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# 肇論疏 1.41

肇論疏 1.41

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [1.41](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1859.1.41)

第三、述異同也。動靜理雖不殊，而迷惑之人謂異也。緣使真言滯於競辨宗途屈於好異者，真言，謂佛教也；競辨，謂異說也；宗途，謂法理也；好異，謂異解也。所以靜躁之極未易言也者，謂靜躁兩間難辨也。又釋靜躁不二是靜躁之極，欲說此理，未易可論也。何者夫談真則逆俗順俗則違真者，俗人謂異，言不異者則逆俗人也；真理是一，言不一者則違真理也。此言真者，謂理實如此故名為真，未必即為真諦也。如云真書、真寶，可即是真諦乎？固不然也。有人執此語，非前序中不遷當俗諦。此非得意之言也。違真故迷性而莫返、逆俗故言談而無味者，違真理則迷法性，不能自返也。亦可情迷不能自返悟也，逆俗人則語薄淡無滋味也。《老子》云：樂與餌，過容上，道之出口，淡乎其無味。今借此語以飾論文也。如來說法皆依二諦，言則順俗、理則明真。且秦人好文，譯經者言參經史；晉朝尚理，作論者辭涉《老》、《莊》。言參經史，不可謂佛與丘且同風；辭涉《老》、《莊》，不可謂法與聃周齊致。肇法師一時挺秀、千載孤標，上智貴其高明、下愚譏其混雜，是謂資宋章而適越，露形之俗見嗤；抱荊玉而歸楚，無目之徒致哂。信可悲也，深可歎哉。近有無識之徒，自相朋附，或身參法侶翻謗大乘，或形廁俗流反宗小教，上誹高德，苟布負俗之名；下贊庸流，將謂契真之實，自忘顏厚，豈識羞慚？經云：譬如癡賊，棄捨金寶，擔負瓦礫。此之謂矣。然信毀禍福素有誠言，及至臨終果招其咎，舌出長餘一尺、氣奔經乎數晨，既出牛聲，不知豹變，無間極苦夫復何疑。後之學者，幸知前事也。緣使中人未分於存亡下士撫掌而不顧者，《老子》云：上士聞道勤而行之，中士聞道若存若亡，下士聞道大笑之，不笑不足以為道。今借此語也。中人聞此動靜不二，未能決定，或信或疑，故云未分於存亡。下人聞此決定不信，故云撫掌而弗顧。撫掌，拍手也。弗顧，不視也。近而不可知者其唯物性乎者，動靜不二，物之性也。近對目前而人不覺，今傷歎之，故云爾也。

> Third, stating differences and similarities. Although the principle of movement and stillness is not distinct, confused people consider them different. As for 'This causes true words to stall in competing debates, and the fundamental path to be bent by a fondness for peculiarities': 'true words' refers to the Buddha's teachings; 'competing debates' refers to divergent assertions; 'fundamental path' refers to the Dharma principle; 'fondness for peculiarities' refers to divergent understandings. As for 'Therefore, the culmination of stillness and agitation is not easily spoken of': this means that distinguishing between the two states of stillness and agitation is difficult. Another explanation is that the non-duality of stillness and agitation is the culmination of stillness and agitation; wishing to expound this principle, it cannot be easily discussed. As for 'Why is this? Discussing the real goes against the conventional; according with the conventional contradicts the real': conventional people consider them different, so saying they are not different goes against conventional people; the true principle is one, so saying they are not one contradicts the true principle. The word 'real' (zhen) here means that the principle is genuinely thus, hence it is called 'real'; it does not necessarily mean the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). Just as when one speaks of 'real writing' or 'real treasure', could that simply be the ultimate truth? Surely not. Some people grasp onto this phrasing and object that 'non-shifting' in the preceding preface should correspond to conventional truth; this is not a statement that grasps the intended meaning. As for 'Contradicting the real, they are confused about the nature and cannot return; going against the conventional, their speech is devoid of flavor': contradicting the true principle, they are confused about the dharmatā and cannot return of themselves. It may also mean that being emotionally confused, they cannot return to awakening of themselves. Going against conventional people, their words are bland and tasteless. Laozi says: 'Music and fine food will make the passing guest stop. But when the Way is spoken from the mouth, how bland and devoid of flavor it is!' Now this wording is borrowed to adorn the prose of the treatise. When the Tathāgata expounds the Dharma, he always relies on the two truths: his words accord with the conventional, and the principle illuminates the real. Furthermore, the people of Qin were fond of literature, so those who translated sūtras mingled their diction with the Classics and histories; the Jin dynasty valued metaphysical principles (li), so those who composed treatises touched upon Laozi and Zhuangzi in their diction. If diction mingles with the Classics and histories, one cannot say the Buddha and Confucius shared the same style; if phrasing touches upon Laozi and Zhuangzi, one cannot say the Dharma and Lao-Zhuang had identical aims. Master Sengzhao stood preeminent in his era, an unmatched standard for a thousand years. Those of superior wisdom value his lofty brilliance, while the utterly foolish ridicule his syncretism. This is what is meant by carrying the ceremonial caps of Song to Yue, where the naked locals laughed at them; or embracing the jade of Bian He and returning to Chu, where the sightless sneered at it. Truly, it is lamentable and deeply pitiable! Recently, there have been ignorant fellows who form cliques among themselves; some mingle as companions in the Dharma yet conversely slander the Mahāyāna, while others place themselves among the secular crowd yet conversely venerate the Hīnayāna teachings. Above, they defame persons of lofty virtue merely to spread a reputation of defying convention; below, they praise mediocre types, claiming they accord with genuine reality. Forgetting their own thick-skinned shamelessness, how could they know shame? A sūtra says: 'Like a foolish thief who discards gold and jewels and shoulders broken tiles.' This is what it refers to. Now, the karmic retribution of faith and slander, misfortune and fortune, has long had authentic pronouncements. When it came to his deathbed, he indeed incurred his retribution: his tongue protruded more than a foot long, his breath gasped frantically for several days, and having emitted the bellowing of an ox, he did not know a leopard's metamorphosis; what doubt can there be about his falling into the unremitting supreme suffering \[of Avīci\]? May later students be fortunate enough to know of this past affair! As for 'This causes persons of middling capacity not to distinguish whether it exists or not, and men of the lowest capacity to clap their hands and look away': Laozi says: 'When the superior man hears of the Way, he diligently puts it into practice. When the middling man hears of the Way, it seems to exist and seems not to exist. When the inferior man hears of the Way, he laughs loudly at it; if he did not laugh, it would not be sufficient to be the Way.' Now this phrasing is borrowed. When middling persons hear of this non-duality of movement and stillness, they cannot resolve it, either believing or doubting; hence it says 'not to distinguish whether it exists or not'. When inferior persons hear this, they resolutely disbelieve it; hence it says 'to clap their hands and look away'. 'Clapping the hands' means striking the palms together. 'Looking away' means not looking. As for 'Being so close yet unknowable—is it not solely the nature of things?': the non-duality of movement and stillness is the nature of things. It is right before one's eyes, yet people do not perceive it; now lamenting and sighing over this, he speaks thus.  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1859~en-mt.1.41) — English, machine translation

## Linked texts (2)

- [肇論新疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1860.1.85) — Classical Chinese
- [肇論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1858.1.10) — Classical Chinese

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1859.1.41](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1859.1.41) · Pramāṇa
