[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [能顯中邊慧日論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863) › 1.20 # 能顯中邊慧日論 1.20 能顯中邊慧日論 1.20 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [1.20](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.1.20) 有義：佛性體有二種，一理、二事。理因性者，第一義空，第一義空與法身為正因，亦與報身為緣因。若體生相，亦與報身為正因，報身本體是第一義空故。此不應理，若第一義空是法身正因者，為生了。若為生因，法身是常，常非因生。《涅槃》十三云「若有諸法從緣生者，則知無常。是諸外道無有一法不從緣生。善男子！佛性無生無滅。」乃至云「非陰界入之所攝持，是故名常。」第九亦云「如是光明名為智慧，智慧者即是常住，常住之法無有因緣。」又云「涅槃之體非本無今有。若涅槃體本無今有者，則非無漏常住之法。」涅槃非本無今有，如何因生？又高貴德王菩薩問：「凡因莊嚴而得成者，悉名無常，涅槃應爾。如來為答，說因有五：一正因、二和合、三住因、四增長、五遠離，涅槃之體非如是等五因所成。」法身即涅槃，如何說有因？又因果位異名殊，體常無別亦無增減，如何真如還與真如與為因耶？《如來藏經》廣說喻況明本具足，為障所覆，說法為因，令得開曉，亦非了因。《涅槃》十九云「復有二因，一作、二了。三十七品波羅蜜等，望於涅槃是名了因。」又三十三云「遠離果者，即是涅槃。遠離諸煩惱一切善業，是涅槃因。因有二種，一近、二遠。近即三解脫，遠則無量世所修善法。」乃至云「是故涅槃唯有了因，無有生因。」此約理事，菩提涅槃智斷門別不同。《涅槃》第二「大般涅槃智斷，俱名大涅槃故。又真如理望法身位，十因四緣是。何者？攝得為正因。」又復自引《密嚴經》云「如來清淨藏，亦名無垢智。」《華嚴經》「無相智、無礙智具足在於眾生身中。」《如來藏經》云「煩惱身中有如來藏，常無染污、德相備足，如我無異。」既云德相具足如我無異，如何為因？只可言教修行為因，故《如來藏經》云「佛見眾生如來藏已，欲令開敷，為說經法，除滅煩惱，顯現佛性。」故天親《般若論》云「於法為了因，亦為餘生因。」經云「一切諸佛從此經出，一切諸佛從此經生。」有說：真如即法身體，無說真如為真如因，故成妄說。謂有說如為了因者，果中說因名，非如即了因。若如能了，應自出染，何待餘緣？然《佛性論》云「應得因者，以有真如。智起斷惑，真如方顯。」是所應得之因由也，非是生了。若名親因，十因四因、生了何攝？又《佛性論》云「應得者，必當可現，名為應得。豈能自顯？顯在智故。」又云：若體生相亦與報身為正因，報身本體是第一義空故者。不爾，此談其體。雖說真如為法界，界者因義亦自性義。因者非生，但為依因，故說真如為迷悟依。《佛性論》云「為道生依，由有真如方有俗事，處處文說。」又《佛性論》云「一有體能生有體，一有體能生無體，此即真實。若為報佛正因，即二有體能生有體，何故云一？」亦同《瑜伽》圓成不生法故。又若以真如為正因者，何故《佛性論》但云「由加行故，論因圓滿及果圓滿。因圓滿者，謂福慧行。」又云「圓滿因者，即加行因。」不云加行因即應得因故，正因者即是福智。不爾，亦說第一義空為染法體，豈許真如與煩惱為正因？若許爾者，違《涅槃經》。三十三云「若有說言：一切眾生定有佛性、常樂我淨，不作不生煩惱因緣，故不可見。當知是人謗佛法僧。」明說真如不作不生煩惱因緣，非謗三寶。既許真如若體生相應為報身正因者，既體生相，應生一切法為其正因，豈簡染淨？若爾，便為大謗三寶。若云言與報身為正因者，非親生報身者。既不親生，何名正因？如喻大地。大地若無，百草不生。雖依地有，不說大地為百卉正因。真如准知。 > One position holds: The essence of buddhadhātu is of two kinds: first, principle; second, phenomena. As for the causal gotra of principle, it is the emptiness of the ultimate truth; the emptiness of the ultimate truth is the pradhāna-hetu for the dharmakāya, and is also the pratyaya-hetu for the saṃbhogakāya. If essence produces marks, it is also the pradhāna-hetu for the saṃbhogakāya, because the fundamental essence of the saṃbhogakāya is the emptiness of the ultimate truth. This is not reasonable. If the emptiness of the ultimate truth were the pradhāna-hetu of the dharmakāya, would it be a janaka-hetu or a jñāpaka-hetu? If it were a janaka-hetu, the dharmakāya is eternal, and what is eternal is not produced by a cause. The Nirvāṇa\[sūtra\], fascicle 13, states: "If there are dharmas produced from conditions, one knows they are impermanent. Among these non-Buddhists, there is no dharma that is not produced from conditions. Good son! The buddhadhātu has neither production nor cessation," down to: "It is not subsumed or retained by the aggregates, realms, or sense fields; therefore it is called eternal." Fascicle 9 also states: "Such radiance is called wisdom; wisdom is eternal and abiding, and an eternal and abiding dharma has no causes or conditions." It also states: "The essence of nirvāṇa is not something that was previously absent and now exists. If the essence of nirvāṇa were previously absent and now exists, it would not be an anāsrava, eternal, and abiding dharma." Since nirvāṇa is not something previously absent and now existing, how could it be produced by a cause? Furthermore, Bodhisattva Superior and Noble King of Virtue asked: "Whatever is achieved through the adornment of causes is called impermanent; nirvāṇa should be likewise." The Tathāgata answered by stating that causes are of five kinds: "first, the pradhāna-hetu; second, the concordant cause; third, the sustaining cause; fourth, the augmenting cause; fifth, the separating cause. The essence of nirvāṇa is not accomplished by these five causes." The dharmakāya is precisely nirvāṇa; how could it be said to have a cause? Moreover, the stages of cause and