[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [能顯中邊慧日論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863) › 1.15 # 能顯中邊慧日論 1.15 能顯中邊慧日論 1.15 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [1.15](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.1.15) 有義：理行佛性一切悉有。如《大雲經》等，如來常住，二亦無滅，一切眾生悉有佛性為宗。此不盡理。信理性遍，是真弟子；言事性遍，經無誠文。雖言得菩提心，能信亦是，非要能得佛果菩提方名得心。准所引文，無一切生皆成佛語。若第八體，是有漏性、無記法，非無漏因，天親《攝論》等皆悉不許。若言無二乘滅，據不定性由來共許，若論定性，此不極成。《涅槃經》云「若云四果皆得作佛，不解我意。」《涅槃》二十七云「一切悉有心，有心皆作佛」者，如說一乘，約同體、約同體意樂。三十六云「一切善不善無記等法盡名佛性」者，不善謂煩惱等。若是不善所依真如名為佛性，此則可爾。即以不善名為佛性，違《入大乘論》。彼云「汝癡無智，謂煩惱為因」等。如顯示中引煩惱若為菩提因，豈以不善為善法因？故名佛性，非正佛性，不可為證。若云：恒河中七人，不離佛性水，豈非行性者。不爾，此在理佛性水。若行性遍，悉皆得出，何名七人各一？言諸法諸道若因若果悉是佛性者，據一人具七說。以第一人有非無性而求有者，亦名常沒，如《佛性論》所會。闡提非無性者，又准此文，雖言常沒，許有出時，言一切生悉有佛性；非定一切，行證不遍故。又云：三十七云「為非佛性說於佛性。非佛性者，所謂牆壁瓦石無情之物。離如是等無情之者，是名佛性」者。此亦不爾。貪瞋癡等何名佛性？若以貪等能覆佛性者故知無性，煩惱覆真名為佛性，非必行性，何能顯行性亦同如性遍？若云：無行性何得名佛性？此亦不爾。瓦石全非，故對生簡。眾生無者，且陰不論。若云：據覆真故名佛性，瓦石等爾，何須簡者。此義不例，貪等是障、瓦石非障，故經說云「妙色如本住世間，智者於中得解脫。」又經云「如財在異方，得言有財者。」據有性者說。三十三云「非有如虛空，非無如兔角。」令觀行佛性，現雖有因而未得果，可增長故、非常有故，不如虛空；能為因故、果當得故，不如兔角。而言「說闡提無性，破虛空之常有。說闡提有性，破兔角之常無。」若言：一分法爾先有，即同虛空常有；一分畢竟無，即同兔角常無。如是說者，謗三寶也。不爾。汝若以真如及心為平等性，一切常有，即如虛空過。若云：據客性見無當有者。此亦不然，無因而生，非釋迦子。又復有漏非無漏因，過已數說。觀此經意，以因中非定有果，如虛空常有；非定無果，如兔角常無，果當有故，非先有故、能為因故、非如言詮顯現得故。又云：三十三云「聲聞緣覺八萬六萬四萬二萬十千劫住處名為涅槃，無上法主聖主住處名大涅槃。」准此二乘無實涅槃者。此亦不爾。經云「名為涅槃，不名大涅槃。」云何云無？又據不定後回者作如是說，非定性者。又云：若預流等位定願留身，八萬劫等及分段有餘。不應道理。何以故？《涅槃》十一病行中云「有五種人。第一人者，斷三結故得須陀洹，不落地獄畜生餓鬼，人天七返永盡諸苦，入於涅槃。乃至是人未來過八萬劫，得阿耨菩提」等。准此故知，非預流位分段有餘，依人天七返永盡諸苦，後八萬劫故。亦非留身，自謂為涅槃。故預流等位永盡諸苦入涅槃故者，此亦不爾，此談彼果有此功德，非要無學始得超大。若執經說人天七返永盡諸苦入於涅槃，豈不許彼得滅七生永盡諸苦耶？又若得涅槃永盡諸苦，無學得涅槃應不受變易，變易之身亦行苦故。雖入涅槃，言諸苦盡，不廢無學受變易身。雖言預流極七返生，亦許滅七得無學果。故知此文據功能說，或據一類取無學者。理實初果亦得回心即受變易，《佛地論》中有誠說故、《法華》有學并回心故。既許《法華》為了義說，何不信受有學回心？又《涅槃》第十九直云「須陀洹人八萬劫，乃至辟支佛十千劫。」第二十又亦直云「須陀洹人八萬劫等得阿耨菩提心，乃至辟支十千劫得菩提心。」云何經說羅漢、辟支，即許依文；說前三果，即執不許？一經所說尚致愛憎，取捨諸文寔為多謬。引《法華》及《法華論》言「唯一佛乘」，聲聞皆依佛。又《佛性論》「入聖道已生究竟心」，為破如是增上慢心，故知《法華》真實法教，世親菩薩為真實，何人更全將為不了者？不爾。何者？《勝鬘經》云「若如來隨彼所欲而方便說」，《解深密》云「若不知佛此密意」，《涅槃經》「我於一時說一行一緣一乘一道等，我諸弟子不解我意，言四果等皆得作佛。」《攝大乘論》無著自云「引攝一類」，天親、無性俱云「隱密」。釋迦、無著普世親師，判為不了；世親何人，將為了義？又天親判為了義，餘人何合將為不了？若爾，《解深密經》佛自說為了義，餘是何人，判為權密？又云：《密嚴》下卷云「若解脫者眾生界滅，即壞如來一切智性，去來今佛所知之法不得平等。又若涅槃眾生滅者，誰離於苦有無餘耶？降魔等事皆是妄說。是故當知，諸觀行者證於解脫，其身常住，離諸有蘊、滅諸習氣。譬如熱鐵投之冷水，熱勢雖除而鐵不壞」者。此文意別。初言若眾生界滅即壞如來一切智性，據真如說，名眾生界故。《寶性論》引《不增不減經》云「舍利弗！不離眾生界有法身，不離法身有眾生界。眾生界即法身，法身即眾生界。此二法者義一名異。」諸大乘經處處有文，故不可以證二乘者無餘不滅。若云：經云「證於解脫其身常住，離眾有蘊滅諸習氣」等以為證者，此亦不爾。此說如來若許二乘入無餘依亦如是者，與佛何殊，更須趣大？若云：許二乘無餘身智都滅，違《密嚴》上卷。彼涅槃若滅壞，眾生有終盡。眾生若有終，是亦有初際。原有非生法，而始依眾生。無有非眾生，尚生眾生界者。此亦不爾，此據理性，或說如來。若以經說眾生有終，應有初際。論眾生滅者，煩惱亦爾，煩惱即眾生。因果俱無始，豈以煩惱盡，例煩惱有初？若不許或終，諸佛有煩惱。雖許煩惱斷，而說或無初。雖復身終，何妨得無始？故彼經意約理性論。又《大法鼓經》云「迦葉白佛言：『世尊！眾生般涅槃者，為有盡耶？為無盡耶？』佛告迦葉：『眾生無有盡也。』白佛：『云何不盡？』佛言：『若眾生盡者，應有減損，此修多羅則為無義。是故迦葉！諸佛世尊般涅槃者悉皆常住。』」以是義故，諸佛世尊般涅槃者終不磨滅。不說二乘般涅槃者亦常不壞，或生界真如無盡。又《大莊嚴論》第一云「餘人善根無利他故，餘人善根涅槃時盡故。菩薩善根不爾，由此為因，種性最勝。」若二乘人入無餘依有善根在，如何言滅？無著、天親事慈尊，自復登極，喜言善根滅。如何不信？又云：《楞伽》第二〈五性〉中云「大慧！說三乘者，為發起修行地諸性差別，非究竟地。」又云「彼三種人聲聞緣覺究竟說得如來法身。」經說三人，是定性二乘及不定性故者。此亦不爾，彼經初定不定性以為三乘，復說第四不定性乘，准取不定。如無性中大悲菩薩，雖亦大乘性，由悲願異，更別說三，云非究竟，據不定說。若判說三是定二乘及不定者定亦起大，何須別說第四乘耶？下釋四卷《楞伽》，准知謬。《勝鬘經》、《寶性論》、《佛性論》等文，皆准前知。世親位居伏忍，蒙讚獨為指南。慈氏身住法雲，何不孤稱逐北？偏讚凡位菩薩說教為真，抑補處慈尊談法為非了，豈非過乎？ > Some hold that the buddhadhātu of principle and of practice is possessed by all alike. As in scriptures such as the Mahāmeghasūtra, their thesis is that the Tathāgata is eternal, the two \[vehicles\] also do not perish, and all sentient beings possess the buddhadhātu. This does not fully accord with reason. One who believes that the nature of principle is all-pervading is a true disciple; as for claiming that the nature of phenomenal practice is all-pervading, the scriptures contain no authoritative text for it. Although it is said that they attain the bodhicitta, being able to have faith is also \[so called\]; one need not be able to attain the bodhi of the fruit of buddhahood for it to be called attaining the mind. According to the texts cited, there are no words saying that