[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大乘法苑義林章](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1861) › 5.47 # 大乘法苑義林章 5.47 大乘法苑義林章 5.47 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [5.47](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1861.5.47) 四分別假實者，下第六云「極微無體，由慧分拆。」《顯揚》第五云「慧拆麁色至最細邊，建立極微，非由有體，故說極微無生無滅。」《瑜伽論》第三云「於色聚中曾無極微，從種生時唯聚集起，亦非極微集成麁色。」《唯識》亦云「至色邊際，假立極微。」五十四等皆說同此。故初二色皆是假有。《成唯識》云「謂依思、願善惡分限，假立無表。」《成業》亦云「依二種子未損壞位，假立善惡律儀無表。」此證甚多，故受所引色亦是假有。《顯揚》第十八說「七事無實，三影像、四響音。」故遍計色亦是假有。五十四說「墮法處色有實有假。若有威德定所行境，猶如變化，彼果、彼境及彼相應識等境色，是實物有。」《成唯識》說「阿賴耶識變十色處，及墮法處所現實色，故定果色體是實有。」此中有義：五種色中前四假有，唯第五實。《顯揚論》說七事假中，但說律儀、不律儀假，不說定果亦是假有。《瑜伽》但說法處色中，威德定色是實物有，律儀、不律儀皆是假有，亦不說此定境色中通假有故。有義：第五亦通假有，菩薩二乘等解脫勝處、遍處，諸假相色實用都無。若非此收，何色所攝？定境界故，非五境攝。性非極微，又非無表。彼解脫等定非遍計，由此復非前四種色，若非第五便無所屬，應此五色攝法不盡。復不可說以影像故遍計色收，豈諸定心皆成搆畫？無漏心等無假相耶？佛智具能現諸影故。此論亦云「靜慮解脫所行境色，名定所生色。然由聖者所變皆能成實，極殊勝故。」《瑜伽》唯說彼為定所生，以彼假想非殊勝故，略而不說。異生所變唯令他見，不堪受用，豈非假也。《顯揚》第一說定所引色，由三品心起彼所緣影像色性，及彼所作成熟色性。初是假色，後是實色。又《顯揚》第十八，七色假中說影像假有。又法處色有十二相，第一影像。若假影像非定果者，彼論不說無表定果外更有法處色，彼影像色何色所收？故知定果有假有實。後義為善，順理、教故。 > Fourth, distinguishing the nominal and the real: Below, the sixth fascicle states: 'Subtle atoms have no substance; they are partitioned and broken down by wisdom.' Xianyang, fascicle 5, states: 'Wisdom breaks down coarse matter to the utmost fine limit, establishing subtle atoms, not because they possess substance; therefore, it is said that subtle atoms have neither arising nor cessation.' The Yogācārabhūmi, fascicle 3, states: 'Within a material cluster there has never been a subtle atom; when arising from seeds, it arises solely as an aggregation; nor do subtle atoms assemble to form coarse matter.' The Weishi also states: 'Reaching the extremity of matter, subtle atoms are nominally established.' Fascicle 54 and others all state the same as this. Therefore, the first two kinds of matter are both nominal existence. The Cheng weishi lun states: 'Namely, on the basis of the limits of wholesome and unwholesome intention and aspiration, unmanifest matter is nominally established.' The Karmasiddhi also states: 'On the basis of the state where the two kinds of seeds have not been damaged, wholesome and unwholesome unmanifest restraint is nominally established.' Proofs for this are very numerous; therefore, matter induced by undertaking is also nominal existence. Xianyang, fascicle 18, states: 'Seven things are devoid of reality: three images, four echoes.' Therefore, matter of conceptualization is also nominal existence. Fascicle 54 states: 'Matter falling under the sensory base of phenomena has the real and the nominal. If it is the sphere of concentration with majestic power, like transformations, that fruit, that sphere, and the objective matter of consciousness associated with it, are substantially existent entities.' The Cheng weishi lun states: 'The ālayavijñāna transforms into the ten sensory bases of matter, and the real matter manifested that falls under the sensory base of phenomena; therefore, the substance of matter that is the fruit of concentration is substantially existent.' Within this, one opinion holds: Among the five kinds of matter, the first four are nominally existent, and only the fifth is real. When the Xianyang lun speaks of the seven nominally existent things, it only speaks of restraint and non-restraint as nominal, not saying that the fruit of concentration is also nominally existent. The Yogācārabūmi only states that within the matter of the sensory base of phenomena, the matter of concentration with majestic power is a substantially existent entity, while restraint and non-restraint are both nominally existent, nor does it state that within this matter of the sphere of concentration there is nominal existence as well. Another opinion holds: The fifth also admits of nominal existence. For bodhisattvas, the two vehicles, and others, the liberations, bases of overcoming (abhibhvāyatana), and bases of totality (kṛtsnāyatana) have nominal image-matters that completely lack real practical function. If not subsumed by this, under what matter would they be included? Because they are spheres of concentration, they are not subsumed under the five sensory objects. Their nature is not subtle atoms, nor is it unmanifest matter. Those liberations and the like are definitely not conceptualization, and consequently they are also not the former four kinds of matter; if they were not the fifth, they would have no belonging, and these five kinds of matter would fail to subsume phenomena exhaustively. Furthermore, it cannot be said that because they are images they are subsumed under conceptualized matter; could all concentrated minds be mere fabrications? Do anāsrava minds and the like lack nominal images? Because the Buddha's wisdom is fully capable of manifesting all images. This treatise also says: 'The matter that is the sphere of the dhyānas and liberations is named matter born of concentration. However, what is transformed by noble ones can all become real, because it is extremely superior.' The Yogācārabūmi solely stated that to be born of concentration, and because those nominal representations are not superior, it omitted them without mentioning them. What ordinary worldlings transform merely causes others to see it but cannot be practically enjoyed and used; how could it not be nominal? Xianyang, fascicle 1, states that in matter induced by concentration, from the three grades of mind arise the nature of image-matter that is their object, and the nature of perfected matter that is what they make. The former is nominal matter, and the latter is real matter. Furthermore, Xianyang, fascicle 18, states among the seven nominal matters that images are nominally existent. Again, the matter of the sensory base of phenomena has twelve characteristics, the first of which is images. If nominal images are not the fruit of concentration, since that treatise does not state that outside unmanifest matter and the fruit of concentration there is any further matter of the sensory base of phenomena, under what matter would that image-matter be subsumed? Therefore, we know that the fruit of concentration has both nominal and real. The latter opinion is the better one, because it accords with reason and scripture. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 5.46](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1861.5.46) - [Next: 5.48](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1861.5.48) - [Up: 5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1861.5) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1861~en-mt.5.47) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1861.5.47](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1861.5.47) · Pramāṇa