云：實爾。 佛照大明，論主照小晦也。 問：他論有破有申，今論亦有破有申，今他二論竟有何異乎？ 又難：若使苟欲為異者，他論可得有破申，今論應唯破不申。 答：既有一問一難，今亦一答一解。 先答第一問。 上問：俱有破申，今他二論何異？ 今明他論有破而復更立，今論唯破而不立。 言他論有破有立者，如破外道神我，而更立假名行人。 破外道二十五諦，而立四諦十六諦等。 外道神我真實不無，汝論世諦假名行人亦不可失。 若言外道二十五諦為非，汝四諦十六諦此亦有過。 彼計有人有法既成外道，汝亦計有人法，亦是外道。 今論不爾，唯破不立。 所以然者，論主出世，唯為破顛倒斷常，更無所立。 故論序云「言而無當，破而不執」也。 次答第二。 難云：與他論異者，他論可有破申，今論應唯破不申。 今一往答，且如汝所問，他論有破有立，則有破別有所申。 今論唯破不立，則唯破不申。 所以然者，若經若論唯破顛倒虛妄，更無所申。 本由病故有教，在病既除，教藥亦盡。 故《百論》下文云「破如可破。 」此論下文復云「無人亦無法，佛亦無所說。 」佛既無所說，寧當有教可申耶？ 今次更答：他論有破有立，此乃是增有所得，非唯不能申，亦不能破。 自是有得，何能破他？ 今論但破，曾不自立，非止能破，即復能申。 故大師舉猛將為譬，前無所立、後無所領，故能剪彼兇醜、顯我皇威。 菩薩亦爾，無生正觀了內外諸法畢竟清淨，故能破洗虛妄斷常，顯出如來真實正法。 如此善巧名為破申，故論序云「儻然靡據，而事不失真； 蕭焉無累，而理自玄會」也。 問：他論非唯不能申亦不成破，今論具能破申。 若爾，他論為負、今論居勝。 此則勝負心生、是非見起，乃是斷常屈滯，豈能申於正道？ 答：若有勝有負，斯則受屈。 只為無勝無負，所以能申。 問：若有勝有負，可得有破； 既云無勝無負，汝何所破邪？ 答：實爾。 執有勝有負則見有破。 今無勝無負，我實無所破。 問：若有勝有負可得言申，既無勝負更何所申？ 答：若有勝有負，應申更屈。 只為無勝無負，屈者得申，而實無所得。 問：破何物邪？ 申若為正？ 答云：佛赴緣說真俗兩教，意為顯中實之道。 但緣迷二教不悟中實，成斷常病。 今破緣邪執，申佛正教也。 師云：非無其義。 若只作此解，未近一家之意。 何故爾？ 論初八不，為破生滅斷常、淨一異來出，若別有二諦中道可申，異於破邪，何謂淨斷常、除生滅耶？ 問：前云第一章明破邪顯正，今噵但淨斷常來出無二諦可申。 若依前言，即乖今說； 若用今解，復反前判。 二言鉾楯，若為取中？ 答：有二條。 一者反質汝言，真俗二諦是何物？ 亦聞破病便言不申教，亦聞申教謂非是破邪。 作此折疑已，略成可見，但復須巧墨解釋。 何故？ 說二諦只為破生滅斷常，世諦假生滅、真諦不生滅。 欲明假生滅實錄不生不滅，令悟生滅不生滅、來出無來出。 只此破生滅斷常即名為教，是破復是教。 今論主還說此破斷常生滅之教以化物，令緣作如此悟，即申破病教、破病教申。 只申此破，名為破申。 今此破得申，稱為申破也。 破申大意，且竟如前。 > As for how they are parallel: the Buddha taught the sūtra teachings, and Nāgārjuna taught the śāstra teachings. As for how they are not parallel: although both responded to resonant capacity, the resonant capacities were not the same. The Buddha was moved by the resonant capacities of sentient beings to teach the doctrine of the two truths; although Nāgārjuna was also moved by resonant capacity, it only moved Nāgārjuna to refute falsehood, refuting falsehood so as to make people recognize the Buddha's teaching. Question: Although they both responded to resonant capacity, the resonant capacities differed; and though the Buddha and the author of the treatise both illuminated, did their illumination also differ? Answer: Indeed, it is so. The Buddha's illumination was grandly bright, while the treatise master's illumination was slightly dim. Question: Other treatises have refutation and demonstration, and the present treatise also has refutation and demonstration; in the end, what difference is there between these two treatises—the present and the others? Another challenge: If one simply insists on making a distinction, then while other treatises may have refutation and demonstration, the present treatise should only refute and not demonstrate. Answer: Since there is one question and one challenge, there is now one answer and one resolution. First, to answer the first question. Above it was asked: "Both have refutation and demonstration; what is the difference between these two treatises—the present and the others?" Now it is explained that other treatises, having refuted, establish something further, whereas the present treatise only refutes and does not establish. As for other treatises having refutation and establishment: for instance, they refute the non-Buddhists' ātman, yet further establish a conventionally designated practitioner; they refute the non-Buddhists' twenty-five principles, yet establish the four truths, sixteen truths, and so forth. If the non-Buddhists' ātman is truly not non-existent, then your treatise's conventionally designated practitioner of conventional truth must also not be lost. If you say that the non-Buddhists' twenty-five principles are false, your four truths and sixteen truths also have faults. Since their positing of a person and phenomena constitutes non-Buddhist doctrine, your positing of a person and phenomena is likewise non-Buddhist. The present treatise is not like this: it only refutes and does not establish. Why is this? The treatise master appeared in the world solely to refute inverted views, annihilationism, and eternalism, with nothing further to establish. Hence the preface to the treatise says: "His words have no reification; he refutes without grasping." Next, to answer the second challenge. The challenge said: "If it differs from other treatises, while other treatises may have refutation and demonstration, the present treatise should only refute and not demonstrate." Now, responding provisionally: let it be as you have questioned. If other treatises have refutation and establishment, then having refuted, they have something else to demonstrate; since the present treatise only refutes and does not establish, it only refutes and does not demonstrate. Why is this? Whether sūtras or treatises, they only refute inverted views and illusions, with nothing further to demonstrate. Originally, teachings exist because of sickness; once the sickness is eliminated, the medicinal teaching is also exhausted. Therefore, the text below in the Śataśāstra says: "Refutation is as what can be refuted." A passage below in the present treatise also says: "There is neither person nor phenomena, nor did the Buddha teach anything." Since the Buddha taught nothing, how could there be any teaching to demonstrate? Now, to answer further: other treatises have refutation and establishment, which merely increases attainment; not only are they incapable of demonstration, they are also incapable of refutation. Being themselves possessing of attainment, how could they refute others? The present treatise only refutes and has never established anything of its own; not only can it refute, it can also demonstrate. Therefore, the Great Master gave the metaphor of a fierce