all living beings become buddhas. As for the substance of the eighth \[consciousness\], it is defiled in nature and an indeterminate (avyākṛta) dharma; it is not an anāsrava cause, which Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha and others do not permit at all. If it is said that there is no extinction of the dviyāna, this is traditionally accepted only with respect to the aniyata-gotra; if one speaks of the niyata-gotra, this is not established by consensus. The Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra states: "If one says that all four fruits attain buddhahood, he does not understand my intention." As for fascicle twenty-seven of the Nirvāṇa stating: "All possess a mind; all that have a mind become buddhas," this is like speaking of the ekayāna: it is spoken in terms of having the same substance, or in terms of the intention regarding that same substance. As for fascicle thirty-six stating: "All wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate dharmas are entirely called buddhadhātu," "unwholesome" refers to the afflictions and the like. If it means that the tathatā on which the unwholesome relies is called buddhadhātu, this is admissible; but if one takes the unwholesome itself to be buddhadhātu, this contradicts the Introduction to the Mahāyāna (Madhyamāntavibhāga), which states: "You are foolish and devoid of wisdom, regarding afflictions as the cause," and so forth. As cited in the Manifestation \[Treatise\], if afflictions were the cause of bodhi, how could an unwholesome dharma be the cause of wholesome dharmas? Therefore, it is called buddhadhātu \[only by metaphor\], not the direct buddhadhātu, and cannot serve as proof. If one says: "The seven persons in the Ganges do not leave the water of buddhadhātu; how is this not the nature of practice?" It is not so: this is in the water of the buddhadhātu of principle. If the nature of practice were all-pervading, all would emerge; why would the seven persons each be distinct? As for the statement that all dharmas and all paths, whether causes or fruits, are buddhadhātu, this is spoken with reference to a single person possessing all seven. Because the first person, not lacking the gotra yet seeking existence, is also called "ever-drowned," as explained in the Buddhagotraśāstra. That the icchantika is not without the gotra is also, according to this text, \[said because\] although called ever-drowned, it is allowed that they have a time of emergence, and it is said that all beings possess the buddhadhātu; it is not definitely all \[without exception\], because practice and realization are not all-pervading. Again, it is said: fascicle thirty-seven says: "For the sake of what is not buddhadhātu, buddhadhātu is spoken of. What is not buddhadhātu refers to walls, tiles, stones, and insentient things. That which is free from such insentient things is called buddhadhātu." This too is not so. How could greed, anger, delusion, and so forth be called buddhadhātu? If greed and the like can cover the buddhadhātu and therefore one knows there is no \[practice\] nature, then afflictions covering the real being called buddhadhātu is not necessarily the nature of practice; how can this demonstrate that the nature of practice is also all-pervading like the nature of tathatā? If one says: "Without the nature of practice, how could it be called buddhadhātu?" This too is not so. Tiles and stones are wholly not \[the nature\]; therefore they are distinguished in contrast to living beings. As for sentient beings who lack it, the skandhas are temporarily set aside without discussion. If one says: "It is called buddhadhātu because it covers the real, and tiles and stones are also like this, so why need they be excluded?" This sense is not analogous: greed and the like are