[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大乘法苑義林章](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1861) › 7.14 # 大乘法苑義林章 7.14 大乘法苑義林章 7.14 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [7.14](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1861.7.14) 一常無常門。《金光明》說「如是三身，以有義故而說為常，以有義故說為無常。化身者恒轉法輪，是故處處如如方便相續不斷，是故說常。非是本故，具足之用不顯現故，是故說無常。」《莊嚴論》說「常有三種：一本性常、二不斷常、三相續常。」《佛地論》說「此變化身沒已復現，化無盡故，是相續常。所依常故亦說為常，有生滅故亦是無常。」正與經同。《金光明》說「應身者，從無始來相續不斷故，以一切諸佛不共之法能攝持故，眾生未盡用亦不盡，是故說常。非是本故，以具足用不顯現故，故說無常。」《佛地論》說「是不斷常，恒受法樂無間斷故。所依常故亦說為常。依此常義，《涅槃經》說獲常色等。若言如來身無常者，此人舌根何不墮落？從因生故、有生滅故，亦說無常。」諸論及《涅槃經》三十五皆說「記有四種：一一向記、二分別記、三返問記、四捨置記。」此記有二：一人四記、二法四記。人四記者，一問生者皆死耶？答言如是，應一向記。二問死者復生耶？答言應分別，有煩惱者死而復生，無煩惱者死而不生，應分別記。三問人為殊勝？應返問彼：汝何所方？若方於天？答言為劣；若方於餘，答言為勝。應返問記。四問我為有無？應捨勿答，是捨置記。法四記者，一問生者皆滅耶？答言如是，是一向記。二問滅者復生耶？答言此分別。有因緣者滅而復生，無因緣者滅而不生。二乘五蘊無大悲緣，無餘依滅而更不生；如來之身但墮法數、不墮生數，有大悲故本願未盡，有因緣故滅而復生。是分別記。三問聲聞善心為勝為劣？應返問彼：汝何所方？隨方為答。是返問記。四問第六蘊為善不善。應捨勿答，是捨置記。佛受用身既墮法數，生者能滅是一向記，故不可說是本性常。許從因生說是常者，違比量故。《金光明》中說「法身者非是行法，無有異相，異無有故、是自本故，是故說常。如如法身非是行法，無有異相。如如智法身是自本故，理智廣大冥合無相，猶如虛空，是故說常。」《佛地論》說「如如法身是自性常，離諸分別及離戲論，本性常住無生滅故，是故說常。」《涅槃》依此，說「佛即法，法即是僧，僧即是常，常即虛空，虛空即佛性，佛性即法身。如如智身是不斷常，眾生無盡，本願不窮。復不入涅槃，中間無間斷，與智冥合如空無限，亦離分別及諸戲論，是故說常。」唯說如如為法身者，唯自性常。《攝大乘》問：佛受用身及變化身既是無常，云何經說如來身常？彼自答言：此二所依法身常故。無性釋云「此非身常，依常身故。」此顯等流及變化身是異門常，非自性常。又彼二身以恒受用無休廢故，數數現化不永絕故，如常受樂、如常施食，如來身常當知亦爾。無性釋言「又受用身以恒受用無休廢故，猶如世間言常受樂。雖非受樂常無間斷，而言常受。佛受用身亦爾。」彼彼菩薩受樂無廢，雖非常住而亦言常。故《勝鬘》言「如來色無盡，智慧亦復然。」由佛化身數數現化不永斷絕，猶如世間言常施食，雖非無間然數數施，其心不絕名常施食。化身亦爾，數數現化不永絕故，二身言常，是密意常。 > First is the section on permanence and impermanence. The Suvarṇaprabhāsa states: 'The three bodies are such that they are spoken of as permanent on account of certain senses, and spoken of as impermanent on account of certain senses. As for the transformation body, it constantly turns the wheel of the Dharma; therefore, in every place it continues incessantly through such and such expedient means, and for this reason it is spoken of as permanent. Because it is not the source \[body\] and its complete function is not fully manifest, it is for this reason spoken of as impermanent.' The Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra states: 'There are three kinds of permanence: first, permanence of inherent nature; second, uninterrupted permanence; and third, continuous permanence.' The Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa states: 'This transformation body reappears after having vanished; because transformations are inexhaustible, it is continuous permanence. Because its support is permanent, it is also spoken of as permanent; because it has arising and cessation, it is also impermanent.' This agrees precisely with the sūtra. The Suvarṇaprabhāsa states: 'As for the response body, because it is continuously uninterrupted from beginningless time, and because it is held and maintained by the dharmas unshared by all Buddhas, its function is not exhausted as long as sentient beings are not exhausted, and for this reason it is spoken of as permanent. Because it is not the source \[body\] and its complete function is not manifest, it is therefore spoken of as impermanent.' The Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa states: 'It is uninterrupted permanence, because it constantly experiences the joy of the Dharma without interruption. Because its support is permanent, it is also spoken of as permanent. Relying on this sense of permanence, the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra speaks of obtaining permanent form and so forth. If one says that the Tathāgata's body is impermanent, why does this person's tongue not fall out? Because it arises from causes and has arising and cessation, it is also spoken of as impermanent.' Various treatises as well as chapter thirty-five of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra all state: 'There are four kinds of declaration: first, categorical declaration; second, analytical declaration; third, counter-questioning declaration; and fourth, dismissive declaration.' These declarations are of two kinds: first, the four declarations concerning persons; second, the four declarations concerning dharmas. Regarding the four declarations concerning persons: first, if it is asked, "Do all who are born die?", one should answer, "Yes"—this is a categorical declaration. Second, if it is asked, "Do those who die take rebirth?", one should answer with an analysis: "Those who possess kleśas die and take rebirth; those without kleśas die and do not take rebirth"—this is an analytical declaration. Third, if it is asked, "Is a human superior?", one should counter-question them: "Compared to what? If compared to gods?", one answers that they are inferior; "If compared to others?", one answers that they are superior—this is a counter-questioning declaration. Fourth, if it is asked, "Does the self exist or not?", one should dismiss it without answering—this is a dismissive declaration. Regarding the four declarations concerning dharmas: first, if it is asked, "Do all arisen \[dharmas\] perish?", one answers, "Yes"—this is a categorical declaration. Second, if it is asked, "Do perished \[dharmas\] arise again?", one answers analytically: "Those with causes and conditions perish and arise again; those without causes and conditions perish and do not arise again. The five aggregates of the two vehicles lack the condition of great compassion, so after perishing in \[nirvāṇa\] without remainder of fuel, they do not arise again. The Tathāgata's body falls only within the category of dharmas and does not fall within the category of \[saṃsāric\] rebirth; because he possesses great compassion and his original vows are not exhausted, and because causes and conditions exist, it perishes and arises again"—this is an analytical declaration. Third, if it is asked, "Is a śrāvaka's wholesome mind superior or inferior?", one should counter-question them: "Compared to what?", and answer according to the comparison—this is a counter-questioning declaration. Fourth, if it is asked whether the sixth aggregate is wholesome or unwholesome, one should dismiss it without answering—this is a dismissive declaration. Since the Buddha's enjoyment body falls within the category of dharmas, that what has arisen is able to perish is a categorical declaration; therefore, it cannot be said to be permanent by inherent nature. If one admits that what arises from causes is said to be permanent, it would contradict inference. In the Suvarṇaprabhāsa it states: 'As for the dharmakāya, it is not a conditioned dharma, nor does it have distinct characteristics; because difference does not exist and it is its own source, it is therefore spoken of as permanent. The dharmakāya of suchness is not a conditioned dharma, nor does it have distinct characteristics. Because the dharmakāya of the wisdom of suchness is its own source, principle and wisdom are vast, darkly coalescing without characteristics, just like empty space; therefore it is spoken of as permanent.' The Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa states: 'The dharmakāya of suchness is permanent by nature; because it is free from all conceptual construction and free from conceptual proliferation, and inherently abides permanently without arising and cessation, it is therefore spoken of as permanent.' Relying on this, the Nirvāṇa \[sūtra\] states: 'The Buddha is the Dharma; the Dharma is the Saṅgha; the Saṅgha is permanent; the permanent is empty space; empty space is Buddha-nature; Buddha-nature is the dharmakāya. The body of the wisdom of suchness is uninterrupted permanence; sentient beings are inexhaustible, and original vows are unending. Furthermore, it does not enter nirvāṇa and has no interruption in the interim, coalescing with wisdom boundlessly like space, and is also free from conceptual construction and all conceptual proliferation; therefore it is spoken of as permanent.' For those who state only that suchness is the dharmakāya, it is permanent only by nature. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha asks: 'Since the Buddha's enjoyment body and transformation body are impermanent, why do sūtras say that the Tathāgata's body is permanent?' It answers itself: 'Because the dharmakāya upon which these two rely is permanent.' Asvabhāva explains: 'This does not mean the bodies themselves are permanent, but that they rely on a permanent body.' This shows that the nisyanda \[-kāya\] and the transformation body are permanent in a figurative sense, not permanent by nature. Furthermore, because those two bodies are continuously enjoyed without cessation and repeatedly manifest transformations without ever ending—just like continually experiencing pleasure or continually giving food—one should know that the permanence of the Tathāgata's body is also like this. Asvabhāva explains: 'Furthermore, because the enjoyment body is continuously enjoyed without cessation, it is like when the worldly speak of continually experiencing pleasure. Although experiencing pleasure is not permanently without interruption, one nonetheless says "continually experiencing". The Buddha's enjoyment body is also like this.' Respective bodhisattvas experience joy without cessation, and although it is not permanently abiding, it is also spoken of as permanent. Thus the Śrīmālādevī-sūtra states: 'The Tathāgata's form is inexhaustible, and wisdom is also likewise.' Because the Buddha's transformation body repeatedly manifests transformations and does not permanently break off—just as in the world one speaks of continually giving food, where although it is not without interruption, one nevertheless repeatedly gives, and with this uninterrupted intention it is called continually giving food; the transformation body is also like this, because it repeatedly manifests transformations without permanently ending—the speaking of these two bodies as permanent is an intentional permanence. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 7.13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1861.7.13) - [Next: 7.15](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1861.7.15) - [Up: 7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1861.7) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1861~en-mt.7.14) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (3) - [金光明最勝王經疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1788.3.24) — Classical Chinese - [合部金光明經](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.mahayanasutra.suvarnaprabhasa*zh-t664.1.81) — Classical Chinese - [金光明最勝王經](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.mahayanasutra.suvarnaprabhasa*zh-yijing.2.12) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1861.7.14](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1861.7.14) · Pramāṇa