[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大乘玄論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853) › 5.9 # 大乘玄論 5.9 大乘玄論 5.9 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [5.9.1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.5.9.1) 大師讀此論，遍數不同，形勢非一。 今略出十條：一者有時明四論宗旨，釋中觀名題，解經論相資、諦智傍正、破申近遠，然後乃入論文。 所以然者，欲明義有詮次文參渙然，稟學門徒尋求易曉。 二者在論初直爾散說大意，仍進論文。 此欲提綱振領揚略要旨，裕其玄莫彰至其後發。 三者先盛解二諦竟即釋論文。 明佛說二諦以表正道，今論以二諦為宗，推功有在也。 四者前明二智後入論文。 明佛以二智說教菩薩，今以權實顯正破邪，故須斷簡二智也。 五者彈碩古今破斥異部。 所以然者，自古迄今凡諸制作，並不稟龍樹之風，皆是斷常，擾於至道，故須廣破始得讀文也。 六者前讀關河舊序，如影叡所作。 所以然者，為即世人云：數論前興、三論後出。 欲示關河相傳師宗有在，非今始搆也。 七者或直唱《無行》、《佛藏》等經然後入論。 欲明經論相成共顯一道，經旨可見、論意易明也。 八者對訶梨所造、旃延之作，欲明大小軀分得無得異也。 九者或面折異學，仍即入論，欲使執固者改迷、慕位者深悟。 十者或直爾披文更無別說，欲明此論出自菩薩中心，精破妙解蘊在文內，輒抽拙意何以加此，故直讀文也。 法師所以講論有多形勢者，略有三義：一者明法師善識根緣調停物性，稟悟既甚多種，演暢亦復不窮。 二者欲異他人。 他人立義定作一說，聽者唯作一解，了無轉悟。 今明諸法無一定相，豈唯一種？ 三者龍樹、提婆妙思深遠權巧萬端，今時傳述寧可一概？ 今就論初，大為五章：一明破申大意、二者明四論宗旨義有同異、三者明經論能所諦智傍正、四者釋《中觀》論名、五者明論緣起問答斷簡。 所以須辨破申大意者，無問內外學徒，凡有製作皆辨破申，故內外並云自是而非彼、美己而惡人。 次內經敘述外道所計云：是事實，餘皆妄語。 次《成實》破斥數經，以四諦命重更顯斯實。 如此之流，盡欲破他申己，既出虛妄橫搆，皆不成破申； 今時論意善巧方便助佛揚化方是破申，故在初明其大意也。 破申只是破邪顯正，即是滅邪見幢、燃正法炬。 問：誰能破邪？ 用何顯正？ 答：不出人、法，人即是聖人、法名正法，若備法人則能破邪顯正。 就此則有三雙：一者佛與菩薩、二者經論、三者破申。 言佛與菩薩者，佛以中道二智所說名經，菩薩以中道二慧所吐名論。 佛以中道二智所說名經，經即是教。 教何所示？ 教則教緣。 緣何所稟？ 緣只稟教。 故緣教相應，無不悟入。 言悟入者，教辨真俗、緣悟不真不俗，教說因果、緣悟不因不果，其餘例然。 故因教悟理，悟理故了教。 教是理門，故因教達理，感應因緣冥若扶契，響然而有、壑爾而無，此即佛說教為緣之意也。 但教流末代，鈍根薄福，尋教失旨，不知佛意。 故論初云「求五陰十二入十八界等決定相，但著文字不知佛意； 聞大乘法中說畢竟空，不知何因緣故空。 即生見疑，故於有生見、於空生疑。 」所以然者，為有所得心有依有得，當聞真俗住真俗，不知本於不真不俗，故還就真俗以求真俗之實，不知就非真非俗以求真俗； 還就真俗以解真俗，不知用非真非俗以解真俗； 還就末中求末，不知就本求末。 本是末本，既不識非真俗本，故不識真俗之末，因果等諸事義例皆然。 故如他人，或謂真俗一體、或言異體、或言因中先有果、或言因中先無果等，有所言說並出彼妄情所搆，曾非經論所明，是故斷常交興、生滅競起，邪言隱覆、正教不申。 所以龍樹菩薩府茲弱喪，顯八不教門，折彼斷常、周還不二，破申之義大略如此也。 問：若箇是邪而言破邪，何者是正而噵申正？ 答：邪既無量，正亦多途。 大略為言，不出二種，謂有得與無得，有得是邪須破，無得是正須申。 故《大品經》善吉致問：何等是菩薩道？ 何等非菩薩道？ 佛答云：有所得非菩薩道，無所得是菩薩道。 > When the Great Master lectured on this treatise, the frequency varied, and his approach was never only one. Now I briefly set forth ten points: First, he would at times explain the overarching tenet of the four treatises, elucidate the title \*Madhyamaka\*, explain the mutual assistance between sūtras and treatises, the primary and secondary roles of truth and gnosis, and the proximal and distal aspects of refutation and exposition, and only then enter the treatise text. The reason for this was to clarify that the doctrinal principles have orderly sequence and the textual points are lucidly displayed, so that disciples receiving the teaching could investigate and easily comprehend. Second, at the beginning of the treatise he would directly and informally discuss the general import, and then proceed into the text of the treatise. This was intended to grasp the main threads and highlight the essentials, keeping its profound mystery concealed until revealed thereafter. Third, he would first comprehensively explain the two truths, and upon concluding immediately interpret the treatise text. This clarified that the Buddha taught the two truths to express the correct path, and now this treatise takes the two truths as its tenet, showing where the credit belongs. Fourth, he would first explain the two gnoses and afterwards enter the treatise text. This clarified that the Buddha taught the bodhisattvas by means of the two gnoses, and now through the provisional and the real one reveals the correct and refutes the heterodox; hence it was necessary to distinguish the two gnoses. Fifth, he would criticize the ancient and modern and refute the heterodox schools. The reason for this was that from antiquity to the present, all writings generally did not inherit the style of Nāgārjuna; they all fell into annihilationism or eternalism and threw the supreme path into confusion; hence he had to refute them broadly before being able to read the text. Sixth, he would first read the old Guanhe prefaces, such as those written by Sengying and Sengrui. The reason for this was that worldly people at the time said that the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma treatises arose first and the Three Treatises emerged later. He wished to show that the Guanhe transmission had a lineage of masters and was not newly fabricated at present. Seventh, he would at times directly chant sūtras such as the \*Wuxing jing\* and \*Fozang jing\*, and then enter the treatise. He wished to clarify that sūtras and treatises complement each other to jointly reveal the one path; then the purport of the sūtras could be seen and the intent of the treatise easily understood. Eighth, he would contrast the treatise composed by Harivarman with the work of Kātyāyana, wishing to clarify whether the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna divisions pertain to attainment or non-attainment. Ninth, he would at times confront and refute heterodox scholars to their faces, and then immediately enter the treatise, wishing to cause those who clung stubbornly to abandon their delusion and those who aspired to attainments to deeply awaken. Tenth, he would at times simply open the text without any other exposition, wishing to clarify that this treatise issued from the mind of a bodhisattva, its precise refutations and wondrous understandings already contained within the text, so how could one arbitrarily insert clumsy opinions to add to it? Hence he directly read the text. As for why the Dharma master had many different approaches when lecturing on the treatise, there are briefly three reasons: First, to show that the Dharma master was skilled in discerning faculties and conditions to harmonize the nature of beings; since receptive awakenings were of very many kinds, his expositions were likewise inexhaustible. Second, he wished to differ from others. When others establish an interpretation, they fix upon a single explanation, so the listeners grasp only a single comprehension, having no transformative awakening at all. Now he clarified that phenomena have no fixed characteristic, so how could there be only one kind? Third, Nāgārjuna and Deva possessed profound and wondrous thoughts with myriad expedient means; how could transmitting them in our time be uniform? Now, with regard to the beginning of the treatise, it is broadly divided into five sections: First, clarifying the general purport of refutation and exposition; second, clarifying that the overarching tenets of the four treatises contain both similarities and differences; third, clarifying the agent and object of the sūtras and treatises, and the primary and secondary roles of truth and gnosis; fourth, elucidating the title of the treatise \*Madhyamaka\*; fifth, clarifying the conditions of the treatise's origin, addressing doubts through question and answer. Why is it necessary to distinguish the general purport of refutation and exposition? Whether internal or external students, whenever they compose writings, they all distinguish refutation and exposition; thus both internal and external schools claim that they themselves are right and others are wrong, praising themselves and disparaging others. Furthermore, internal sūtras describe what non-Buddhists assert, saying: 'This is real, everything else is false speech.' Next, the \*Tattvasiddhi\* refutes the Sarvāstivāda sūtras, using the four truths to re-emphasize and re-reveal this truth. Such lines of thought all wish to refute others and establish themselves, but since they stem from delusive fabrications, none of them accomplishes true refutation and exposition. The intent of the present treatise is to use skillful means to assist the Buddha in spreading his transformation; only this is true refutation and exposition. Therefore, its general purport is clarified at the beginning. Refutation and exposition are simply refuting the heterodox and revealing the correct; that is, felling the banner of wrong views and kindling the torch of the correct Dharma. Question: Who can refute the heterodox? What is used to reveal the correct? Answer: It does not go beyond persons and Dharma: 'person' means the sage; 'Dharma' is called the correct Dharma. If one possesses both Dharma and person, one can refute the heterodox and reveal the correct. Regarding this, there are three pairs: first, the Buddha and bodhisattvas; second, sūtras and treatises; third, refutation and exposition. As for the Buddha and bodhisattvas: what the Buddha spoke by means of the two gnoses of the Middle Way is called sūtras; what the bodhisattvas expressed by means of the two wisdoms of the Middle Way is called treatises. What the Buddha spoke by means of the two gnoses of the Middle Way is called sūtras, and sūtras are teaching. What does teaching show? Teaching instructs conditions. What do conditions receive? Conditions merely receive teaching. Therefore, when conditions and teaching correspond, there are none who do not awaken and enter. As for 'awakening and entering': the teaching distinguishes the ultimate and conventional, while conditions awaken to what is neither ultimate nor conventional; the teaching speaks of cause and effect, while conditions awaken to what is neither cause nor effect; the rest follow this pattern. Therefore, due to teaching one awakens to principle; because one awakens to principle, one understands the teaching. Teaching is the