obstacles, whereas tiles and stones are not obstacles. Hence the sūtra states: "Wondrous form abides in the world according to its fundamental nature; the wise attain liberation therein." Furthermore, the sūtra states: "Just as when wealth is in another land, one can say that there is wealth." This is spoken with respect to those who possess the gotra. Fascicle thirty-three says: "It is not existent like empty space, nor non-existent like a rabbit's horn." This bids one observe the buddhadhātu of practice: although it now has a cause, it has not yet attained the fruit; because it can increase and is not eternal, it is not like empty space; because it can serve as a cause and its fruit will certainly be attained, it is not like a rabbit's horn. Yet they say: "Speaking of the icchantika lacking the gotra refutes the eternal existence of empty space; speaking of the icchantika possessing the gotra refutes the eternal non-existence of a rabbit's horn. If one says that one part exists previously by dharmatā, this is identical to the eternal existence of empty space; if one part is completely non-existent, this is identical to the eternal non-existence of a rabbit's horn. Speaking in this way slanders the Three Jewels." It is not so. If you take tathatā and mind to be an equal nature, eternally existing in all, that is precisely the fault of being like empty space. If one says: "It is viewed in terms of an adventitious nature that what is non-existent will come to exist," this too is incorrect: arising without a cause does not belong to a son of Śākya. Moreover, the sāsrava is not the cause of the anāsrava; this fault has already been stated several times. Observing the intent of this scripture, it is because in the causal stage the fruit is not determinately existent like the eternal existence of empty space, nor determinately non-existent like the eternal non-existence of a rabbit's horn; because the fruit will certainly exist, because it is not previously existent, because it can serve as a cause, and because it is not attained as an explicit manifestation as verbal expressions denote. Again, they say: fascicle thirty-three states: "The dwelling place of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas for eighty thousand, sixty thousand, forty thousand, twenty thousand, and ten thousand kalpas is called nirvāṇa; the dwelling place of the unsurpassed Lord of the Dharma, the Noble Lord, is called the Great Nirvāṇa." Inferring from this, the dviyāna have no real nirvāṇa. This too is not so. The sūtra says: "It is called nirvāṇa, not called the Great Nirvāṇa." How can you say it is non-existent? Furthermore, such a statement is made in terms of the indeterminate who later turn their minds, not those of determinate gotra. Again, they say: "If in stages such as the stream-enterer they retain their bodies through determinate vows for eighty thousand kalpas and the like, as well as the remainder of fragmentary \[samsāra\], this does not accord with reason. Why is that? In the 'Practices regarding Illness' of Nirvāṇa eleven, it says: 'There are five kinds of persons. The first person, because of severing the three fetters, attains srotāpanna, does not fall into the hells, beasts, or hungry ghosts, and after seven returns among humans and devas, eternally exhausts all suffering and enters nirvāṇa. Even up to this person passing eighty thousand kalpas in the future, he attains anuttarā bodhi,' and so on. Inferring from this, one knows that this is not the remainder of fragmentary \[samsāra\] in the stream-enterer stage, because it is based on seven returns among humans and devas to eternally exhaust all suffering, after which are the eighty thousand kalpas. Nor is it retaining the body and personally calling it nirvāṇa. Therefore, it is because