[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大乘法苑義林章](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1861) › 3.29.1 # 大乘法苑義林章 3.29.1 大乘法苑義林章 3.29.1 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [3.29.1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1861.3.29.1) 「『九十七日誦四十九遍乃一懺悔。 』」廣說菩薩及沙彌等滅罪之法。 彼經第一卷中說陀羅尼，亦言「犯比丘戒、比丘尼戒等，當一懺悔。 若不還生，無有是處，除不至心。 」故知犯重而不失戒，但名污戒。 若不爾者，云何還得已後清淨？ 《佛名經》中說亦大同。 就《四分律》，同薩婆多犯重不失。 不共住者，是治罰法，非失戒義。 二云：犯重，不問何心決定失戒。 五十三云「犯重捨故」。 〈菩薩地〉第四十解菩薩戒云「若用耎中品纏，毀犯四種他勝處法，不捨菩薩淨戒律儀，上品纏犯即名為捨。 若諸菩薩毀犯四種他勝處法，數數現行都無慚愧，深生愛樂見是功德，當知說名上品纏犯。 非諸菩薩暫一現行他勝處法，便捨菩薩淨戒律儀。 如諸苾芻犯他勝法，即便棄捨別解脫戒。 」此中意說：菩薩淨戒上纏犯失，非諸菩薩中下纏犯亦名為失，如諸苾芻犯重便失。 此即翻顯苾芻犯重，中下品心亦即失戒，菩薩不爾，故云非諸菩薩暫一現行即名為犯等。 長讀論文，義道亦遠，故知菩薩犯重有失不失，破戒苾芻犯重決定失戒。 不可以菩薩戒犯重有失不失證苾芻同，苾芻意樂廣大深遠為法器故，菩薩種種皆引攝故。 故四十云「由此菩薩犯重失戒，今生得受。 苾芻現生不任更受，惡意樂思損善器故。 若二形生及斷善根，作法棄捨而失戒者，後無前事，今生得受，不污戒故。 」《十輪經》等護末法僧，息謗化俗，故言不失，非實不失。 《涅槃》由此犯重實失，息謗不失，故言定失，決定不失皆不解意。 方等經中但是懺悔犯重罪滅，言更生者是引接語，亦不相違。 故經中說「犯重之人，世尊不許食僧祇食下至一摶，踐毘訶羅一足跟地，擯出一切苾芻業事。 」故佛又言：「應速拔除稻禾稗秀，應速簡擇𭬙朽棟梁，應速簸揚種中糠粃，應速除擯似稱苾芻。 」故知犯重定成失戒。 律中自云不犯者，最初未制戒、癡狂心亂、病惱所纏。 雖有此解言不失戒，文多理正。 又犯戒者實有三心，何因一類是令失戒？ 故前解善。 形沒二形生者，形沒有二解。 一云：一形沒，無形時，不失戒。 如入聖人，雖有失形，而戒不失。 雖知聖人不作無形，如凡時得戒，後被虫食。 虫食之時即入見諦，當時先戒悉皆不失，入見諦已不失戒故，可失形故。 言形沒者，二形生時，先唯一形必轉沒故方成二形，非是無形而便失戒。 若先無形，受大戒不得者，意樂劣故、非道器故，受戒已後可無形故、意不劣故。 二云：應六緣捨，一形沒時戒必捨故。 二形後生，先一形在，云何名沒？ 然俱、非形而失戒故。 論一處說，其實六緣。 無入見諦而許虫食，不可以小乘而亂大義。 若爾，諸有漸命終者，先從下死，豈過形已即便失戒，後得重甦須更受戒？ 此亦何爽？ 先無形時戒已捨故，何要命終？ 若爾，此處初生，此處後捨。 《瑜伽》第一說「末後心方死」，死位一切先皆無形，何得更有命終捨也。 二形先有受戒不得，後二形生亦定捨戒。 無形不爾，先有不得，後生不捨。 二形器惡，男女煩惱恒俱現前，障法器故。 無形初有，其理亦同。 後有不失，不壞本性，不障聖故。 二形便壞，障聖位故。 故《俱舍》說「成就未知當知根，定成就十三，謂信等五，身、命、意，四受除憂根，并未知當知根。 」不言定成男、女隨一，故知諸聖亦有無形。 斷善根者，有二心受戒，謂生得、加行。 斷生得善，非加行善。 加行善心受者，斷善根前加行道其戒已失，斷善為緣，亦名斷善。 若生得心受，要邪見起現在前，其戒方失。 然戒通有三品心受，邪見九品方斷善盡。 其戒亦爾，但言斷善捨，不言初捨故。 棄眾同分者，謂命終捨。 末後一念正命終心在現在世，戒亦現在，未名已捨，可名正捨。 如第一法捨異生性，若命終已戒入過去，現住中有等，已捨戒故名捨，隔異生故。 > "'\[Recite it\] for ninety-seven days, forty-nine times per day, before making one confession.'" \[The sūtra\] extensively explains the methods for extinguishing transgressions for bodhisattvas, śrāmaṇeras, and others. In the first fascicle of that sūtra, when it speaks of dhāraṇīs, it also says: "Those who have violated the bhikṣu precepts, the bhikṣuṇī precepts, and the like should make one confession. If \[the roots of the precepts\] are not restored, that is impossible, unless their mind is not sincere." Therefore, one knows that by committing a grave offense one does not lose the precepts, but it is only called defiling the precepts. If it were not so, how could they subsequently regain purity? What is stated in the \*Foming jing\* is also largely the same. In terms of the \*Sifen lü\*, as with the Sarvāstivāda, committing a grave offense does not entail losing \[the precepts\]. "Not dwelling together" is a disciplinary measure, not the meaning of losing the precepts. The second \[view\] says: When committing a grave offense, regardless of the mental state, one definitely loses the precepts. Fascicle 53 says, "because by committing a grave offense, one relinquishes them." The \*Bodhisattvabhūmi\*, in fascicle 40, explaining the bodhisattva precepts, says: "If, by means of a weak or middling entanglement, one violates the four pārājika dharmas, one does not relinquish the pure moral discipline of the bodhisattva; but violating them with a strong entanglement is called relinquishing it. If bodhisattvas violate the four pārājika dharmas, repeatedly performing them without any shame or remorse, and deeply cherishing and regarding them as meritorious, one should know that this is called violating them with a strong entanglement. It is not the case that bodhisattvas, by temporarily performing a pārājika dharma just once, thereby relinquish the pure moral discipline of the bodhisattva. Just as when bhikṣus commit a pārājika dharma, they immediately relinquish the prātimokṣa precepts." The meaning here is: The pure precepts of a bodhisattva are lost through an offense committed with a strong entanglement; it is not that for bodhisattvas an offense committed with a middling or weak entanglement is also called a loss, whereas when bhikṣus commit a grave offense, they lose them immediately. This conversely shows that when a bhikṣu commits a grave offense, even with a middling or weak mind, he also immediately loses the precepts; with bodhisattvas it is not so, which is why it says that it is not the case that a bodhisattva, by temporarily performing \[a pārājika\] once, is called having committed \[an offense that loses them\], and so forth. If one reads the treatise's text continuously, its doctrinal trajectory is also