gateway to principle; hence due to teaching one reaches principle. Stimulus and response through dependent co-arising tally in secret like fitting tallies: resounding, they exist; vast and empty, they are non-existent. This is precisely the Buddha's intent in speaking teachings for conditions. However, when the teachings flowed down to the final age, those of dull faculties and meager merits pursued the teachings and lost their purport, not knowing the Buddha's intent. Therefore, the treatise states at the beginning: 'Seeking fixed characteristics of the five aggregates, twelve sense-bases, eighteen elements, and so forth, they merely cling to words and letters and do not understand the Buddha's intent. Hearing that in the Mahāyāna teaching complete emptiness is spoken of, they do not understand due to what conditions it is empty. Thereupon they give rise to views and doubts: towards existence they give rise to views, and towards emptiness they give rise to doubts.' Why is this? Because with a mind of attainment, having reliance and having attainment, when they hear of the ultimate and conventional they abide in the ultimate and conventional, not knowing that they are rooted in what is neither ultimate nor conventional. Thus they turn back to the ultimate and conventional to seek the reality of the ultimate and conventional, not knowing to turn to what is neither ultimate nor conventional to seek the ultimate and conventional; they turn back to the ultimate and conventional to understand the ultimate and conventional, not knowing to use what is neither ultimate nor conventional to understand the ultimate and conventional; they turn back to the branches to seek the branches, not knowing to turn to the root to seek the branches. The root is the root of the branches; since they do not recognize the root of what is neither ultimate nor conventional, they do not recognize the branches of the ultimate and conventional. All matters and principles, such as cause and effect, are all like this. Therefore, just as others say, some claim that the ultimate and conventional are of one substance, some say they are of different substances, some say that within the cause the effect already exists, and some say that within the cause the effect does not previously exist, and so forth; whatever they state all comes from what their deluded sentiments fabricate, and has never been what the sūtras and treatises clarify. Therefore, annihilationism and eternalism arise by turns, production and cessation contend to occur, heterodox words conceal \[the truth\], and correct teachings are not expounded. Therefore, Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna took pity on this degeneration, revealed the teaching gateway of the eight negations, broke down their annihilationism and eternalism, and returned all to non-duality. The meaning of refutation and exposition is broadly like this. Question: What is heterodox such that one speaks of refuting the heterodox, and what is correct such that one speaks of expounding the correct? Answer: Since the heterodox is immeasurable, the correct is also of many paths. Broadly speaking, they do not go beyond two kinds, namely attainment and non-attainment. Attainment is heterodox and must be refuted; non-attainment is correct and must be expounded. Therefore, in the \*Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra\*, Subhūti asked: 'What is the bodhisattva path? What is not the bodhisattva path?' The Buddha answered: 'Attainment is not the bodhisattva path; non-attainment is the bodhisattva path.' > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) ### [5.9.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.5.9.2) 問：既破有得申無得，亦應但破性執申假名以不？ 答性執是有得，假名是無得。 今破有得申無得，即是破性執申假名也。 問：既破性申假，亦應但破有申無。 若有無兩洗，亦應性假雙破耶？ 答：不例。 有無皆是性，所以須雙破。 既分性假異，故有破不破。 問：性有性無皆是性，唯破性不破假者，亦應性有假有皆是有，唯破有不破無也。 答：雖同是有，而有不同，故但破性有，不破假有。 問：若雖同是有而有不同故，但破性有不破假有者，亦應雖同是性而性不同，不破性無但破性有耶？ 答：有例不例。 言其例者，既性有性無皆是性，所以兩破； 亦性有假有皆是有，亦須二除也。 而不例者，明性有住有，乖道故須破； 假有非有，扶道故不除也。 次時云前明破邪顯正，即是佛與菩薩。 今問：爰及正化迄平像法，傳持紹繼其人不少。 今定取何人破邪顯正？ 答：大格為論，不出四人。 一是調御世尊，是能化主，其餘三聖助佛宣揚，三者所謂馬鳴開士與龍樹、提婆也。 問：此之四人破邪顯正，為當是同？ 為當有異？ 答：一往且折彼疑，則云不同不異。 佛與菩薩，所以不同； 同顯實相，所以不異。 此是同異不同不異。 既得不同異，即得同異。 佛菩薩具足不具足勝劣故異，皆破邪顯正故同也。 言佛菩薩異者，佛即說教樹二諦赴緣，菩薩直助佛揚化，無別制作也。 就菩薩中自復有異。 若是龍樹，作論前破法，後兼淨人我。 提婆所造，先正破神我，後兼洗法。 所以然者，《中論》破內弟子雖知無我，猶計有法，是故前正除法、後兼淨人我。 故《十二門》云「有為無為尚空，何況我耶。 」《百論》破外道，如僧伽等計云有神我，不知無我，故須前正破我、後兼破法，故破神辨生空、破一異等明法空。 此為異也。 問：既同破邪皆為顯正，何故一論申大小？ 一論不申大小？ 答：若俱申大小，何有兩論殊？ 必齊顯小大，焉判兩人異？ 作折彼問已是消疑，但意趣不然，更須指掌。 《中論》破執大小緣，所以申大小。 《百論》不破執大小緣，故不明申大小，即竝。 《中論》破執真俗緣，可顯真俗。 《百論》不破執真俗緣，論末應不明真俗，結論歸旨也。 釋云：真俗二諦是諸佛教門，譬若眾流皆歸大海，凡欲悟入莫不因此教門。 