stages such as the stream-enterer eternally exhaust all suffering and enter nirvāṇa." This too is not so. This discusses that fruit possessing this merit; it is not necessary that only the non-learner (aśaikṣa) first begins to leap beyond to the Great \[Vehicle\]. If you cling to the scripture's statement that with seven returns among humans and devas one eternally exhausts all suffering and enters nirvāṇa, do you not concede that they attain the extinction of the seven rebirths and eternally exhaust all suffering? Moreover, if attaining nirvāṇa eternally exhausts all suffering, then when a non-learner attains nirvāṇa, they should not undergo transformation \[birth\], because the transformational body also entails suffering of conditioned existence (saṃskāra-duḥkhatā). Although entering nirvāṇa is spoken of as exhausting all suffering, this does not preclude the non-learner from undergoing a transformational body. Although it is said that the stream-enterer has at most seven returns of birth, it is also permitted that upon extinguishing the seven, they attain the fruit of a non-learner. Therefore, one knows that this text speaks in terms of efficacy, or in terms of a class that grasps the non-learner \[attainment\]. In truth of principle, the first fruit can also turn their mind and immediately undergo transformation, because there is an explicit statement in the Buddhabhūmiśāstra, and because the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka includes learners who also turn their minds. Since you accept the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka as an explicit teaching (nītārtha), why do you not faithfully accept that learners turn their minds? Furthermore, Nirvāṇa fascicle nineteen directly states: "The srotāpanna person \[takes\] eighty thousand kalpas, up to the pratyekabuddha \[taking\] ten thousand kalpas." Fascicle twenty also directly states: "The srotāpanna person after eighty thousand kalpas and so on attains the bodhicitta, up to the pratyekabuddha after ten thousand kalpas attaining the bodhicitta." How is it that when the scripture speaks of arhats and pratyekabuddhas, you immediately accept it according to the text, but when it speaks of the previous three fruits, you cling and do not accept it? Bringing forth liking and aversion even to what is taught in a single scripture, your selections and rejections among the various texts are truly full of errors! Citing the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkopadeśa stating "there is only one buddha vehicle" and that śrāvakas all rely on the Buddha, and also the Buddhagotraśāstra saying "having entered the noble path, they give rise to the mind of finality"—that this was to destroy such arrogance, and therefore one knows the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka is the real Dharma teaching, and Bodhisattva Vasubandhu regarded it as real—\[you ask\] who would entirely take it as non-final? It is not so. Why? The Śrīmālāsūtra says: "If the Tathāgata speaks expediently in accordance with what they desire"; the Saṃdhinirmocana says: "If one does not know this esoteric intention (saṃdhi) of the Buddha"; the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra says: "At one time I taught one practice, one condition, one vehicle, one path, and so forth, but my disciples did not understand my intention, and said that the four fruits and others all attain buddhahood." In the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, Asaṅga himself says it is "to attract and guide a certain class," and Vasubandhu and Asabhāva both say it is "cryptic." Śākyamuni and Asaṅga are the universal teachers of Vasubandhu, and they judged it to be non-final; who is Vasubandhu that he could take it as final? Moreover, if Vasubandhu judged it to be