result are distinct and their designations differ, but their essence is eternally without difference and without increase or decrease; how could tathatā in turn serve as a cause for tathatā? The Tathāgatagarbhasūtra extensively uses parables to illuminate that it is fundamentally complete, and that because it is covered by hindrances, the teaching of the Dharma is spoken of as a cause to bring about awakening; neither is it a jñāpaka-hetu. The Nirvāṇa\[sūtra\], fascicle 19, states: "Furthermore, there are two causes: first, the productive cause; second, the revelatory cause. The thirty-seven factors of awakening, the pāramitās, and so forth, in relation to nirvāṇa, are termed revelatory causes." Fascicle 33 also states: "The result of separation is precisely nirvāṇa. The separation from all defilements and all wholesome karmas are the causes of nirvāṇa. Causes are of two kinds: first, proximate; second, remote. Proximate refers to the three liberations; remote refers to the wholesome dharmas cultivated over immeasurable lifetimes," down to: "Therefore, nirvāṇa has only a jñāpaka-hetu and has no janaka-hetu." This is explained in terms of principle and phenomena, and the different approaches of bodhi and nirvāṇa, wisdom and abandonment. Fascicle 2 of the Nirvāṇa\[sūtra\] \[states\] that "Great Parinirvāṇa encompasses both wisdom and abandonment, because both are called Great Nirvāṇa." Furthermore, with respect to the principle of tathatā in relation to the stage of the dharmakāya, which of the ten causes and four conditions subsumes it so that it could be taken as a pradhāna-hetu? Moreover, \[that position\] cites on its own the Ghanavyūhasūtra: "The pure garbha of the Tathāgata is also named immaculate wisdom"; and the Avataṃsakasūtra: "Markless wisdom and unhindered wisdom are fully present within the bodies of sentient beings"; and the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra: "Within the body of defilements there is a tathāgatagarbha, eternally unpolluted, fully endowed with virtues and marks, no different from myself." Since it says it is fully endowed with virtues and marks and is no different from myself, how could it be a cause? It can only be that verbal teaching and cultivation serve as the cause. Hence the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra says: "The Buddha, having seen the tathāgatagarbha of sentient beings, desires to cause it to unfold, and preaches the scriptures and Dharma for them, eliminating defilements and manifesting the buddhadhātu." Thus Vasubandhu's Prajñā\[-pāramitopadeśa\]-śāstra states: "With respect to phenomena, it is a jñāpaka-hetu, and it is also a janaka-hetu for the rest." The sūtra states: "All Buddhas emerge from this sūtra; all Buddhas are born from this sūtra." Some say: Tathatā is precisely the essence of the dharmakāya; no one says that tathatā is the cause of tathatā, and so it becomes a false assertion. As for those who claim that tathatā is a jñāpaka-hetu, the name of the cause is spoken of within the result; it is not that tathatā is itself the jñāpaka-hetu. If tathatā could reveal itself, it ought to emerge from defilement by itself; why would it depend on other conditions? However, the Buddhagotraśāstra states: "The cause of what ought to be attained is because tathatā exists. When wisdom arises and cuts off delusion, tathatā is then revealed." This is the reason for what ought to be attained; it is not a janaka-hetu or jñāpaka-hetu. If it is termed a sākṣāt-hetupratyaya, where among the ten causes, four conditions, janaka-hetu, and jñāpaka-hetu would it be subsumed? Furthermore, the Buddhagotraśāstra says: "'What ought to be attained' means that it must certainly be manifestable, hence it is termed 'what ought to be attained.' How could it reveal itself? Its