general: with nothing established before him and nothing held behind him, he can vanquish the fierce and vile enemy and display our imperial majesty. The bodhisattva is likewise: with the unborn right contemplation, he realizes that inner and outer phenomena are ultimately pure, and thus can refute and cleanse away illusions of annihilationism and eternalism, revealing the Tathāgata's true and correct Dharma. Such skillfulness is called "refutation and demonstration." Hence the preface to the treatise says: "Detached and without reliance, yet affairs do not lose their truth; calm and without entanglements, yet principle spontaneously accords with the profound." Question: Other treatises are not only unable to demonstrate but also fail to refute, whereas the present treatise can fully refute and demonstrate. If so, other treatises are defeated and the present treatise is victorious. This then gives rise to a mind of victory and defeat and views of right and wrong, which is an impediment of annihilationism and eternalism—how could it demonstrate the correct path? Answer: If there were victory and defeat, this would indeed be an impediment. It is precisely because there is neither victory nor defeat that it can demonstrate. Question: If there were victory and defeat, there could be refutation; since you say there is neither victory nor defeat, what falsehood do you refute? Answer: Indeed, it is so. Grasping at victory and defeat, one perceives refutation; now, having neither victory nor defeat, I truly refute nothing. Question: If there were victory and defeat, one could speak of demonstration; since there is neither victory nor defeat, what else is there to demonstrate? Answer: If there were victory and defeat, what was meant to be demonstrated would become even more impeded. Precisely because there is neither victory nor defeat, that which was impeded is demonstrated, yet in reality there is non-attainment. Question: What falsehood is refuted? In what way is the correct demonstrated? Answer: The Buddha responded to capacities and taught the two teachings of ultimate and conventional truth, with the intention of revealing the path of the middle and true. However, because capacities were deluded about the two teachings and did not awaken to the middle and true, they formed the sickness of annihilationism and eternalism. Now we refute the false attachments of these capacities and demonstrate the Buddha's correct teaching. The master said: This meaning is not absent. Yet if one only offers this interpretation, it does not come close to the meaning of our lineage. Why is this so? The eight negations at the beginning of the treatise are meant to refute arising, ceasing, annihilationism, and eternalism, and to purify coming, going, oneness, and difference. If there were separately two truths and a Middle Way that could be demonstrated distinct from the refutation of falsehood, why would it be said to purify annihilationism and eternalism and eliminate arising and ceasing? Question: Earlier it was said that the first section clarifies the refutation of falsehood and the revelation of the correct, but now it is said that it only purifies annihilationism, eternalism, coming, and going, and that there are no two truths to demonstrate. If one relies on the former statement, it contradicts the present explanation; if one adopts the present interpretation, it in turn overturns the previous judgment. With two contradictory statements, how does one hit the middle? Answer: There are two points. First, to turn your words back upon you: what kind of thing are the two truths, ultimate and conventional? Hearing of refuting sickness, you say that it does not demonstrate teaching; hearing of demonstrating teaching, you say it is not refuting falsehood. Having broken down doubts in this way, it can be roughly seen, but it still requires skillful words to explain. Why is this? The two truths are taught solely to refute arising, ceasing, annihilationism, and eternalism: conventional truth is provisional arising and ceasing; ultimate truth is non-arising and non-ceasing. The intention is to clarify that provisional arising and ceasing are in truth non-arising and non-ceasing, causing one to awaken that arising and ceasing are non-arising and non-ceasing, and coming and going are non-coming and non-going. Precisely this refutation of arising, ceasing, annihilationism, and eternalism is called "teaching"; it is both refutation and teaching. Now the treatise master again teaches this doctrine that refutes annihilationism, eternalism, arising, and ceasing to transform beings, enabling capacities to attain such awakening; this is demonstrating the teaching that refutes sickness, and the teaching that refutes sickness is demonstrated. Demonstrating precisely this refutation is called "refutation and demonstration." Now that this refutation is demonstrated, it is called "demonstrating refutation." The general meaning of refutation and demonstration is provisionally concluded as above. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 5.9.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.5.9.2) - [Next: 5.10](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.5.10) - [Up: 5.9](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.5.9) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853~en-mt.5.9.3) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.5.9.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.5.9.3) · Pramāṇa