final, how could others properly take it as non-final? If so, then in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra the Buddha himself spoke of it as final; who are the others that they should judge it to be expedient and esoteric? Again, they say: the lower fascicle of the Ghanavyūhasūtra says: "If upon liberation the realm of sentient beings were extinguished, that would destroy the omniscience of the Tathāgata, and the dharmas known by the past, future, and present buddhas would not be equal. Moreover, if in nirvāṇa sentient beings are extinguished, who is free from suffering, having remainder or without remainder? Deeds such as subduing Māra would all be false speech. Therefore one should know that when all contemplative practitioners realize liberation, their bodies are eternal, free from the aggregates of existence, and their propensities (vāsanā) extinguished. Just as when hot iron is cast into cold water, though the heat is removed, the iron is not destroyed." The intention of this passage is different. The opening words—that if the realm of sentient beings were extinguished, that would destroy the omniscience of the Tathāgata—are spoken in terms of tathatā, because it is called the realm of sentient beings. The Ratnagotravibhāga cites the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśasūtra: "Śāriputra! Apart from the realm of sentient beings, there is no dharmakāya; apart from the dharmakāya, there is no realm of sentient beings. The realm of sentient beings is itself the dharmakāya; the dharmakāya is itself the realm of sentient beings. These two dharmas are one in meaning and different in name." There are passages everywhere in the various Mahāyāna scriptures, so this cannot be used as proof that the dviyāna are not extinguished in the remainderless \[nirvāṇa\]. If one says: "The scripture says: 'Realizing liberation, their bodies are eternal, free from the aggregates of existence, and their propensities extinguished,' and so forth, which is taken as proof"—this too is not so. This speaks of the Tathāgata. If one allows that when the dviyāna enter the remainderless element they are also like this, how would they differ from a buddha, that they should further need to proceed to the Great \[Vehicle\]? If one says: "Allowing that the body and wisdom of the dviyāna are completely extinguished in the remainderless contradicts the upper fascicle of the Ghanavyūha: 'If that nirvāṇa were extinction and destruction, sentient beings would have a final end. If sentient beings had an end, they would also have a beginning point. Originally there were non-living dharmas, which only then began to rely on sentient beings. There would be nothing that is not a sentient being, yet still born into the realm of sentient beings.'" This too is not so; this is spoken in terms of the nature of principle, or spoken of the Tathāgata. If one argues from the scripture's statement that sentient beings having an end means they should have a beginning point, and debates the extinction of sentient beings, the afflictions are also like this: afflictions are sentient beings. Both causes and fruits are beginningless; how could the exhaustion of afflictions be analogized to afflictions having a beginning? If one does not allow that afflictions have an end, then all buddhas would have afflictions. Although one allows that afflictions are severed, yet one says afflictions have no beginning. Though the body has an end, what prevents it from having no beginning? Therefore the intent of that scripture is discussed in terms of the nature of principle. Furthermore, the Mahābherīhārakasūtra states: "Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha, saying: 'World-Honoured One! When sentient beings enter parinirvāṇa, is there an exhaustion, or is there