manifestation depends on wisdom." It was also stated: "If essence produces marks, it is also the pradhāna-hetu for the saṃbhogakāya, because the fundamental essence of the saṃbhogakāya is the emptiness of the ultimate truth." This is not so; this speaks of its essence. Although tathatā is spoken of as the dharmadhātu, dhātu has the meaning of cause and also the meaning of svabhāva. Being a cause does not mean producing; it is merely a support-cause; therefore, tathatā is said to be the support for delusion and awakening. The Buddhagotraśāstra says: "It is the support for the arising of the Path; because tathatā exists, conventional phenomena can exist, as stated in texts throughout." Furthermore, the Buddhagotraśāstra says: "One existent essence can produce an existent essence, and one existent essence can produce a non-existent essence; this is reality. If it were the pradhāna-hetu for the saṃbhogabuddha, then two existent essences would produce an existent essence; why would it say 'one'?" This also agrees with the Yogācāra\[bhūmi\] that the pariniṣpanna does not produce dharmas. Moreover, if tathatā were taken as the pradhāna-hetu, why does the Buddhagotraśāstra merely say: "Due to preparatory application, the treatise discusses the perfection of the cause and the perfection of the result. As for the perfection of the cause, it refers to the practice of merit and wisdom." It also says: "The cause of perfection is precisely the cause of preparatory application." It does not say that the cause of preparatory application is the cause of what ought to be attained; therefore, the pradhāna-hetu is precisely merit and wisdom. If this were not so, the emptiness of the ultimate truth would also be said to be the essence of defiled dharmas; could one allow that tathatā is the pradhāna-hetu for defilements? If one were to allow this, it would contradict the Nirvāṇasūtra. Fascicle 33 says: "If someone says: 'All sentient beings definitely possess buddhadhātu, which is eternal, blissful, self, and pure; it does not make or produce the causes and conditions of defilements, and therefore it cannot be seen'—know that this person slanders the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha." It clearly states that tathatā does not make or produce the causes and conditions of defilements, and \[saying so\] is not slandering the Three Jewels. Since you allow that if essence produces marks, tathatā should be the pradhāna-hetu for the saṃbhogakāya, then since essence produces marks, it should produce all dharmas and be their pradhāna-hetu; how could it discriminate between defiled and pure? If that were so, it would be a great slander of the Three Jewels. If it is said that in saying it is the pradhāna-hetu for the saṃbhogakāya, it does not directly produce the saṃbhogakāya: since it does not directly produce it, how can it be called a pradhāna-hetu? It is like the analogy of the great earth. If the great earth did not exist, the hundreds of grasses would not grow. Although they exist depending on the earth, the great earth is not said to be the pradhāna-hetu for the hundreds of plants. Tathatā should be understood in the same way. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 1.19](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.1.19) - [Next: 1.21](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.1.21) - [Up: 1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.1) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863~en-mt.1.20) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [大般涅槃經](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.mahayanasutra.mahaparinirvana-mahayana*zh-t375.13.3) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.1.20](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.1.20) · Pramāṇa