論既破空破有、除斷除常，外人失彼所執，情無所寄，即問佛法為何所說。 論主應聲即答：有二諦，以世諦有故不斷、真諦無故不常，令彼斷常見息，是故須說二諦也。 問：或言破邪顯正； 或言豈離邪有正？ 即撥邪者令正，因邪故得正。 此兩言似如乖反。 若言破邪顯正，即不應言因邪有正，只令邪者正。 若言只因邪故正，又不應言破除邪顯正也。 又問：邪正一故言破邪顯正？ 為邪正異故破邪顯正？ 他人解：邪正兩端，破除邪故得顯正也。 難：若爾，瓶衣體異，破瓶顯衣耶？ 彼云：瓶衣乃異，不相違害，非相障法故，不破瓶顯衣。 邪正是相障法，邪障正故，破邪顯正也。 難：若邪正相違故破邪顯正者，水火相害，何不破水顯火？ 而不爾，故知邪正寧可碩異耶？ 今若噵邪言隱覆正教，不開破邪言顯正教，非為不爾，但此邪正疎遠，非一家意。 今明道非邪正，能體道之緣亦悟非邪正，但以向迷今悟，詺向迷僻為邪、呼今悟為正，此得悟時了無邪正。 問：若爾，定是破邪顯正？ 定是因邪顯正？ 答：具此兩義。 言破邪顯正者，向迷成斷常，所以須破此邪； 今得悟不斷不常，名為顯正義，是以言破邪顯正。 亦可言因邪有正者，只令悟斷常者不斷常，豈得離迷有悟離斷常別有不斷常耶？ 問：佛出世既有感緣所感，龍樹出世亦為感緣所感不？ 答：例爾。 問：佛與龍樹出世俱有感緣所感者，佛能照緣，龍樹亦照緣不？ 答：亦例。 又問：若爾，佛說教，龍樹亦應說教不？ 答：應例而不例。 > Question: Since refuting attainment affirms non-attainment, should one also merely refute attachment to intrinsic nature and affirm conventional designation, or not? Answer: Attachment to intrinsic nature is attainment, and conventional designation is non-attainment. Now, refuting attainment and affirming non-attainment is precisely refuting attachment to intrinsic nature and affirming conventional designation. Question: Since refuting intrinsic nature affirms the conventional, should one also merely refute existence and affirm non-existence? If both existence and non-existence are washed away, should both intrinsic nature and conventional designation be doubly refuted? Answer: They are not analogous. Both existence and non-existence are intrinsic natures, which is why both must be refuted. Since intrinsic nature and the conventional are distinguished as different, there is that which is refuted and that which is not refuted. Question: If both intrinsic nature as existence and intrinsic nature as non-existence are intrinsic nature, such that one only refutes intrinsic nature and does not refute the conventional, then both intrinsic existence and conventional existence are existence, so one should only refute existence and not refute non-existence. Answer: Although they are equally existence, existence is not the same \[in both cases\]; therefore, one only refutes intrinsic existence and does not refute conventional existence. Question: If, because although they are equally existence the existence is not the same, one only refutes intrinsic existence and does not refute conventional existence, then should it also be that although both are equally intrinsic nature the intrinsic natures are not the same, so that one does not refute intrinsic non-existence but only refutes intrinsic existence? Answer: There is that which is analogous and that which is not analogous. To speak of that which is analogous: since both intrinsic existence and intrinsic non-existence are intrinsic nature, both are refuted; likewise, since both intrinsic existence and conventional existence are existence, both must also be eliminated. As for that which is not analogous: it is explained that intrinsic existence abides in existence and conflicts with the Way, so it must be refuted; conventional existence is non-existence and supports the Way, so it is not eliminated. Next, it was said earlier that refuting the erroneous and revealing the correct refers to the Buddha and the bodhisattvas. Now I ask: down through the true Dharma and continuing to the counterfeit Dharma, those who transmitted, upheld, and carried on the succession were not few. Exactly which persons are taken here as refuting the erroneous and revealing the correct? Answer: Speaking in terms of the general framework, they do not exceed four persons. The first is the Tamer, the World-Honoured One, who is the master capable of transforming beings; the remaining three sages assist the Buddha in proclaiming and propagating \[the teaching\], the three being the great being Aśvaghoṣa, together with Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva. Question: In refuting the erroneous and revealing the correct, are these four persons the same or are they different? Answer: Provisionally, to resolve the doubt for the moment, one says they are neither different nor the same. As the Buddha and bodhisattvas, they are therefore not the same; in jointly revealing the true mark, they are therefore not different. This is being neither the same nor different with respect to sameness and difference. Once one understands neither difference nor sameness, one understands sameness and difference. Because of the superior and inferior nature of being complete or incomplete as Buddha and bodhisattvas, they are different; because all refute the erroneous and reveal the correct, they are the same. Speaking of the difference between Buddha and bodhisattvas: the Buddha speaks the teaching, establishes