no exhaustion?' The Buddha told Kāśyapa: 'Sentient beings have no exhaustion.' He addressed the Buddha: 'How are they not exhausted?' The Buddha said: 'If sentient beings were exhausted, there would be decrease, and this sūtra would be meaningless. Therefore, Kāśyapa! When all Buddha World-Honoured Ones enter parinirvāṇa, they are all eternal.'" For this reason, when all Buddha World-Honoured Ones enter parinirvāṇa, they are never extinguished. It does not say that when the dviyāna enter parinirvāṇa they are also eternally indestructible; or \[it means\] the tathatā of the realm of sentient beings is inexhaustible. Again, fascicle one of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra states: "Because the wholesome roots of other persons do not benefit others, and because the wholesome roots of other persons are exhausted at the time of nirvāṇa. The wholesome roots of a bodhisattva are not like this; by this as the cause, their gotra is supreme." If when persons of the dviyāna enter the remainderless element wholesome roots remain, how could it say they are extinguished? Asaṅga and Vasubandhu served Maitreya and personally ascended to the supreme \[stages\]; they joyfully said that wholesome roots are extinguished. How could you not believe it? Again, they say: in the second fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra, in the chapter on the "Five Gotras," it states: "Mahāmati! Speaking of the three vehicles is to initiate the differences of the gotras on the grounds of practice, not the ultimate ground." It also says: "Those three kinds of persons—śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas—ultimately are said to attain the dharmakāya of the Tathāgata." The scripture speaks of three persons, which are the determinate dviyāna and the indeterminate \[gotra\]. This too is not so. That scripture initially takes the determinate and indeterminate gotras as three vehicles, and further speaks of a fourth vehicle of the indeterminate gotra, following and taking the indeterminate. Like the great-compassion bodhisattva among those without gotra, who although also of the Mahāyāna gotra, due to the difference of compassionate vows, is separately spoken of as three; saying it is non-ultimate is spoken in terms of the indeterminate. If you judge that speaking of the three refers to the determinate dviyāna and the indeterminate, and that the determinate also give rise to the Great \[Vehicle\], why would one need to speak separately of a fourth vehicle? The later explanation of the four-fascicle Laṅkāvatāra will show the error accordingly. Passages such as the Śrīmālāsūtra, Ratnagotravibhāga, Buddhagotraśāstra, and so forth are all to be understood following the preceding. Vasubandhu's stage was that of suppressing forbearance (kṣānti); he received praise as uniquely a guiding compass. Maitreya's person abides in the Cloud of Dharma (dharmameghā); why do you not exclusively proclaim him as the supreme guide? To praise exclusively a bodhisattva of ordinary stage as teaching the true doctrine, while demoting Maitreya, the next buddha to succeed, as speaking non-final teachings—is this not a grave error? > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 1.14](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.1.14) - [Next: 1.16](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.1.16) - [Up: 1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.1) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863~en-mt.1.15) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [大乘莊嚴經論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.yogacara.mahayanasutralankara!bhasya*zh-prabhakaramitra.1.85) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.1.15](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.1.15) · Pramāṇa