[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [能顯中邊慧日論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863) › 1.13.1 # 能顯中邊慧日論 1.13.1 能顯中邊慧日論 1.13.1 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [1.13.1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.1.13.1) 有云：《善戒》、《地持》、《瑜伽》等說無種性人者，據說客性，非本性也。 何以得知？ 經自釋云「菩薩性者，謂初發心及三十七品。 何以故？ 菩薩發菩提心，乃是一切善法根本，是故名發。 因此發心，得阿耨菩提，是故名因。 因初發心決定必得阿耨菩提，是故名性。 」此釋初發心，以三義別有三種，名習種性發心。 具此三義，前位發心唯有因義，無餘二義。 然經說云「若無菩薩性者，雖復發心懃修精進，終不能得阿耨菩提」者，據前位說，未至種性，雖有輕微，無決定必得堪忍之力及圓滿持，名為無性，非是不與發心為因名無種性。 此同《仁王》、《瓔珞經》等。 此不應然。 若以未至種性無決定力終圓滿持，云終不得，名為無性者。 云何經云「因初發心，決定必得阿耨菩提，是故名性。 」准此經文，即初發心名之為性，即因初心能得菩提。 云不至種性名為無性，未至堪忍及圓滿持云終不得，豈不違經文？ 《地持》云「依初發心修行六度，名為菩薩行方便持。 依行方便滿足菩提，是故行方便名為大菩提持。 」《瑜伽》亦同。 又復後位因初方有，云終不得，豈不乖反？ 又因前前，得有後後。 云何經云「是故當知，非因發心懃修精進故有菩薩性。 」既違經義，謬之過甚。 亦不得言無不發心云無種性，經言「非因發心有菩薩性。 」《地持論》云「非種性人無種性故，雖復發心懃修精進，必不究竟阿耨菩提。 」是故當知，雖不發心、不修行方便，猶得名為種性持。 《瑜伽論》云「住無種性補特伽羅，無種性故，雖有發心及行加行為所依止，定不堪忍圓滿無上正等菩提。 」由此道理，雖未發心、未修菩薩所行加行，若有種性，當知望彼而得名持。 又有種性，若未發心，不能速得，不得云終不能得。 故《瑜伽》次云「又住種性補特伽羅，若不發心、不修菩薩所行，雖有堪任，而不速證無上菩提。 」今約位分云無種性，故知為謬。 又云：《瑜伽論》等云無性者，據客性說者，彼自立義理。 心為本性，行無漏種為客性。 客性自許初無，《瑜伽》等云無，即了義。 云何判為不了？ 由不能知二種種性？ 一種性即法爾有，二習種性即法爾種。 隨緣起現熏新種者，名為習性。 《善戒經》云「性有二種：一者本性、二者客性。 言本性者，陰界六入次第相續，無始無終法性自爾，是名本性。 」即是前云是故當知非因發心有菩薩性。 《地持》云「雖不發心、不修加行方便，猶得名為種性持。 」「所修一切善法即為客性。 」《瑜伽論》云「從無始世展轉傳來法爾所得，名性種性。 若從先來修善所得，是名習姓。 法性自爾即，是本性故。 」《善戒經》云「非因發心有菩薩性」者，由本有故，說之為主； 習種新起，故名為客。 《地持論》同。 彼敘異釋，廣為難序，徒設劬勞。 又由不了法性自爾之言，將作真如佛性。 若真如，言無始終，理即可爾。 如何《善戒經》言次第相續、《地持》云展轉相續、《瑜伽論》云展轉傳來？ 廣引文論，是真如性唐捐其功，下當顯示。 又云：《解深密》第二云「一向趣寂不坐道場，無餘依中諸受永盡。 」《瑜伽論》云「無餘依中唯有真如無諸作業」者，依小乘說，以四十年前未說二乘無實涅槃，捨分段身別有變易眾生無斷。 《深密》既在於前，故許二乘趣寂實滅。 此亦非理。 《深密》自判《般若》等經猶非了義，今第三時是真了義。 豈肯更隨小乘教說二乘實滅，勝義生讚歎為真了義？ 又若非真，彌勒菩薩《瑜伽論》中引為決擇，可不解會釋。 後代方解通經，判言彌勒捨實弘權，深為未可。 又云：先說佛滅後不滅，信後不滅為了義。 先說決定，今回心。 何獨不信言決定？ 此不同例。 唯小乘教定說佛滅，大乘經論咸許非真決定，必不回心。 大乘經論通說，決定不回心，變易非別受身。 > Some say: “When texts such as the Bodhisattvasīla-sūtra, the Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra, and the Yogācārabhūmi speak of persons lacking gotra (agotraka), they are speaking with reference to adventitious gotra (āgantuka-gotra), not the original gotra (mūla-gotra). How is this known? The sūtra itself explains: ‘As for the bodhisattva-gotra, it refers to the initial generation of the thought \[of awakening\] (bodhicittotpāda) and the thirty-seven factors \[of awakening\]. Why so? When a bodhisattva generates the thought of awakening, that is the root of all wholesome dharmas; therefore it is called ‘generating’ (utpāda). Because of this generation of the thought, one attains anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi; therefore it is called ‘cause’ (hetu). Because by cause of the initial generation of the thought one is determined to certainly attain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, it is therefore called ‘gotra’.’ This explains the initial generation of the thought: distinguished by three meanings, there are three types, named the generation of the thought of the gotra acquired through practice (samudānīta-gotra). Having these three meanings, the generation of the thought in the prior stage possesses only the meaning of ‘cause’, lacking the remaining two meanings. Yet when the sūtra states, ‘If one lacks the bodhisattva-gotra, even though one generates the thought and vigorously cultivates energetic exertion, one will ultimately never be able to attain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi,’ it is speaking with reference to the prior stage: before reaching the gotra, although one has slight \[virtue\], lacking the capacity and endurance that determinedly and certainly attains \[awakening\] as well as the full upholding, this is termed ‘lacking gotra’; it is not that not serving as a cause for generating the thought is termed ‘lacking gotra’. This agrees with the Renwang and the Yingluo sūtras.” > > This should not be so. If, because of not having reached the gotra and lacking the determined power and ultimate full upholding, one says ‘ultimately cannot attain’ and terms it ‘lacking gotra’, why does the sūtra state: ‘Because by cause of the initial generation of the thought, one is determined to certainly attain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, it is therefore called gotra’? Following this sūtra passage, it is precisely the initial generation of the thought that is termed gotra, and it is precisely by cause of the initial thought that one is able to attain awakening. Saying that not reaching the gotra is termed ‘lacking gotra’, and that not having reached capacity and full upholding means ‘ultimately cannot attain’—does this not contradict the sūtra text? The Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra states: ‘Relying on the initial generation of the thought to practice the six perfections is termed the bodhisattva’s upholding of expedient conduct. Relying on expedient conduct one fulfills bodhi; therefore expedient conduct is termed the upholding of great bodhi.’ The Yogācārabhūmi is also identical. Furthermore, since subsequent stages exist only because of the initial \[stage\], to say that one ‘ultimately cannot attain’—how is this not contradictory? Moreover, because of prior \[stages\], subsequent \[stages\] can exist. Why does the sūtra state: ‘Therefore, you should know that it is not because of generating the thought and vigorously cultivating energetic exertion that the bodhisattva-gotra exists’? Since this contradicts the meaning of the sūtra, it is an extreme error. Nor can one say that not lacking the generation of the thought is termed ‘lacking gotra’, for the sūtra states: ‘It is not because of generating the thought that the bodhisattva-gotra exists.’ The Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra-śāstra states: ‘Because a non-gotra person lacks gotra, even though they generate the thought and vigorously cultivate energetic exertion, they definitely do not consummate anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi.’ Therefore, one should know that even if one has not generated the thought and does not practice expedient means, one can still be termed an upholder of gotra. The Yogācārabhūmi states: ‘A person abiding in agotraka, because of lacking gotra, even though having the generation of the thought and the practice of preparatory application (prayoga) as a basis, is definitely incapable of enduring the fulfillment of anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi.’ By this principle, even if one has not yet generated the thought and not yet cultivated the preparatory applications practiced by bodhisattvas, if one possesses the gotra, one should know that in relation to that it can be termed ‘upholding’. Moreover, if one possesses the gotra, if one has not yet generated the thought, one cannot attain it swiftly; one cannot say that one ‘ultimately cannot attain’. Hence the Yogācārabhūmi immediately continues: ‘Furthermore, a person abiding in gotra, if they do not generate the thought and do not cultivate what is practiced by bodhisattvas, though possessing capacity, will not swiftly realize unsurpassable bodhi.’ Now, to explain ‘lacking gotra’ in terms of stage-divisions is therefore known to be mistaken. > > It is also claimed: “When the Yogācārabhūmi and other texts speak of lacking gotra, they are speaking with reference to adventitious gotra (āgantuka-gotra).” They establish this doctrine themselves: the mind is the original gotra (mūla-gotra), while practicing untainted seeds is adventitious gotra. They themselves concede that adventitious gotra is initially non-existent; when the Yogācārabhūmi and other texts say it is non-existent, that is the definitive meaning (nītārtha). How could it be judged as non-definitive? This arises from failing to know the two kinds of gotra: the first is the prakṛtistha-gotra, which exists dharmatā-wise; the second is the samudānīta-gotra, which is the dharmatā seed. That which, arising in manifestation according to conditions, perfumed into new seeds, is termed the gotra acquired through practice (samudānīta-gotra). The Bodhisattvasīla-sūtra states: ‘There are two kinds of gotra: the first is the original gotra, and the second is the adventitious gotra. As for the original gotra: the aggregates, realms, and six sense-spheres continue in succession; beginningless and endless, dharmatā is naturally so; this is called the original gotra.’ This is precisely what was stated earlier: ‘Therefore you should know that it is not because of generating the thought that the bodhisattva-gotra exists.’ The Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra states: ‘Even if one does not generate the thought and does not cultivate preparatory expedients, one can still be termed an upholder of gotra.’ ‘All wholesome dharmas cultivated are precisely the adventitious gotra.’ The Yogācārabhūmi states: ‘That which is obtained dharmatā-wise, transmitted successively from beginningless time, is termed prakṛtistha-gotra. If it is obtained from previously cultivating wholesome \[qualities\], this is termed samudānīta-gotra.’ Because dharmatā being naturally so is precisely the original gotra, the Bodhisattvasīla-sūtra says ‘it is not because of generating the thought that the bodhisattva-gotra exists’; because it is originally existent, it is spoken of as primary; the seeds of practice are newly arisen, and therefore called adventitious. The Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra-śāstra is identical. That \[opponent\], narrating a divergent interpretation and composing extensive sequences of objections, labored in vain. Furthermore, due to failing to understand the words ‘dharmatā is naturally so’, they take them to mean the tathatā-buddhadhātu. If it were tathatā, speaking of ‘beginningless and endless’ would indeed be reasonable. But how could the Bodhisattvasīla-sūtra speak of ‘successive continuity’, the Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra speak of ‘continuous transmission in succession’, and the Yogācārabhūmi speak of ‘transmitted successively’? Extensively citing texts and treatises \[to prove that\] this is the nature of tathatā wastes its effort, as will be demonstrated below. > > It is also claimed: “The second fascicle of the Saṃdhinirmocana says, ‘Those who are solely inclined toward tranquility (śamāyana) do not sit at the place of awakening (bodhimaṇḍa); in the residue-less realm, all sensations are forever extinguished.’ And the Yogācārabhūmi says, ‘In the residue-less realm, there is only tathatā and no activities.’ These are spoken in accordance with the Hīnayāna, because forty years earlier it had not yet been spoken that the two vehicles lack a real nirvāṇa, and that relinquishing the body of delimited portions (pariccheda-kāya) there is separately a body of transformation (pariṇāmikakāya) whereby sentient beings are without interruption. Since the Saṃdhinirmocana came before this, it conceded that the two vehicles’ inclination toward tranquility is real extinction.” > > This is also unreasonable. The Saṃdhinirmocana itself determines that sūtras such as the Prajñāpāramitā are still non-definitive (neyārtha), while this present third period is truly definitive (nītārtha). How could it then still follow the Hīnayāna teaching to say that the two vehicles have real extinction, such that Paramārthasamudgata praised it as truly definitive? Moreover, if it were not true, when Maitreya Bodhisattva in the Yogācārabhūmi cited it for decisive determination (viniścaya), could he have failed to understand and harmonize it? For later generations to only now understand how to harmonize the sūtras, judging that Maitreya discarded the real to propagate the provisional, is exceedingly improper. > > They also say: “First it was taught that the Buddha becomes extinguished, and later that he is unextinguished; one believes the later \[teaching of\] non-extinction to be definitive. First it was taught they are determined (niyata), and now they turn their minds. Why disbelieve only the statement that they are determined?” This is not of the same order. It is only the Hīnayāna teaching that definitively states the Buddha is extinguished; Mahāyāna sūtras and treatises all concede that this is not real. Those who are determined definitely do not turn their minds. Mahāyāna sūtras and treatises uniformly state that those who are determined do not turn their minds, and that transformation (pariṇāmikī) is not the receiving of a separate body. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 1.12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.1.12) - [Next: 1.13.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.1.13.2) - [Up: 1.13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.1.13) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863~en-mt.1.13.1) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [瑜伽師地論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.yogacara.yogacarabhumi*zh-xuanzang.35.15) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.1.13.1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.1.13.1) · Pramāṇa