the two truths, and responds to conditions; the bodhisattvas merely assist the Buddha in propagating the transformation and make no separate production. Among the bodhisattvas themselves, there are again differences. In the case of Nāgārjuna, when composing treatises he first refutes phenomena, and afterward cleanses the personal self as well. In the case of Āryadeva's composition, he first directly refutes the ātman, and afterward washes away phenomena as well. Why is this? The Madhyamakaśāstra refutes internal disciples who, although knowing there is no self, still grasp at the existence of phenomena; therefore, it first directly eliminates phenomena and afterward cleanses the personal self as well. Thus the Dvādaśanikāyaśāstra says: 'Even conditioned and unconditioned phenomena are empty, how much more so the self!' The Śataśāstra refutes non-Buddhists such as the Sāṃkhyas who postulate that there is an ātman and do not know selflessness; therefore, it must first directly refute the self and afterward refute phenomena as well. Hence, refuting the spirit explains the emptiness of persons, and refuting identity and difference clarifies the emptiness of phenomena. This is the difference. Question: Since both equally refute the erroneous to reveal the correct, why does one treatise affirm both the Greater and Lesser \[Vehicles\], while the other treatise does not affirm both the Greater and Lesser? Answer: If both affirmed the Greater and Lesser, how would there be a distinction between the two treatises? If they necessarily revealed the Lesser and Greater equally, how could one determine the difference between the two persons? Having formulated this to resolve that question, the doubt is settled; however, the intended purport is not merely this, and must be explained even more clearly. The Madhyamakaśāstra refutes the conditions of attachment to the Greater and Lesser \[Vehicles\], and therefore affirms the Greater and Lesser. The Śataśāstra does not refute the conditions of attachment to the Greater and Lesser, and so it does not explicitly affirm the Greater and Lesser. This is parallel. The Madhyamakaśāstra refutes conditions of attachment to the ultimate and the conventional, so it can reveal the ultimate and conventional. Since the Śataśāstra does not refute conditions of attachment to the ultimate and conventional, at the end of the treatise it should not clarify the ultimate and conventional to conclude the treatise's destination. The explanation states: The two truths of the ultimate and conventional are the teaching gates of all buddhas. They are like the myriad streams all returning to the great sea; whoever wishes to awaken and enter does so by relying on this teaching gate. When the treatises have refuted emptiness and refuted existence, and eliminated annihilationism and eliminated eternalism, the non-Buddhists lose their attachments and their minds have nowhere to lodge, so they immediately ask what the Buddha's Dharma teaches. The treatise master answers promptly: There are two truths; because conventional truth exists, there is no annihilation, and because ultimate truth is non-existent, there is no permanence. Causing their annihilationist and eternalist views to cease, one must therefore expound the two truths. Question: Some say 'refuting the erroneous and revealing the correct'; others say 'how could the correct exist apart from the erroneous? One simply turns the erroneous person toward the correct; because of the erroneous, one attains the correct.' These two statements seem to be contradictory. If one says 'refuting the erroneous and revealing the correct', then one should not say 'because of the erroneous there is the correct, merely making the erroneous person correct.' If one says 'only because of the erroneous is there the correct', then one should not say 'eliminating the erroneous reveals the correct.' Again, I ask: is it because the erroneous and the correct are one that one speaks of 'refuting the erroneous and revealing the correct'? Or is it because the erroneous and the correct are different that one speaks of 'refuting the erroneous and revealing the correct'? Others explain: The erroneous and the correct are two separate poles; because one eliminates the erroneous, one is able to reveal the correct. Objection: If so, a jar and a garment are different in substance—does refuting a jar reveal a garment? They say: A jar and a garment are indeed different, but they do not mutually harm or obstruct each other; because they are not mutually obstructing dharmas, refuting a jar does not