extensive. Therefore, one knows that when a bodhisattva commits a grave offense, there is losing and not losing \[the precepts\], but when a bhikṣu of broken discipline commits a grave offense, he definitely loses the precepts. One cannot use the bodhisattva precepts' having loss and non-loss upon committing a grave offense to prove that bhikṣus are the same; for a bhikṣu's aspiration is vast and profound, serving as a Dharma vessel, whereas a bodhisattva guides and gathers all kinds of beings. Therefore, fascicle 40 says: "Because of this, when a bodhisattva commits a grave offense and loses the precepts, he may receive them \[again\] in this life. A bhikṣu, in his present life, is not fit to receive them again, because the intention and thought of evil aspiration damages the good vessel. If one loses the precepts through the emergence of both sexes, the severance of good roots, or ritual renunciation, then because subsequently the former circumstance is absent, one may receive them in this life, as the precepts were not defiled." Texts such as the \*Shilun jing\* protect the saṅgha of the final Dharma age to quell slander and convert the worldly, and therefore say they are not lost; it is not that in reality they are not lost. The \*Nirvāṇa-sūtra\*, because of this, \[holds that\] committing a grave offense is an actual loss, and not losing them is to quell slander; therefore, those who say they are definitely lost or definitely not lost have all failed to understand the intention. In the Vaipulya sūtras, it is merely that through confession the grave offense is extinguished; the statement that they are "restored" is an accommodating expression, so there is no contradiction either. Thus the sūtra says: "For a person who commits a grave offense, the World-Honoured One does not permit him to consume even a single mouthful of saṅgha food, to tread with a single heel upon the ground of a vihāra, and expels him from all monastic duties." Therefore the Buddha also said: "One should quickly pull out the tares among the rice; one should quickly select and discard rotten ridgepoles and beams; one should quickly winnow out the chaff from the seeds; one should quickly banish those who merely bear the name of bhikṣus." Therefore, one knows that committing a grave offense definitely constitutes losing the precepts. That the Vinaya itself states there is no offense refers to before the precepts were first instituted, to madness and mental confusion, or to being overwhelmed by the torments of illness. Although there is this explanation saying the precepts are not lost, \[the other view\] has abundant textual support and correct reasoning. Furthermore, those who violate the precepts actually have three mental states; why should only one class cause the loss of the precepts? Therefore, the former explanation is good. Regarding "loss of gender characteristics and emergence of both gender characteristics," there are two explanations of the loss of gender characteristics. The first says: When one gender characteristic is lost and there is no gender characteristic, one does not lose the precepts. Just as when one enters the state of an ārya, although one may lose the gender characteristic, the precepts are not lost. Although it is known that an ārya does not become genderless, if, for example, one obtained the precepts while an ordinary person and was subsequently eaten by insects, and at the time of being eaten by insects one immediately entered the seeing of truth, at that time the former precepts were all not lost; because having entered the seeing of truth one does not lose the precepts, yet one may lose the gender characteristic. When it says "loss of gender characteristics," it means that when both gender characteristics emerge, the former single gender characteristic must change and disappear before the two gender characteristics are formed; it is not that becoming genderless immediately causes the loss of the precepts. If one was originally genderless and could not receive the full ordination, that is because one's aspiration is inferior and one is not a vessel for the path; whereas after receiving the precepts, one may become genderless because one's intention is not inferior. The second \[view\] says: They should be relinquished through six conditions, because when one gender characteristic is lost, the precepts are definitely relinquished. When two gender characteristics subsequently emerge, the former single gender characteristic is still present; how could that be called "loss"? Rather, both \[loss of gender\] and becoming genderless cause the loss of the precepts. The treatise mentions \[them\] in one place, but in reality there are six conditions. There is no such thing as having entered the seeing of truth and being eaten by insects; one cannot disrupt the Great Vehicle's meaning with the Hīnayāna. If so, for all those who gradually expire, dying first from below, could it be that once \[death\] passes the gender characteristics, they immediately lose the precepts, and upon reviving later must receive the precepts again? What would be wrong with this? Since the precepts were already relinquished when there was no gender characteristic earlier, why must death be required? If so, it would be newly born here, and relinquished later here. Fascicle 1 of the \*Yogācāra\* says: "Only at the final thought does one die." At the state of death, all are originally genderless; how could there further be relinquishment at death? If two gender characteristics are present from the beginning, one cannot receive the precepts; if two gender characteristics emerge later, one also definitely relinquishes the precepts. With genderlessness it is not so: if present from the beginning, one cannot receive them, but if it arises later, they are not relinquished. The vessel of two gender characteristics is vile, for male and female defilements are constantly present together, obstructing one from being a Dharma vessel. If genderlessness is present at first, the principle is the same; but if it occurs later, \[the precepts\] are not lost, because it does not destroy one's original nature and does not obstruct the noble state. Two gender characteristics, however, cause ruin, because they obstruct the noble stage. Therefore, the \*Kośa\* says: "Possessing the anājñātamājñāsyāmīndriya, one definitely possesses thirteen \[indriyas\]—namely, the five beginning with faith, body, life, mind, the four feelings excluding the grief indriya, and the anājñātamājñāsyāmīndriya." It does not say that one definitely possesses either the male or female \[indriya\]; therefore, one knows that noble ones may also be genderless. Regarding the "severance of good roots": There are two minds with which one receives the precepts, namely, the innate and the preparatory. It is the innate good that is severed, not the preparatory good. For one who receives them with a mind of preparatory good, the precepts have already been lost on the preparatory path prior to the severance of good roots; with the severance of good roots serving as the condition, it is also called the severance of good. If they are received with an innate mind, only when false view arises and becomes manifest are the precepts lost. However, the precepts may be received with three grades of mind, whereas false view requires nine grades before good is completely severed. The precepts are likewise: it only says they are relinquished upon the severance of good, not that they are relinquished at the first \[grade\]. Regarding "abandoning the sa-bhāgatā": This refers to relinquishment at death. In the final moment, the mind at the precise point of death exists in the present; the precepts also exist in the present, and are not yet called already relinquished, but may be called currently being relinquished. Just as the supreme mundane dharma relinquishes the nature of an ordinary worldling, if one has already died, the precepts enter the past, and one currently abides in the intermediate existence and so forth; because the precepts have already been relinquished, it is called relinquishment, owing to the separation from the ordinary worldling. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 3.28](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1861.3.28) - [Next: 3.29.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1861.3.29.2) - [Up: 3.29](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1861.3.29) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1861~en-mt.3.29.1) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (3) - [法苑珠林](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2122.86.23) — 道世, Classical Chinese - [菩薩戒本](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.vinaya.sastra.bodhisattvapratimoksa*zh-xuanzang.1.10) — Classical Chinese - [菩薩戒羯磨文](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.vinaya.sastra.bodhisattvasilakarmavacana*zh-xuanzang.1.9) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1861.3.29.1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1861.3.29.1) · Pramāṇa