[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [二諦義](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1854) › 2.34 # 二諦義 2.34 二諦義 2.34 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [2.34](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1854.2.34) 問：此之四諦名，何異他？解云：真、俗，當體得名；世與第一，褒貶為稱。言真俗當體得名者，明俗是浮虛為義，當體浮虛；真是真實為義，當體真實。故真俗當體得名也。世與第一為褒貶者，明世是代謝隔別為義，第一則莫過為義。既隔別為世、莫過為第一，故世與第一是褒貶之名也。然此釋不可解，且難之。俗當體浮虛，世亦當體隔別。俗體是浮虛，既是當體得名；世體是隔別，亦當體得名。若便貶世是隔別非第一，我亦貶俗是浮虛非真實。俗實是浮虛既非貶，世實是隔別，那忽是貶耶？然俗之與世，世乍可是當體，俗應是貶毀。何者？知世隔別，今言世隔別，豈非當體？俗不知浮虛，今名其是浮虛，豈非是貶？若爾，那得言俗浮虛是當體得名，世隔別是貶毀為稱耶？次難真與第一。真當體真實，第一亦當體第一。若對凡非第一，褒聖為第一；亦對凡非真實，褒聖是真實。若言褒真為第一，亦褒第一為真，何得言真是當體，第一為褒耶？ > Question: How do these names of the four truths differ from \[the views of\] others? Explanation: 'Ultimate' and 'conventional' get their names from their intrinsic nature; 'worldly' and 'supreme' are designations based on praise and dispraise. Saying that 'ultimate' and 'conventional' get their names from their intrinsic nature means: 'conventional' has the meaning of being insubstantial, its intrinsic nature being insubstantial; 'ultimate' has the meaning of being real, its intrinsic nature being real. Therefore, 'ultimate' and 'conventional' get their names from their intrinsic nature. 'Worldly' and 'supreme' being based on praise and dispraise means: 'worldly' has the meaning of succession and differentiation, while 'supreme' has the meaning of nothing surpassing it. Since differentiation is 'worldly' and unsurpassable is 'supreme', therefore 'worldly' and 'supreme' are names of praise and dispraise. However, this explanation is incomprehensible, and we shall challenge it for a moment. If the conventional's intrinsic nature is insubstantial, the worldly's intrinsic nature is also differentiation. The essence of the conventional being insubstantial is already getting its name from intrinsic nature; the essence of the worldly being differentiation is also getting its name from intrinsic nature. If one then disparages the worldly as differentiation and not supreme, I would also disparage the conventional as insubstantial and not real. If the conventional really being insubstantial is not dispraise, how could the worldly really being differentiation suddenly be dispraise? Furthermore, between conventional and worldly: the worldly might rather be intrinsic nature, whereas the conventional should be dispraise. Why? Knowing that the world is differentiated, when one now says that the world is differentiated, how is that not intrinsic nature? Conventionally, one does not know it is insubstantial; now naming it insubstantial, how is that not dispraise? If so, how can one say that 'conventional' being insubstantial gets its name from intrinsic nature, while 'worldly' being differentiation is a designation of dispraise? Next we challenge 'ultimate' and 'supreme'. 'Ultimate' is real in its intrinsic nature; 'supreme' is also supreme in its intrinsic nature. If, in contrast to the ordinary, it is not supreme, one praises the noble as supreme; likewise, in contrast to the ordinary, it is not real, so one praises the noble as real. If one says that praising the ultimate makes it supreme, one also praises the supreme as ultimate; how can one say that 'ultimate' is intrinsic nature and 'supreme' is praise? > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 2.33](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1854.2.33) - [Next: 2.35](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1854.2.35) - [Up: 2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1854.2) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1854~en-mt.2.34) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1854.2.34](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1854.2.34) · Pramāṇa