reveal a garment. The erroneous and the correct are mutually obstructing dharmas; because the erroneous obstructs the correct, refuting the erroneous reveals the correct. Objection: If it is because the erroneous and the correct conflict that refuting the erroneous reveals the correct, then water and fire harm each other—why does refuting water not reveal fire? Since that is not the case, one knows: how could the erroneous and the correct be radically different? Now, if one says that erroneous words conceal the correct teaching, and without refuting erroneous words one cannot reveal the correct teaching—it is not that this is not so, but this erroneous and correct are distant and alien, not our school's intention. Now we clarify that the Way is neither erroneous nor correct, and the condition capable of realizing the Way also awakens to being neither erroneous nor correct. But because one was previously deluded and is now awakened, one designates the previous delusion and deviation as 'erroneous' and calls the present awakening 'correct'; when this awakening is attained, there is completely no erroneous and correct. Question: If so, is it definitively refuting the erroneous to reveal the correct? Or is it definitively revealing the correct because of the erroneous? Answer: Both of these meanings are present. When speaking of refuting the erroneous to reveal the correct: previous delusion constituted annihilationism and eternalism, and therefore this erroneous view must be refuted; now attaining the awakening of non-annihilation and non-permanence is called the meaning of revealing the correct; therefore one speaks of refuting the erroneous and revealing the correct. One may also say that because of the erroneous there is the correct: it merely causes one who is deluded by annihilationism and eternalism to be non-annihilated and non-permanent; how could there be awakening apart from delusion, or a non-annihilation and non-permanence apart from annihilationism and eternalism? Question: Since the Buddha's appearing in the world had conditions of response by which he was moved to appear, was Nāgārjuna's appearing in the world also moved by conditions of response, or not? Answer: It is analogous. Question: If the Buddha's and Nāgārjuna's appearing in the world were both moved by conditions of response, then the Buddha could illuminate conditions—could Nāgārjuna also illuminate conditions, or not? Answer: That is also analogous. Question again: If so, the Buddha spoke teachings—should Nāgārjuna also speak teachings, or not? Answer: It should be analogous, but it is not analogous. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) ### [5.9.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.5.9.3) 言應例者，佛說經教，龍樹說論教也。 言不例者，雖同感而感不同，佛為感緣所感，感佛說二諦教； 龍樹雖為感緣所感，但感龍樹破邪，破邪令識佛教也。 問：雖同感，感不同，佛與論主雖同照，照亦不同。 答云：實爾。 佛照大明，論主照小晦也。 問：他論有破有申，今論亦有破有申，今他二論竟有何異乎？ 又難：若使苟欲為異者，他論可得有破申，今論應唯破不申。 答：既有一問一難，今亦一答一解。 先答第一問。 上問：俱有破申，今他二論何異？ 今明他論有破而復更立，今論唯破而不立。 言他論有破有立者，如破外道神我，而更立假名行人。 破外道二十五諦，而立四諦十六諦等。 外道神我真實不無，汝論世諦假名行人亦不可失。 若言外道二十五諦為非，汝四諦十六諦此亦有過。 彼計有人有法既成外道，汝亦計有人法，亦是外道。 今論不爾，唯破不立。 所以然者，論主出世，唯為破顛倒斷常，更無所立。 故論序云「言而無當，破而不執」也。 次答第二。 難云：與他論異者，他論可有破申，今論應唯破不申。 今一往答，且如汝所問，他論有破有立，則有破別有所申。 今論唯破不立，則唯破不申。 所以然者，若經若論唯破顛倒虛妄，更無所申。 本由病故有教，在病既除，教藥亦盡。 故《百論》下文云「破如可破。 」此論下文復云「無人亦無法，佛亦無所說。 」佛既無所說，寧當有教可申耶？ 今次更答：他論有破有立，此乃是增有所得，非唯不能申，亦不能破。 自是有得，何能破他？ 今論但破，曾不自立，非止能破，即復能申。 故大師舉猛將為譬，前無所立、後無所領，故能剪彼兇醜、顯我皇威。 菩薩亦爾，無生正觀了內外諸法畢竟清淨，故能破洗虛妄斷常，顯出如來真實正法。 如此善巧名為破申，故論序云「儻然靡據，而事不失真； 蕭焉無累，而理自玄會」也。 問：他論非唯不能申亦不成破，今論具能破申。 若爾，他論為負、今論居勝。 此則勝負心生、是非見起，乃是斷常屈滯，豈能申於正道？ 答：若有勝有負，斯則受屈。 只為無勝無負，所以能申。 問：若有勝有負，可得有破； 既云無勝無負，汝何所破邪？ 答：實爾。 執有勝有負則見有破。 今無勝無負，我實無所破。 問：若有勝有負可得言申，既無勝負更何所申？ 答：若有勝有負，應申更屈。 只為無勝無負，屈者得申，而實無所得。 問：破何物邪？ 申若為正？ 答云：佛赴緣說真俗兩教，意為顯中實之道。 但緣迷二教不悟中實，成斷常病。 今破緣邪執，申佛正教也。 師云：非無其義。 若只作此解，未近一家之意。 何故爾？ 論初八不，為破生滅斷常、淨一異來出，若別有二諦中道可申，異於破邪，何謂淨斷常、除生滅耶？ 問：前云第一章明破邪顯正，今噵但淨斷常來出無二諦可申。 若依前言，即乖今說； 若用今解，復反前判。 二言鉾楯，若為取中？ 答：有二條。 一者反質汝言，真俗二諦是何物？ 亦聞破病便言不申教，亦聞申教謂非是破邪。 作此折疑已，略成可見，但復須巧墨解釋。 何故？ 說二諦只為破生滅斷常，世諦假生滅、真諦不生滅。 欲明假生滅實錄不生不滅，令悟生滅不生滅、來出無來出。 只此破生滅斷常即名為教，是破復是教。 今論主還說此破斷常生滅之教以化物，令緣作如此悟，即申破病教、破病教申。 只申此破，名為破申。 今此破得申，稱為申破也。 破申大意，且竟如前。 > As for how they are parallel: the Buddha taught the sūtra teachings, and Nāgārjuna taught the śāstra teachings. As for how they are not parallel: although both responded to resonant capacity, the resonant capacities were not the same. The Buddha was moved by the resonant capacities of sentient beings to teach the doctrine of the two truths; although Nāgārjuna was also moved by resonant capacity, it only moved Nāgārjuna to refute falsehood, refuting falsehood so as to make people recognize the Buddha's teaching. Question: Although they both responded to resonant capacity, the resonant capacities differed; and though the Buddha and the author of the treatise both illuminated, did their illumination also differ? Answer: Indeed, it is so. The Buddha's illumination was grandly bright, while the treatise master's illumination was slightly dim. Question: Other treatises have refutation and demonstration, and the present treatise also has refutation and demonstration; in the end, what difference is there between these two treatises—the present and the others? Another challenge: If one simply insists on making a distinction, then while other treatises may have refutation and demonstration, the present treatise should only refute and not demonstrate. Answer: Since there is one question and one challenge, there is now one answer and one resolution. First, to answer the first question. Above it was asked: "Both have refutation and demonstration; what is the difference between these two treatises—the present and the others?" Now it is explained that other treatises, having refuted, establish something further, whereas the present treatise only refutes and does not establish. As for other treatises having refutation and establishment: for instance, they refute the non-Buddhists' ātman, yet further establish a conventionally designated practitioner; they refute the non-Buddhists' twenty-five principles, yet establish the four truths, sixteen truths, and so forth. If the non-Buddhists' ātman is truly not non-existent, then your treatise's conventionally designated practitioner of conventional truth must also not be lost. If you say that the non-Buddhists' twenty-five principles are false, your four truths and sixteen truths also have faults. Since their positing of a person and phenomena constitutes non-Buddhist doctrine, your positing of a person and phenomena is likewise non-Buddhist. The present treatise is not like this: it only refutes and does not establish. Why is this? The treatise master appeared in the world solely to refute inverted views, annihilationism, and eternalism, with nothing further to establish. Hence the preface to the treatise says: "His words have no reification; he refutes without grasping." Next, to answer the second challenge. The challenge said: "If it differs from other treatises, while other treatises may have refutation and demonstration, the present treatise should only refute and not demonstrate." Now, responding provisionally: let it be as you have questioned. If other treatises have refutation and establishment, then having refuted, they have something else to demonstrate; since the present treatise only refutes and does not establish, it only refutes and does not demonstrate. Why is this? Whether sūtras or treatises, they only refute inverted views and illusions, with nothing further to demonstrate. Originally, teachings exist because of sickness; once the sickness is eliminated, the medicinal teaching is also exhausted. Therefore, the text below in the Śataśāstra says: "Refutation is as what can be refuted." A passage below in the present treatise also says: "There is neither person nor phenomena, nor did the Buddha teach anything." Since the Buddha taught nothing, how could there be any teaching to demonstrate? Now, to answer further: other treatises have refutation and establishment, which merely increases attainment; not only are they incapable of demonstration, they are also incapable of refutation. Being themselves possessing of attainment, how could they refute others? The present treatise only refutes and has never established anything of its own; not only can it refute, it can also demonstrate. Therefore, the Great Master gave the metaphor of a fierce general: with nothing established before him and nothing held behind him, he can vanquish the fierce and vile enemy and display our imperial majesty. The bodhisattva is likewise: with the unborn right contemplation, he realizes that inner and outer phenomena are ultimately pure, and thus can refute and cleanse away illusions of annihilationism and eternalism, revealing the Tathāgata's true and correct Dharma. Such skillfulness is called "refutation and demonstration." Hence the preface to the treatise says: "Detached and without reliance, yet affairs do not lose their truth; calm and without entanglements, yet principle spontaneously accords with the profound." Question: Other treatises are not only unable to demonstrate but also fail to refute, whereas the present treatise can fully refute and demonstrate. If so, other treatises are defeated and the present treatise is victorious. This then gives rise to a mind of victory and defeat and views of right and wrong, which is an impediment of annihilationism and eternalism—how could it demonstrate the correct path? Answer: If there were victory and defeat, this would indeed be an impediment. It is precisely because there is neither victory nor defeat that it can demonstrate. Question: If there were victory and defeat, there could be refutation; since you say there is neither victory nor defeat, what falsehood do you refute? Answer: Indeed, it is so. Grasping at victory and defeat, one perceives refutation; now, having neither victory nor defeat, I truly refute nothing. Question: If there were victory and defeat, one could speak of demonstration; since there is neither victory nor defeat, what else is there to demonstrate? Answer: If there were victory and defeat, what was meant to be demonstrated would become even more impeded. Precisely because there is neither victory nor defeat, that which was impeded is demonstrated, yet in reality there is non-attainment. Question: What falsehood is refuted? In what way is the correct demonstrated? Answer: The Buddha responded to capacities and taught the two teachings of ultimate and conventional truth, with the intention of revealing the path of the middle and true. However, because capacities were deluded about the two teachings and did not awaken to the middle and true, they formed the sickness of annihilationism and eternalism. Now we refute the false attachments of these capacities and demonstrate the Buddha's correct teaching. The master said: This meaning is not absent. Yet if one only offers this interpretation, it does not come close to the meaning of our lineage. Why is this so? The eight negations at the beginning of the treatise are meant to refute arising, ceasing, annihilationism, and eternalism, and to purify coming, going, oneness, and difference. If there were separately two truths and a Middle Way that could be demonstrated distinct from the refutation of falsehood, why would it be said to purify annihilationism and eternalism and eliminate arising and ceasing? Question: Earlier it was said that the first section clarifies the refutation of falsehood and the revelation of the correct, but now it is said that it only purifies annihilationism, eternalism, coming, and going, and that there are no two truths to demonstrate. If one relies on the former statement, it contradicts the present explanation; if one adopts the present interpretation, it in turn overturns the previous judgment. With two contradictory statements, how does one hit the middle? Answer: There are two points. First, to turn your words back upon you: what kind of thing are the two truths, ultimate and conventional? Hearing of refuting sickness, you say that it does not demonstrate teaching; hearing of demonstrating teaching, you say it is not refuting falsehood. Having broken down doubts in this way, it can be roughly seen, but it still requires skillful words to explain. Why is this? The two truths are taught solely to refute arising, ceasing, annihilationism, and eternalism: conventional truth is provisional arising and ceasing; ultimate truth is non-arising and non-ceasing. The intention is to clarify that provisional arising and ceasing are in truth non-arising and non-ceasing, causing one to awaken that arising and ceasing are non-arising and non-ceasing, and coming and going are non-coming and non-going. Precisely this refutation of arising, ceasing, annihilationism, and eternalism is called "teaching"; it is both refutation and teaching. Now the treatise master again teaches this doctrine that refutes annihilationism, eternalism, arising, and ceasing to transform beings, enabling capacities to attain such awakening; this is demonstrating the teaching that refutes sickness, and the teaching that refutes sickness is demonstrated. Demonstrating precisely this refutation is called "refutation and demonstration." Now that this refutation is demonstrated, it is called "demonstrating refutation." The general meaning of refutation and demonstration is provisionally concluded as above. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853~en-mt.5.9.1) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [大智度論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.prajnaparamita.pancavimsatisahasrika!mahaprajnaparamitopadesa*zh-kumarajiva.82.142) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.5.9](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1853.5.9) · Pramāṇa